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Abstract 
 
The problematical notion of the ‘Armenian question’ has become a political and 
linguistic tool for the official genocide denial ever since the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic, and has come to stand for the controversy that exists around the denial and 
recognition of the Armenian Genocide at both national and international levels. This 
research explores how the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkey opens up a discursive space in 
which various forms of Turkish nationalism are constructed and reproduced, and 
addresses multifaceted narratives from members of the Armenian community. By 
employing this term I aim to challenge the attempt to decontextualize collective acts of 
violence against Armenians, restricting them to the period of the Ottoman Empire, and 
indicate how this issue goes far beyond the politics of genocide. The objective of my 
research is to point out particular production and consumption phases of the Armenian 
question in Turkey. The production side focuses on three national newspapers in order 
to unveil overlapping and divergent discursive strategies in their coverage of three 
recent incidents, namely the assassination of Hrant Dink, the murder of Sevag Balıkçı, 
and the public protest against the Khojaly Massacre. In contrast, the consumption side 
embraces the perceptions and experiences of particular members of the Armenian 
community in Istanbul with respect to past and present occurrences. This research thus 
uncovers consistencies and contradictions between news discourse and the responses of 
the Armenian interviewees concerning three particular events and sheds light on the 
asymmetrical production and consumption patterns of the Armenian question in 
Turkey. Drawing on data from both a critical discourse analysis of three cases in three 
Turkish national newspapers and forty-five semi-structured interviews with Armenians, 
this qualitative study seeks to contribute to the growing body of research on the 
Armenian question and Turkish nationalism.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The co-existence of practices between different identities and an imposed national 
identity are important indicators for a nation state’s problematic treatment of minority 
groups within its physical and mental borders. Past atrocities, particularly those 
committed for the sake of national unity/security and identity, reveal how the 
ideological agendas of a nation state play roles in the acts of violence committed against 
distinct ethnic and religious communities. In this respect, nation-building processes in 
post-conflict and post-colonial settings develop their own strategies of dealing with 
divergent groups and their peculiarities. The formation of the nation state in the Turkish 
Republic which, among many other states, became the successor state of the 
multicultural and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, also resulted in conflict-ridden relations 
with minority groups. The organic link between past injustices perpetrated during the 
Ottoman Empire period and continuing state violence in Turkey against its particular 
unwelcome citizens (Armenians, Jews, Kurds, etc.) also stands for current patterns of 
oppression and discrimination. More specifically, the mass killings, deportation, torture 
and starvation of the Armenian people under the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the state-sponsored discriminatory policies and 
attitudes of consecutive governments in Turkey since 1923 towards Armenians, 
epitomise deep-seated official prejudices against the members of this community.  
The focal point of the discussions, however, mainly revolves around questions of 
whether those violent incidents should be called a ‘genocide’ or ‘deportation’ and 
whether the Turkish Republic should be held responsible for the unjust acts of its 
predecessor. The tension between the official denial of the Turkish state and the 
decisions of some other states and international bodies to identify historical atrocities 
against Armenians as genocide also confines the issue to the politics of genocide 
recognition at both national and international levels. This dichotomist way of 
understanding genocide tends to overlook the collective and distinct sufferings of 
Armenians and the ongoing manifest and latent forms of state violence legitimised 
through national institutions and narratives. In addition to the political calculus of the 
state and the dynamics of international relations, one of the main reasons that might lie 
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behind these partial accounts is the fixed conception of genocide as an ‘event’ and ‘the 
outcome of a process’ (Rosenberg, 2012: 16-17). In this study, though, genocide is 
viewed as a process which is ‘a temporal and spatial unfolding of ambiguous actions, 
shifting contexts, and actors with multiple and contradictory motives’ (Fujii, 2009: 11). 
Thus, from the very beginning this research maintains a stance against the official 
denialist ideology, and more importantly the discursive reformulation of the Armenian 
Genocide as the ‘Armenian question’. In broad terms, the notion of the ‘Armenian 
question’ is the constituent element for the construction and reproduction of the 
rhetoric of the state to restrict collective violence against Armenians to a specific 
temporality and spatiality, and to present the Armenian community as the major actor in 
the extension of this ‘issue’ due to their unending demands for genocide recognition. 
However, by employing this term I intend to move beyond this perspective, which 
endeavours to downplay the magnitude and scope of the multifaceted process of the 
Armenian Genocide. My research indicates that this ‘issue’ is not solely of particular 
concern to Armenians in Turkey and Armenia or the Armenian Diaspora and their 
reparations claims, but that it also uncovers diverse forms of Turkish nationalism as 
primary components of the genocidal process in today’s Turkey.  
The expression ‘genocidal process’ on the one hand refers to multifaceted practices of 
destruction, including the mass executions of Armenian elites, the expropriation of 
Armenian property and capital transfer to the state, deportations, forced assimilation 
through conversion to Islam, the kidnapping of women and children, the construction of 
an artificially created famine region, and the destruction of material culture such as 
churches and buildings (Üngör, 2013). On the other hand, this phrase denotes the 
permanent actions and policies of the Turkish state after the period of the Armenian 
Genocide (1915-1917) and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire aimed at eradication of 
the Armenian presence and its heritage, and more crucially the promotion of a genocidal 
ideology in both institutional and public spaces. In other words, I consider the genocidal 
ideology that structures genocide as ‘natural, necessary, rational and/or obligatory’ 
(Freeman, 1991: 189) and adopted by the perpetrators as an integral part of the existing 
genocidal process in Turkey.  
This also comes to mean the interconnected relationship between genocidal ideology 
and Turkish nationalism in different settings and instances. The understanding of 
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Turkish nationalism held by the Young Turks, as the perpetrators of the Armenian 
Genocide, was based on an ‘ethnoreligious homogenisation’ which can be defined as the 
‘cleansing’ and assimilation of non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities (Akçam, 
2012:29). By taking into account the catalyst role of this perception of Turkish 
nationalism for the genocide, this research in the most general sense addresses the 
‘Armenian question’ with a specific emphasis on its current interactions with various 
forms of Turkish nationalism. In order to expose the patterns of this problematic 
encounter, as a first step I will explore how the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkey creates a 
discursive space in which Turkish nationalisms are constructed and reproduced in the 
national newspapers. As a second step of this research I will disclose the repercussions 
of this ‘issue’ for Armenians as citizens of the Turkish Republic and their engagements 
with the complex and fluid dimensions of the genocidal process.  
For a comprehensive picture of the research the first part of this introduction chapter 
will clarify the aims of the study. In the following parts I will describe the research 
questions and research design that provided the basis for this research and highlight 
other bodies of research that are related to the theoretical framework of this study. 
Finally, I will present the outline of the subsequent chapters. Based on this plan, I 
attempt to point out the originality of this research and its potential contributions to the 
academic literature on genocide studies, nationalism, media representations and 
minority groups.  
1.1. Aims of the Study  
Before setting out the core objectives of my research there are a few conceptual points 
that need to be underlined. Given the shifting and ‘paradoxical nature of nationalism as a 
diversity of types with an overall unity’ (Smith, 1969: 119) this research is not built 
upon a singular definition and/or understanding of Turkish nationalism. In order to 
reflect this fragmented and plural understanding of nationalism, I prefer to use 
‘diverse/various’ forms of Turkish nationalism or ‘Turkish nationalisms’ throughout the 
thesis. In addition to the commonalities between varieties of nationalism in distinct 
spaces and at different phases, the forms of nationalism in the Turkish case have their 
own particularities. Accordingly, this research is mostly concerned with the ways in 
which these forms of Turkish nationalism are unveiled in their ‘confrontation’ with the 
‘Armenian question’. To be more precise, I will especially concentrate on the 
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construction and reproduction of Turkish nationalist discourses in media 
representations by taking into account the heterogeneous and non-monolithic 
composition of Turkish nationalisms.  
Secondly, the frequently employed terms ‘Armenians in Turkey’ and ‘the Armenian 
community’ in the following parts of the study are inclusive of Armenians living in 
Istanbul as citizens of the Turkish Republic. In contrast, in the public and academic 
debates and in the mass media the expressions ‘Turkish-Armenian’ and ‘Turkish citizen 
of Armenian descent’ are largely employed. However, from my point of view both of 
them imply the so-called ‘achievements’ of suppressive and assimilatory state policies 
that have propagated ethnic and religious homogenisation within national borders. 
Moreover, the stress on ‘Armenian descent’ signifies the importance of ethnic origin and 
at the same time the difference of being an Armenian from being ‘pure’ Turkish. 
Therefore, I decided to refer to more politically correct words, such as ‘Armenians in 
Turkey’ and ‘the Armenian community’. However, it should be noted that there are three 
inherent problems in using these terms, namely the assumption of a homogeneous 
community, the ignorance of ‘disguised’ Armenians, and the claim to represent all 
members of the Armenian community. Although I pick out these identifications for 
practical reasons, basically, this research takes note of significant intra-group disparities 
in terms of social class, age, gender, political and educational background and other 
variables. This study also does not involve the perceptions and experiences of Islamised 
Armenians in Turkey. Consequently, this research investigates and exemplifies only a 
sample of the Armenian population in Istanbul and undoubtedly it is unable to represent 
the status and standpoints of the entire community.  
Bearing in mind these points, the main goal of my research is to scrutinise particular 
‘production’ and ‘consumption’ phases of the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkey. My 
particular focus is on the contemporary period as well as issues concerning the 
Armenian question. The distinctiveness of my approach towards this issue mainly lies in 
an attempt to bring these two processes together. As there are many actors engaging 
with the Armenian question namely, the Turkish state, Armenians in Turkey, the 
Armenian state, Armenian Diaspora as well as civil society groups, national institutions 
and international community, this research centres around designated national 
newspapers and a certain number of Armenians in Turkey. In addition to the analyses of 
11 
 
Turkey’s genocide denial efforts and state-led discrimination and inequality, I put 
specific emphasis on the creation of a discursive sphere by the printed press regarding 
the production side of the Armenian question in Turkey. In particular, my research looks 
at the role of media representations in the normalisation of acts of violence against the 
Armenian community and the discursive formation of Turkish nationalisms on an 
ongoing basis. The inquiry of the consumption stage also enables this research to move 
beyond official and legal forms of knowledge production concerning both past and 
present experiences of Armenians. Despite the formal narratives that aim to confine the 
Armenian Genocide to the Ottoman Empire period and bring Turkish nationalisms 
forward as a defence strategy, the perspectives of Armenians offer alternative ways of 
understanding the connection between the contemporary and historical events.  
Accordingly, on the production side I focus on national newspapers as one of the central 
and effective instruments for information production and dissemination in society. 
Considering the role of national newspapers in the creation of narratives through the  
language and ideology of the state, news discourse turns into a crucial object of analysis 
for the inquiry into the ‘Armenian question’ in written communication channels. 
Therefore, I aim to question the overlapping and divergent discursive strategies 
employed in three national newspapers (Hürriyet, Zaman and Cumhuriyet) with 
supposedly different political affiliations in their coverage of three recent incidents, 
namely the murders of two Armenian individuals and the public protest against the 
Khojaly Massacre. I will discuss these cases and their media portrayals in detail in the 
following chapters, but at this point it needs to be mentioned that these three events 
demonstrate how the Armenian question unfolds discursive spaces in the national 
newspapers, in which forms of Turkish nationalism are constructed and reproduced. As 
these happenings have both direct and indirect relationships with the ‘Armenian 
question’, their media representations are noteworthy to observe the interplay between 
the ‘Armenian question’ and Turkish nationalisms. Generally speaking, national 
newspapers’ perception management techniques with regard to the ‘Armenian question’ 
and the image of Armenians through positioning Turkish nationalisms against them 
have become evident in the coverage of these incidents. Furthermore, it is equally 
interesting to discover changing hegemonic nationalist discourse vis-à-vis victim and 
perpetrator roles in the Armenian situation. Drawing on these three particular cases, a 
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comprehensive analysis of the ‘production’ phase of the ‘Armenian question’ in relation 
to forms of Turkish nationalism will be provided in the empirical chapters.  
On the other hand, this research delves into the ‘consumption’ side of the ‘Armenian 
question’, which corresponds to the opinions and experiences of certain members of the 
Armenian community living in Istanbul.  The key intention here is to find out how 
Armenians define, interpret and challenge the dominant understanding and 
representation of the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkey. To put it explicitly, it becomes 
relevant to question how Armenians, as descendants of genocide victims and recipients 
of state violence, come to terms with past and present experiences. I point out the 
consistencies and contradictions between news discourse in the national newspapers 
and the responses of the Armenian interviewees with respect to the three particular 
incidents. This research thus sheds light on the asymmetrical production and 
consumption patterns of the Armenian question. Unquestionably, this must not lead one 
to neglect intra-textual and intragroup dynamics. In addition, the analysis of the 
consumption side of past experiences includes the formation of collective memory 
across generations of the Armenian community concerning the genocidal process and 
the redefinition of the Armenian question and the Armenian Genocide.  On the subject of 
more recent history my exploration of the consumption phase embraces the ideas of 
Armenian interviewees on the discourses of nationalism and national identity, the 
official ideology of the state and the developments under the latest government. In an 
effort to unsettle particular victim and perpetrator images ascribed to the Armenian 
community, I attach importance to the accounts of Armenian individuals as they indicate 
the multi-layered aspects of the ‘Armenian question’.  
1.2. Research Questions and Research Methods 
In line with the purposes of this study, I attempt to answer two main research questions 
as follows: 
• How Turkish nationalisms are constructed and reproduced in their encounter with 
the ‘Armenian question’ in the discursive sphere?  
• How does the Armenian community in Turkey define, experience and confront both 
past and present forms and processes of the ‘Armenian question’?  
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With reference to the first question I pick out three recent incidents, namely the 
murders of an Armenian journalist in 2007 and an Armenian soldier in 2011 and the 
protest in Istanbul against the Khojaly Massacre in 2012. I examine news stories 
concerning these incidents in three national newspapers (Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and 
Zaman) for a one week period after the time of the occurrences. By employing critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) as a data collection method, I unmask prevailing and 
suppressed Turkish nationalist discourses in the media representations of these events, 
as well as the Armenian issue in general.  The analysis also includes three sub-questions: 
• How do Turkish national newspapers that seem to be ideologically different depict 
those events concerned with Armenians in Turkey? 
• What sort of discursive strategies are developed by national newspapers in terms of 
constructing and reproducing Turkish nationalisms with regard to media 
representations of Armenians? 
• How does the editorial language reflect the wider understanding of the Armenian 
issue within the socio-cultural and political setting in Turkey and how does it 
disseminate the dominant official ideology? 
Relying on these questions, I additionally probe how the interaction between news 
discourse and Turkish nationalisms plays a part in the writing style and visual 
preferences of journalistic texts in their reporting of Armenians and the Armenian issue.  
In conjunction with the first question, the second part of the research investigates the 
interpretations and reactions of the Armenian community with respect to these three 
incidents. Furthermore, I critically engage with the connotations of the ‘Armenian 
question’, as well as the far-reaching effects of its relationship and confrontation with 
collective memory, Turkish nationalisms, official ideology, and pro- and anti-Armenian 
developments under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey. 
Thus, this qualitative research draws on data from forty-five semi-structured interviews 
with Armenians in Istanbul, along with a CDA of news stories in designated national 
newspapers. The sub-questions below demonstrate the focal points of the semi-
structured interviews.  
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• How do Armenians in Turkey react to the assassination of Hrant Dink/the 
murder of Sevag Balıkçı/the protest against the Khojaly Massacre?  
• How does the Armenian Genocide still affect memory transmissions among the 
Armenian generations in Turkey, and their acts of remembrance and forgetting 
with regards to past atrocities and present violent attacks? 
• How is the artificially constructed binary opposition between the Armenian 
question and the Armenian Genocide read by Armenians in Turkey? 
• How do Armenians describe and experience discourses of Turkish nationalisms 
and national identity and how do they evaluate the period under AKP rule for 
their own identity and rights?  
As a result, this research indicates the multi-dimensional aspects and implications of the 
‘Armenian question’ in Turkey through CDA of news discourses in the national 
newspapers and semi-structured interviews with particular members of the Armenian 
community. Accordingly, the following part focuses on previous studies that deal with 
the Armenian question.  
1.3. Previous Studies  
The academic literature on the Armenian Genocide, Turkey and the Armenian 
community mainly revolves around the specific nature of the 1915 events and the 
consequences of this humanitarian catastrophe for the victim group. In relation to the 
research focus of this thesis one set of previous studies concentrates on the historical 
aspects and stages of the Armenian Genocide along with the official denialist standpoint 
of the Turkish state (Akçam, 2004, 2006, 2012; Göçek, 2015) and the comparative 
analysis of the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide (Melson, 1989, 1992, 1996; 
Hovannisian, 1999; Travis, 2010, 2013; Balakian, 2013). Although my research is not 
primarily concerned with historical accounts of the causes, conditions and perpetrators 
of the Armenian Genocide, it adopts the claim that the dominant understanding and 
representation of the ‘Armenian question’ in today’s Turkey is strongly grounded in 
systematic and continuing state violence and a denialist tradition, a lack of confrontation 
with the past and a refusal to recognise the role of Turkish nationalisms in both past and 
present acts of violence against the Armenian community. Furthermore, on one level the 
studies that put forward the differences and similarities between the Holocaust and the 
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Armenian Genocide leads this research to spotlight the unique traits of the Armenian 
Genocide. On another level, they provide important insights into the patterns of 
recognition and remembrance of the Holocaust by the German state and the ways in 
which the images of Jews and the Holocaust are constructed and reproduced in the 
national media in comparison with the Armenian case. From another perspective, 
however, a number of scholars, such as Bernard Lewis, Heath Lowy, Justin McCarthy, 
Stanford Shaw, Roderic Davison and Rhodas Murphey, do not consider the 1915 events 
as genocide and ‘hesitate to reach a judgment in terms of identifying the causes of the 
events that resulted in the death or removal of the entire Armenian population’ (Canefe, 
2007:238). Instead they underscore ‘the inter-communal characteristics of warfare, the 
involvement of irregular forces in the massacres and the consequences of disease and 
famine throughout the First World War’ (ibid). Even though this research takes a stand 
against this line of academic inquiry, these bodies of work might be considered as 
functional in terms of their ability to show how discourses of denial rationalise and 
trivialise state oppression and antagonism against Armenians.  
The second line of research draws attention to the victim accounts in which genocide 
survivors or their descendants recount their own experiences in different settings. The 
studies carried out by Miller and Miller (1982; 1991; 1993) based on oral history 
fieldwork examine the effect of the Armenian Genocide on the memories and identities 
of the survivors and their descendants. From a psychological perspective Kalayjian et.al 
(1996) also take first person testimonies into consideration and discuss the 
retrospective recollection of personal experiences, coping strategies, communication 
patterns and the influence of continuing denial on the survivors. Drawing together the 
physical and mental outcomes of the Armenian Genocide, the research conducted by 
Sarkisian (1984) interestingly addresses the correlations among survivors’ perceptions 
of coping immediately after the Genocide and their current opinions about their own 
health and morale. In more recent study by Azarian-Ceccato (2010: 107) the narratives 
of eleven great-grandchildren of genocide survivors in central California are selected as 
objects of an analysis which alleges that the ‘genocide narrative is told by descendants in 
a manner in which there is little linguistic delineation to differentiate the past from the 
present’.  In a similar vein, this research also intends to emphasise the consequences of a 
symbiotic relationship between past and present for the lives of the members of the 
Armenian community. More importantly, I illustrate how past atrocities are considered 
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and lived through as mundane parts of present day life by Armenians in Turkey and how 
the historical heritage of sorrow and oppression has become a decisive aspect of the 
Armenian identity. Unlike the above mentioned works in which the members of the 
Armenian Diaspora stand at the core of analysis, my research seeks out the forms of 
memory transmission in the Armenian community in Turkey which Armenians consider 
as ‘homeland’. When viewed from this aspect the differences and similarities between 
these two groups in terms of attributing meaning to the Armenian Genocide and its 
continuing effects bring the importance of genocide denial at both societal and state 
levels to light. This enquiry into the patterns of collective memory among the Armenian 
community in Turkey also unmasks the influence of various factors such as imposed 
national collective memory, the state and its institutions’ power of silencing, and the 
processes of mourning and melancholia.  
In addition to the studies that look at the ways in which acts of remembrance and 
forgetting become evident in the lives of the offspring of Armenian survivors in the 
diasporic communities, academic interest in the experiences, identity and status of the 
Armenian community in Turkey is correspondingly noteworthy. In order to discover the 
in-group (Armenian), out-group (Turkish) and global-human identities of Turkish-
Armenians, Der-Karabetian and Balian (1992) use questionnaires on seventy Turkish-
Armenians and conclude that men, the elderly and those who attended Armenian 
schools had more of an in-group Armenian identity.  In a different way Bilal (2006) 
attempts to challenge mutually exclusive definitions of belonging and displacement and 
describes a feeling of being displaced and/or being a minority ‘at home’ as the prevailing 
sentiment within the lived experiences of Armenians in Turkey. By employing a field 
survey, Örs and Komşuoğlu (2007) portray the definitions of Turkey’s Armenians with 
respect to their own identity and the elements that contribute to the perpetuation of a 
dominant Armenian identity.  In their follow-up study Komşuoğlu and Örs (2009) 
introduce the role of Armenian women in the survival of Armenian identity and 
reproduction of Armenian culture and Örs (2010) investigates the perception of the 
Turkish army by Turkey’s Armenians. By focusing on Agos, a weekly bilingual Armenian 
newspaper in Turkey, Dönmez (2008) also questions how and in what context the 
newspaper plays a part in the construction of collective identity for Turkey’s Armenians. 
Along with these academic efforts to understand the collective identity, experiences and 
perceptions of the Armenian community, other studies also deal with the minority rights 
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of Armenians and their controversial depictions in public spheres. While Hofmann 
(2002) sketches out the historical background of the lives of Armenians during the 
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, she only briefly touches on the problems of 
Armenian institutions, the violation of the civil rights of Armenians and anti-Armenian 
reporting in the Turkish media. From a different point of view, Dixon (2010) brings up 
the issue of altering official narratives of the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkish high school 
history textbooks and analyses the content of narratives within four diverse historical 
phases. The investigation of the Turkish media debate on the Armenian Genocide by 
Necef (2003) additionally reveals four different positions held by Turkish intellectuals 
and political commentators. According to his classification, ‘genocide recognisers’, 
‘mutual killings group’, ‘we are the real victims group’ and the group arguing that 
deportation and massacre were necessary measures, are the major standpoints that 
direct public discussion on the Armenian Genocide in Turkey.  
These scholarly works notably point out different components of Armenian identity and 
the difficulties Armenians confront in their daily lives, as well as the problematic aspects 
of their representation and the ‘Armenian question’ in mass media and the national 
education system in Turkey. Unquestionably, their reflections on both the inherent 
tensions and founding characteristics of the Armenian identity, along with the unsettled 
relationship between the Armenian community and state institutions, partially laid the 
groundwork for this research. However, this research takes a step forward in explicating 
the reverberations of discourses of Turkish nationalisms and national identity, the 
official ideology of the Turkish state, the standpoint of the current government and 
recent violent attacks, for the interpretations and experiences of particular members of 
the Armenian community. Moreover, I identify the discursive strategies in selected 
national newspapers that are mobilised in the news coverage of Armenians and, more 
notably, the mismatch between the media portrayals of the ’Armenian question’ and 
Armenian identity concerning particular incidents targeted at this minority group, and 
the repercussions of these incidents for Armenian interviewees.  
Lastly, recent years have been marked by a growing body of research on the Armenian 
community in Turkey. In particular, some unpublished theses and dissertations (Kopşa 
2008; Baykal 2011; Tataryan 2011; Özden 2014; Gabrielsen 2015) written in the 
universities in Turkey  have strived to break the taboo of the Armenian Genocide or the 
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‘Armenian question’. It might be argued that the assassination of Hrant Dink was the 
turning point for these academic enquiries as this event opened up the debates over 
genocide claims, the position of the Armenian community within the wider society, and 
the conflictual relationship between the Turkish state, the government and minority 
groups. Kopşa (2008) looks at the psychological effects of this assassination on the 
‘Turkish Armenian’ youth living in Istanbul and asks how the murder affected the 
opinions of young Armenians with respect to Turks, the Turkish-Armenian conflict and 
its resolution. Furthermore, Tataryan (2011:6) discusses ‘how Armenian society 
experiences the state of being Armenian’, ‘how Armenian history is carried and lived 
today’ and ‘how a new affective memory emerged after Hrant Dink’s death’. In addition 
to these two studies that examine the impact of the assassination of Hrant Dink on 
Armenians in Turkey, Baykal (2011) and Gabrielsen (2015) respectively scrutinise the 
construction of Armenian identity, defined as multi-layered, situational and fluid, in 
Istanbul and the role of Islamised Armenians in the process of identity reformulation in 
the Armenian community in Turkey by inspecting Agos, the Armenian-Turkish 
newspaper between the years 1996 and 2014.  Based on oral history research, Özden 
(2014) also concentrates on how particular events after the genocide, such as the 
confiscation of Armenian properties, the Democrat Party’s election victory, the 6-7 
September riots, the emergence of ASALA (the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation 
of Armenia)  and the assassination of Hrant Dink, are experienced and narrated by 
Armenians.  
However, in contrast to these studies, the thesis database of the Council of Higher 
Education of the Republic of Turkey is an illuminating source to comprehend the effect 
on academic works of state-propagated narratives regarding the Armenian Genocide. 
Even a cursory glance at the headings and abstracts of some masters’ and PhD theses 
uncovers the fact that many of the studies in the Turkish context fail to adopt a critical 
approach to the study of the ‘Armenian question’. Even the titles - for instance, 
‘Armenian Genocide claims in view of international law’ (Onay 2006), ‘The evaluation of 
Armenian claims from the point of view of law’ (Takımsu 2008), ‘The importance of 
diaspora, pressure groups, lobby activities within the context of the so-called Armenian 
Genocide’ (An 2013), ‘According to the documentations the Holocaust and genocide 
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claims in the Turkish-Armenian relations’1(Taşcıoğlu 2014), ‘An analysis of Armenian 
Genocide allegations in terms of propaganda techniques’ (Talipoğlu 2014) - give a rough 
idea about the common mind-set and discourse shared by the Turkish state. In addition, 
they exemplify how the occurrence of genocide is primarily cast as an ‘invention’ of 
Armenians, how their ‘claims’ have no statutory bases in international law, and how they 
are utilised through the efforts of the diaspora and other actors.   
By taking into consideration all these studies, this research intends to fill the gap in the 
literature by combining the stages of the ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ of the 
‘Armenian question’ with a specific focus on the news discourse of national newspapers 
and opinions and the experiences of particular members of the Armenian community. It 
critically addresses the ways in which an incomplete genocidal process and ideology 
emerge in the discursive construction and reproduction of different forms of Turkish 
nationalism, and also impinges on the opinions and experiences of Armenians in Turkey 
with respect to both past and present circumstances. In other words I intend to explore 
the current discursive construction and contestation of the Armenian question rather 
than simply doing historical work or studying the Armenian community. In the following 
and last part of the introduction chapter, I will briefly explain the organisation of the 
thesis.  
1.4. Outline of the Chapters  
Chapter Two basically consists of historical background of the Armenian question. 
Starting from the Ottoman Empire period I give an overview of the process of Turkish 
nation state formation, and the subsequent discriminatory state policies, particularly the 
Incident of Reserves and the Wealth Tax. Then I delineate the 6-7 September riots as an 
important anti-minority attack in the history of the Turkish Republic, the effect of 
military coups and the ASALA on the understanding of the Armenian question and the 
lives of the Armenian community.  Finally I concentrate on the developments during the 
AKP government period.  This chapter underscores continuous discriminatory policies 
of the state against the Armenian community along with other non-Muslim and non-
Turkish citizens. Furthermore I aim to explicate uncompleted genocidal process in 
                                                          
1 This is the original title of the PhD thesis which mistakenly translates the word ‘katliam’ in Turkish as 
Holocaust instead of ‘massacre’.   
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Turkey that paved the way for contemporary anti-Armenian attacks, which will be 
discussed in the following chapters.  
Chapter Three describes the theoretical framework of the research. Firstly, I critically 
assess previous literature on nationalism with a specific focus on the conventional 
discussions on nationalism and national identity. Then I re-examine the quotidian and 
discursive aspects of nationalism mainly because I think these are important and 
neglected issues in the debates of the Armenian question. This is followed by a review of 
the interplay between nationalism and media representations, and the portrayals of 
minority groups in the national newspapers. The importance of temporal and discursive 
dimensions in the Armenian question for the construction and reproduction of Turkish 
nationalisms and Turkish national identity led this research to centre on the relationship 
between national identity and memory. This chapter ends with a discussion on collective 
memory, national myths, historiography and (trans-) national remembrance and 
forgetting.  
Chapter Four is the methodology chapter, which clarifies data collection methods of the 
research, namely critical discourse analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews. First, 
I open up a methodological discussion on CDA and then explain the discursive tools that 
are employed in the research, the selection of the newspapers and the selection of news 
stories for CDA. Following this, I discuss different perspectives on the interview process, 
followed by an outline of the semi-structured interviews with Armenians. Next, I 
describe the interview topic guide, sampling design, gaining access for interviews and 
the reflections on my position as a researcher and the impact of contextual factors on 
the interview settings.  
Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, as the first three data analysis chapters, 
respectively explore the cases of the assassination of Hrant Dink, the murder of Sevag 
Balıkçı and the protest against the Khojaly Massacre. I present the findings of my CDA of 
the news stories concerning these incidents, integrated with the analysis of the 
interviewees’ responses into each chapter. These chapters reveal the ways in which 
news discourse is incompatible with the accounts of Armenian interviewees. In other 
words, they provide important insights with respect to the asymmetrical production and 
consumption stages of the Armenian question. Chapter Eight, as the next data analysis 
chapter, especially discloses the opinions and experiences of the interviewees by 
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critically dealing with the topics of collective memory, the distinction between the 
‘Armenian question’ and the Armenian Genocide, the discourses of nationalism and 
national identity, the official ideology of the Turkish state and developments during the 
AKP government. Finally, Chapter Nine concludes the thesis with a summary of 
empirical findings, theoretical implications, a discussion section, limitations of the 
research and the recommendations for prospective studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The CONTEXTUALISATION of the ARMENIAN QUESTION 
This chapter outlines the historical background of the research and situates it within the 
socio-political context in which the ‘Armenian question’ was and has been shaped by 
historical and recent developments during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Republic. Contemporary debates on the Armenian Genocide and the Armenian 
community basically originate from a historically problematic socio-political milieu and 
the discriminatory approach of the state towards non-Turkish and non-Muslim citizens. 
As this research views the Armenian Genocide as a process that has a continuous 
interaction with the various forms of Turkish nationalism, I reconsider their 
confrontations in the course of past occurrences.  The main objective of this chapter is 
thus to point out how catastrophic acts of violence against the Armenian community 
show historical continuity, and, more notably, how unending nation-state formation in 
Turkey has led to the treatment of Armenians as ‘the strangers’ who ‘by definition 
represent an anomaly to be rectified’ (Bauman, 1997: 19).  
In other words, I suggest that what is called the ‘Armenian question’ at present is not 
merely concerned with the long-lasting clash between the recognition and denial of the 
genocide. From a historical perspective, instead, it stands for the encounter between the 
ambivalent status of Armenians ‘who are located within the ensemble of the imagined 
nation, yet are simultaneously rendered strange and undecidable precisely because they 
are haunted by their presumed links to an outside’ (Kumar, 2013:85), and the ways in 
which the Turkish nation-state copes with ‘the problem of strangers’ (Bauman, 1991: 
63) and ‘superimposes one kind of allegiance over the mosaic of communitarian 
“particularisms”’ (Bauman, 1997:190). Based on this standpoint, in this chapter I briefly 
touch upon the momentous events, with respect to the ‘Armenian question’, during the 
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. By pursuing a chronological order, firstly I 
provide a general overview of the massacres of Armenians in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Following the disintegration 
of the Empire and the formation of the new Turkish state, I deal with the implications of 
this regime change for the relationship between Turkish nationalisms and the Armenian 
community, along with other non-Turkish and non-Muslim ethnic and religious 
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communities. In line with acute conflicts throughout the state formation process in the 
1920s and 1930s, my succeeding examination indicates that assimilatory policies and 
treatment towards minority groups took a new form in the 1940s and 1950s. The next 
part correspondingly delineates the consequences of the military coups in Turkey, and 
the actions of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), for the 
interpretations of the ‘Armenian question’. The chapter concludes with an analysis of 
more recent developments during the AKP government period.  
2.1. Massacres of the Armenians during the Ottoman Empire  
Although large bodies of research on the extermination of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire centre on the period 1915-1917, in this part I also refer to the massacres of 
1894-1897, as they were earlier atrocity crimes against the Armenian community. Until 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, under the reign of the Ottoman Empire non-
Muslim minorities were entitled to self-government thanks to the unique millet system, 
and the Armenian population, among several ethnic and religious groups, were known 
by Turks as the millet-i sadıka, the ‘loyal community’. The noticeable weakening of the 
power of the Ottoman Empire and the rising European influence during the early 
nineteenth century resulted in the change of the status of non-Muslim minority groups. 
In particular, the position of Armenians as the ‘loyal community’ started to change due 
to the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and the creation of ‘a Russian Armenia, where 
the Armenian Church was established and recognised and Armenian governors and 
generals ruled provinces and commanded armies’ (Morrock, 2010:126). Moreover, 
before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and World War I, the decay of the Ottoman 
Empire was affected by the losses of the 1877-78 war against Russia. In that time period 
‘the Armenian question also became a secondary theatre of confrontation between the 
Great Powers, particularly Britain and Russia, with Germany and France playing a 
secondary role’ and the Ottoman Armenians were perceived as ‘Christians in peril’ 
(Deringil, 2009:345). The Ottoman Empire perceived Christianity as a common ground 
shared by Armenians and the allied powers, which in turn became a direct threat to the 
dominant Islamic character of the Empire.   
 
Armenians were inevitably exposed to oppressive living conditions due to the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century in territorial, economic and political 
terms. According to Sarkissian (Gunter, 2011: 2), there were mainly four problems that 
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Armenians faced at that time: ‘the non-acceptance of non-Mohammedan testimony in 
the courts; the abuses connected with the matter of taxation; oppressions and outrages 
committed by government officials (forced conversions, rapes, assaults); and 
oppressions and outrages committed by civilians’. These legal, economic and social 
difficulties that Armenians confronted also drew attention of Russia, as it had gained 
some of the eastern Armenian provinces as a consequence of the war. Cohan (2005:334) 
points out that Russian Armenians gradually started to defend the rights of Ottoman 
Armenians and also encouraged their efforts to launch political organisations under 
Ottoman law. In addition to these developments, the Treaty of Berlin, which was signed 
between the European Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the 1877-
78 Russia-Turco war, led to the overturning of relationships between Armenians and the 
Ottoman Empire. Although this agreement consisted of the provision of more rights for 
Armenians, such as ‘fair taxation practices, protections from tribal attacks, and the right 
to give evidence in Ottoman courts of law’ (ibid), ‘the period in the immediate aftermath 
of the signing of the Treaty of Berlin can clearly be identified as one of dramatic risk 
escalation for the Armenian minority’ (Mayersen, 2014:29).  
 
Accordingly, a tragic event took place when the Ottoman Armenians maintained their 
protests against discriminatory laws and Sultan Abdülhamid II counteracted this with 
mass killings (Cohan 2005: 334). Even the massacres were referred to by the name of 
the emperor (Abdülhamid). Although many studies have examined the 1915 events 
concerning the Armenian issue, little attention has been devoted to the massacres that 
took place in the late nineteenth century. Under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the 
years 1895-97 witnessed the Hamidian Massacres, which refer to the annihilation of 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, with estimates of the dead ranging 80,000 to 
300,000 (Akçam, 2006:42). Most of the Armenian survivors of the Hamidian Massacres 
were also forced to convert to Islam. In his inspiring article, Deringil (2009:352) 
addresses the issue of mass conversions of Armenians in Anatolia during the Hamidian 
Massacres and considers adoption of Islam as a survival tactic during the extermination 
and the insecure environment of the Empire. He also points out the ways in which those 
mass conversions were presented to the ‘outside world’ and underlines how those 
conversions were shown as the result of voluntary preferences rather than the forced 
choice of Armenians. Thus, official authorities had planned to prevent the reactions of 
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the ‘foreign observers’ and the conversions to Islam from Christianity served the 
purpose of Islamisation of the Ottoman land. Despite the legal efforts to conceal the 
inner reasons and hostile atmosphere, the Armenian conversions were instances of the 
violation of the basic principle of freedom of religion.  
The sufferings of Armenians entered a new phase of tragedy with the uninterrupted 
maltreatment of the Ottoman Empire until its collapse in the twentieth century. Three 
historical developments can be considered as catalysts for the Armenian Genocide. 
These are, sequentially, the Committee of Union and Progress’s (CUP – the governing 
political party of that time) coup d’état, the defeat of Balkan Wars, and the outbreak of 
the First World War. At the domestic level, the incompetence of the system, mostly 
displayed in the army and administration, along with the despotism of the ruler and at 
the international level, ‘the aggressive and imperialist ambitions of Great Powers’ to 
intervene in Macedonia, led to political and social unrest in the Ottoman Empire. All 
these problems paved the way for the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908, which 
included the demand for the re-establishment of the constitution of 1876 (Ahmad, 
1968:19-20). The political thought behind this revolution is also important to 
comprehend the big picture of the dominant mind-set in the Ottoman Empire during this 
period. This new doctrine, with ‘the aim of creating a huge ethnic state’ (Poulton, 
1999:16), was defined as Turanism, referring to ‘the trend towards a closer association 
of the Turks with the original, semi-legendary home of the Turkic peoples’ (Arnakis, 
1960:22). More notably, Arnakis (ibid) emphasises that ‘Turanism bore the stamp of 
genuine Turkish ideology and came closer to the roots of Turkish nationalism’. In other 
words, the origins of Turkish nationalism are based on this quest to unite all Turkish 
people under a single flag, single religion, single language and also single race.  
 
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 resulted in the loss of major cities of the Ottoman 
Empire, degrading the status of the Ottoman elite as well as the potency of the army. 
This defeat was the confirmation of the myth of the ‘stab in the back’ by Ottoman 
Christians, such as Ottoman Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians, to Turkish nationalists. 
Thus, the polarisation of Ottoman society in terms of ethno-religious differences 
emerged (Üngör, 2013:98). In addition to the Balkan Wars, the wartime conditions and 
the consequences of the First World War directly shaped the status of Armenians in the 
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Ottoman Empire. As Winter states, within the condition of total war, an armed and 
mobilized society, a heightened sense of national security, a deepened xenophobia, and a 
sense of chaos were created; and these conditions were employed by the CUP to 
mobilise the ‘final solution’ for the Armenians. According to Winter, the Armenian 
genocide ‘opened up a new phase in the history of warfare: The CUP waged a campaign 
of race annihilation against the Armenians by deeming them ‘the internal enemy’ 
(Balakian, 2003:166). From the perspective of the ruling party, all the discriminatory 
and even fatal policies against Armenians could be explained by their non-Muslim 
attributes and their capability to endanger the solidarity of the Empire. Therefore, they 
deserved remain only as the subjects of the Empire rather than the active citizens.  
When the Armenians -who were known by the Ottoman Empire as the most loyal 
subjects- were accused of collaborating with the Russians against the Ottoman Empire 
during the First World War, the first implementation of the CUP ’regime was the 
elimination of Armenians from Anatolia in 1915 so as to create a homogeneous nation’ 
(Göl, 2005:130). The policies of ‘homogenisation’ and ‘Turkification’ reinforced by the 
conditions of World War I were implemented by the CUP leadership (Rae, 2002:151-3). 
Between the years 1915 and 1917, the Armenian genocide, which involved deportation, 
expropriation, abduction, torture, massacre, and starvation of the Armenian people in 
the Ottoman Empire, took place ‘when the governing leaders of the CUP organised and 
executed the forced deportation of the vast majority of Armenians living in the Ottoman 
Empire’ (Dixon, 2010:469). Despite the variety of reports, it is agreed that there were 
about two million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire during the massacres. By the 
early 1920s, when the massacres and deportations finally came to an end, one and a half 
million Armenians were dead and Armenians who survived during the genocide were 
forcibly displaced or expelled from the country. 
According to Göl (2005:131), three historical factors were connected to the relationship 
between nationalism and modernisation and led to the process of ‘othering’ of 
Armenians in Ottoman/Turkish social history. First, by means of the use of print 
capitalism and standardised language in the Ottoman Empire, a strong national 
consciousness developed among Armenians; they claimed more socio-political rights 
and sought to be considered as equal to Muslim subjects of the Empire. Secondly, as the 
power of Ottoman Empire declined, the European intervention in Ottoman domestic 
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politics on behalf of Christian minorities came into question. ‘The refusal of Armenian 
demands gave legitimacy to Western interference in Ottoman internal affairs during the 
modernisation period’. Third, the territorial claims of Armenians over the six Ottoman 
provinces which were recognized as one of the main parts of the historic homeland of 
Armenians brought about controversy between the Turkish and Armenian nationalist 
claims.  
However, this othering process of Armenians went far beyond discriminatory or 
penalising policies and the efforts to solve unexceptional problems between the state 
and its subjects. The debates over the recognition of the mass destruction and 
deportation of Armenians as genocide necessitate re-examining its relation to the 
Holocaust. In the history of genocide, Hitler provided one of the most conspicuous 
sentences, speaking before the invasion of Poland by Germany in 1939: “Who, after all, 
talks nowadays of the annihilation of the Armenians?” (Dadrian 2003 cited in Jones, 
2010:149). This sentence also triggered discussions about the link between the 
Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Genocide. According to Travis (2013:34), there 
existed a similarity between the Nazis and the Ottomans in terms of genocidal methods 
in both theory and practice, such as the pivotal position of race ‘in the self-conception of 
the fascist elites and the notion of relocating ethnic minorities to reservations’. Melson 
(1989:162) also puts forward three parallel aspects of these genocides: first, the 
despised minorities became the targets of genocide because of their social mobilisation; 
second, the conditions formed by revolutions strengthened the power of authorities and 
paved the way for genocidal movements; and third, wartime circumstances enabled the 
implementation of genocide as a state policy.  
 
More notably, Melson (1989:162-163) calls attention to the scholarship on the 
Holocaust about which two schools of thought, the intentionalists and the functionalists, 
are influential; the former emphasises the effects of Nazi ideology and its pathological 
anti-Semitist intentions, whereas the latter stresses the middle and lower strata of the 
Nazi system that ‘translate general directives into practical actions’. These explanations 
are mostly employed to explain the underlying reasons for the Holocaust and how the 
genocidal policies were legitimised by both Hitler’s intentions and the institutional 
structures. As distinct from those standpoints, in some of the analyses of the Armenian 
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Genocide, the provocative behaviour of the victims is presented as the main reason for 
these mass killings and deportations. As Melson (1989:164) summarises, the supporters 
of this ‘provocation thesis’ allege that ‘the Armenian Genocide was due to the intolerable 
threat the Armenians posed to the Ottoman Empire and to the Committee of Union and 
Progress’ and the conflict between two national movements over the eastern provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire was the main issue. However, this perspective is insufficient to 
answer the question: why did the genocide not only aim at the elimination of the 
Armenian population but also ‘the eradication of its intellectual and cultural identity 
along with its cultural process of symbolization and its continuous history’? (Balakian, 
2013:65). Üngör (2013) also criticizes the view regarding the genocide as just one 
phenomenon and argues that the Armenian Genocide was a multifaceted process of 
destruction which embraced the mass executions of Armenian elites, the expropriation 
of Armenian property and capital transfer to the state, deportations, forced assimilation 
through conversion to Islam, the kidnapping of women and children, the construction of 
an artificially created famine region and the destruction of material culture such as 
churches and buildings. Despite all these diverse and connected dimensions of the 
genocide, as well as the historical and social developments under the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire, the still question under consideration is ‘whether the Turkish regime 
intentionally organized the annihilation of its Armenian minority’ (Lewy, 2005:48). But 
the magnitude of the issue exceeds the disagreement on its definition, the intentions of 
those involved and the numbers of people killed or deported. Even a cursory glance at 
the history of the Turkish Republic as the successor of the Ottoman Empire suggests a 
predominant understanding towards non-Muslim and non-Turkish minorities. 
 
2.2. The Turkish Nation-State Building Process 
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the Treaty of Sévres, 
which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers, included the 
occupation of most of the territories of the Empire by France, Britain, Italy and Greece. 
As a response to this ‘invasion’, the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) began 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and The Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TBMM) was inaugurated in 1920 and later in 1923, the foundation of Turkish 
Republic was promulgated. More importantly, the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty 
in 1923 called a halt to the War of Independence, set the national borders of Turkey, 
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rearranged the Ottoman debts and the independence of Turkey in political and 
economic spheres was officially recognised. The Republican People’s Party (CHP), 
founded by Atatürk in 1923, was the dominant ruling party from 1923 to 1945, which is 
identified as the main single-party period in the history of the Turkish Republic. 
By these means, in what ways did this regime change (from empire to republic) 
influence political and social life in Turkey, and what did it mean for the citizens of new 
Turkey, especially for non-Muslim minorities? I intend to indicate how the Turkish 
Republic underwent a period of transition in terms of the understanding of nationalism, 
citizenship and minority rights. To begin with, the most remarkable change throughout 
the 1920s was the endeavour of the Kemalist paradigm to detach itself from all its 
historical ties with the Ottoman Empire. The clear-cut distinction between the East and 
West, and the darkness of superstition and religion and the light of progress and science, 
marked the reorientation of Turkey. During this period, the new and modern Kemalist 
Turkey was in consistent conflict with the Ottoman past, which had been labelled as 
backward, Islamic and traditional, and thus lacking value in the new system (Philliou, 
2011:172).  
In line with this effort, secularism became the predominant aspect of the political 
identity of the new state, which also symbolised the deliberate break with the Ottoman 
past. The legal and social reforms of Atatürk that were planned to achieve a secular, 
modern nation-state, constituted the backbone of the efforts for Westernisation and 
modernisation (Eisenstadt 1984). This nation-building process was also significant for 
the conceptualisation of nationhood and the link between nationalism and modernism. 
The universal validity of Western modernity was acknowledged as the only way to 
construct modern Turkey by the early republican ruling elite; thus, the epistemic and 
moral dominance of the West formed the basis of Turkey as a project of modernity 
(Keyman and Kancı, 2011:320). However, while Turkey strove to take Western 
civilisations as role models for its own progress and consolidation as a newly 
established state, the contradiction between the concepts of citizenship and nationality 
was not resolved. 
Although the Constitution of 1924 regarded all inhabitants of Turkey as Turkish, 
irrespective of religion or ethnicity, the 1920s were characterised by the ‘emergence of a 
hierarchy of citizens’, in which particularly Armenian and Greek Orthodox populations 
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‘were perceived and treated as suspect populations’ (Bayar, 2013:2). The distinction 
between ‘being Turkish in terms of citizenship’ and ‘being Turkish in terms of 
nationality’ was obviously clear in that almost all the laws passed during this single-
party period consisted of discriminatory policies based on this distinction. Put 
differently, as minorities were accepted as Turkish citizens rather than Turks and 
citizenship rights were only for ‘real Turks’ in practice, minorities could only be ‘half 
citizens’ of the Republic (İnce, 2012:45). Even before the Constitution of 1924, the 
Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923 also outlined the definition of minorities in Turkey and 
the attitudes of the Turkish delegation about the criterion to designate the citizens that 
belonged to the minority groups were notable. For the Allied powers, ensuring the 
protection of the Christian populations within the national territories of Turkey was one 
of the central aims, so they demanded ‘an expansive definition of minorities’, involving 
linguistic and ethnic minorities and different Muslim denominations. However, the 
Turkish delegation opposed this idea and claimed that there were no minorities in 
Turkey other than non-Muslim minorities, and they also overlooked the denominational, 
linguistic and ethnic differences among the Muslim population (Meray, 1969-1973 cited 
in Bayar, 2013:114). By doing so, the political elite of the republic planned to safeguard 
homogeneity in the nation-building process. The differentiation among the citizens on 
the basis of their Muslim or non-Muslim identity reduced religion to the basic dichotomy 
between Islam and Christianity and neglected all their different sects and other religious 
or non-religious beliefs. Thus, Christian minorities were described in reference to Islam 
rather than their own characteristics. Moreover, all other linguistic and ethnic identities 
among the Muslim population such, as Alevis and Kurds, were also neglected. As Bayar 
(2013: 109) rightly argues, the discussions over the Lausanne Treaty and the stance of 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly manifest the tension between ‘the protection of 
minorities and the process of homogenization’. However, it might be noted that for the 
Turkish state to defend the suitable political and social environment for national 
homogeneity has been always in the foreground.  
White (2013: 28) ironically highlights that non-Muslim citizens were not excluded 
according to Atatürk’s definition of the nation; at least if they spoke Turkish as their 
mother tongue, adopted Turkish culture, and accepted the ideals of Turkism. As a part of 
the Turkification process, those citizens were asked to disperse their ‘own community 
structures and dissolve their religious/ethnic identities into the new national Turkish 
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identity so they were be able to become Turks of Jewish or Christian faith, 
indistinguishable from Muslim Turks’ (ibid:29). Thus integration of those non-Muslim 
citizens depended on the number of criteria they met for Turkification and their survival 
and the protection of their rights could be guaranteed within the Turkish state. 
However, the strategies adopted by the state and also other social actors to assimilate 
non-Muslim minorities were multi-directional in the late 1920s and 1930s.  
The ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign started in 1928 was a typical example of the 
unification of language as one of the common and influential means in the course of 
nation-state formation. This campaign expectedly targeted non-Turkish speakers 
(Armenians, Greeks, Jews, etc.) and compelled them to speak Turkish, particularly in the 
public spheres. However, the state was not alone in enforcing nation-building policies. 
Aslan (2007) demonstrates how a social network that considered themselves as the 
missionaries of the state contributed to the creation of homogeneous Turkish nation and 
the reproduction of Turkish nationalism during this campaign. Not only did the state and 
its centres of power create and implement nationalist projects and work for the 
assimilation of minority groups as claimed by state-centred analyses, but in addition, 
‘the mobilization of university students, intellectuals, and journalists was effectual in 
creating strong public pressure on the non-Muslim minorities’ (ibid:267). This historical 
event also lays the groundwork for a discussion of the role of narrative for the 
construction of the nation. In particular my analysis of national newspapers in the 
following chapters reveals the discursive strategies to create and reproduce a 
homogeneous Turkish nation.  
Moreover this campaign indicated that the majority of the Turkish citizens, and mainly 
the Kemalist missionaries, were supporters of the state policy of linguistic homogeneity. 
As Bali (2000:136-137) mentions, during the campaign it became impossible to speak in 
a language other than Turkish due to the risk of verbal harassment and even physical 
attack. In addition, the newspaper articles and columns played an important role in 
proliferating the idea that ‘as long as the state recognized them as minorities with 
certain minority rights and allowed them to have separate schools, orphanages, and 
charitable foundations, their inclusion into the Turkish nation would be impossible’ 
(Hizmet, 22 Feb.1928; Ahenk 15 Jan. 1928 cited in Aslan, 2007: 255). This was also the 
evidence for the disapproval of the Lausanne Treaty among the public and the press. 
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Moreover, the resentment against non-Muslim minorities within the Turkish state 
revealed by this campaign was connected to the idea of Turkishness based on 
Muslimhood, which was actually opposite to the secular ideals of the Republic.   
The 1930s Turkish Republic was marked by the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ and ‘Sun 
Language Theory’, which underlined the importance of race for the description of the 
nation and brought a new construction of citizenship to the agenda. The Turkish History 
Thesis had mainly four implications: 1) the Turks were the ancestors of all the 
brachycephalic peoples, including the Indo-Europeans; 2) the Turkish race had created 
civilisations in all the lands to which the Turks had migrated; 3) the contemporary Turks 
were the inheritors of the glories of ancient Sumerians, Egyptians and Greeks; 4) all 
Anatolia’s inhabitants were Turks. More radically, based on these premises, the Minister 
of Education claimed that the Armenians had the same ethnic origins as the Turks and 
‘believed that he sufficiently indicated the logical line of conduct which the Armenians in 
Turkey should follow with the regard to the performance of their duties as Turkish 
citizens’ (Çağaptay, 2004:88-89). In other words, having common origins with Muslim 
Turks as members of the minority group also entailed the responsibility of meeting the 
expectations of the Turkish state. In a similar manner, Sun Language Theory contended 
that most major languages were of Turkish origin. As Çağaptay (ibid:89-93) sums up, the 
ideologues of Kemalism argued that all the past and present inhabitants of Turkey were 
ethnically and racially Turkish and thus the main signifiers of Turkishness were the 
emphasis on language, ethnicity and race. This rise of the concepts of race, ethnicity and 
language and their interdependent relations, and the decline of the emphasis on Islam 
during the 1930 were distinct from the understanding of nation-formation in reference 
to the minority groups in 1920s. 
 
2.3. The Incident of Reserves, the Wealth Tax and the 6-7 September Riots 
The problematic relationship between Turkish nation building and minority rights was 
affected by the Second World War in a similar way as for other nation-states. In terms of 
militaristic measures, during the war, the concerns for national security and defence 
controlled the policies of the Turkish government regarding the issues related to the 
minority groups. Non-Muslim men aged 26-45 were enrolled in the special recruitment 
named as the Incident of Reserves, in which the main goal was to quarantine society’s 
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‘untrustworthy’ elements so as to preserve the national security (İçduygu et al., 
2008:367). In economic terms, these unequal measures reached their peak when the 
Wealth or Capital Tax was implemented in 1942. It came into force in order to grant 
supplementary resources for wartime expenses. However, non-Muslims and Converts 
were charged five to ten times higher than Muslims, so they were forced to sell their 
properties to pay their taxes (Ökte, 1978:24). It was claimed that the underlying reason 
for this tax was the elimination of minorities from the economy and the replacement of 
the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by its Muslim counterpart (Akar, 1999: 75).  
Although a new law was levied two years later, according to Aktar (2000 cited in 
İçduygu et al., 2008:367) 98 per cent of the real estate belonging to non-Muslims was 
either bought by Muslim individuals or confiscated by the state. All those measures 
signal how non-Muslims were subjected to discriminatory policies on behalf of the 
nation’s security and development. For the sake of the so-called nationalisation of 
capital and employment, Armenians, Jews, Greeks and other minority groups were 
penalised due to their ethnic and religious identities. The capital transfer from non-
Muslim minorities to Muslim citizens also disclosed the state’s objective of economic 
Turkification.  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey also experienced the transition from 
single-party government to multi-party parliamentary rule. The period 1946-1950 was a 
significant break in Turkish modernity because of the transition to democracy (Keyman 
and Kancı, 2011:325). Despite the more democratic stance of the Democrat Party (DP) in 
terms of citizenship rights and the understanding of nationalism, İçduygu et al. 
(2008:371) claim that the status of minorities began to be influenced by the diplomatic 
crises of external (international) relations as well as nationalist aspirations at the 
domestic level. The tense relationship between Turkey and Greece over the issue of 
Cyprus was the catalyst for the 6-7 September riots targeting Greek and other non-
Muslim citizens. After a pro-government paper published the news that the house where 
Atatürk was born had been bombed by Greeks in Salonika, thousands of people attacked 
the properties of non-Muslim citizens in Istanbul. The records of the court revealed that 
4214 houses, 1004 shops, 73 churches, 1 synagogue, 2 monasteries and 26 schools were 
damaged. Although many people were murdered during these attacks, the official death 
toll was 10-12 and around 400 women were raped. It was claimed that the police said: 
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“We are not police today we are Turks”. Despite claims concerning the role of the 
government in this ethnic and religious violence, the communists were announced as 
the genuine offenders by the government and by the press as well. However, the DP was 
brought down by a military coup in 1960, five years after the riots, and the military 
court declared the final decision that the government was highly involved in the 
planning of the riots; consequently, three members of the DP, including the prime 
minister, were executed (Kuyucu, 2005:362). Kuyucu (ibid: 364) examines these riots to 
understand Turkish nationalism and its measures to ethnically homogenise the 
population and to create a unitary nation out of an ethno-religiously diverse population. 
Kuyucu (ibid: 364) claims that this catastrophic collective violence against non-Muslim 
minorities, ‘the designated ‘others’ of Turkish nationalism, constitutes an important 
episode in the ethno-national homogenisation of Turkey’. These riots also demonstrated 
the means by which nationalist projects marginalise and charge the minority groups by 
creating an invented enemy. Despite the inclusionary narrative of the state, the non-
Muslim minorities became radicalised through the image of potential threat. 
2.4. The Military Coups and  the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of    
Armenia 
The military coups and interventions in the subsequent years -1960, 1971 and 1980- 
have been a challenging test ground for democracy in Turkey throughout its history. The 
Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have been always recognised as one of the inseparable 
components of national integrity and security and the protector of Atatürk’s principles 
and reforms, which are acknowledged as the prerequisites for modernisation and 
Westernisation. While İnce (2012:133) explores the civic virtue aspect of citizenship 
during the period 1960-1980, she finds that the textbooks underlined the significance of 
democracy and multi-party politics, but that they identified the military coup of 1960 as 
a revolution. This also showed the positioning of the army as the guardian of the 
national identity and a vital presence for political stability in Turkey.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, due to the attacks of the Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) against Turkish institutions and diplomats, Armenians in 
Turkey suffered from this insecure atmosphere and once again came to be seen as 
precarious citizens regarding national security interests. In response to these attacks, 
both the state and the military took action by ‘fostering, organising and 
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institutionalising’ symbolic violence against the Armenians, in particular in two ways. 
Firstly, a nationalised historiography of the Armenian issue predicated on the national 
myths was generated and secondly, the state arranged a series of organisations with the 
‘overt purpose of studying and researching the Armenian issue’ (Göçek, 2008:100). 
More importantly, ‘the Armenian community was brought under pressure by the state to 
constantly issue statements that they lived in peace in Turkey, that they condemned the 
attacks and that they professed their undying allegiance to the Turkish Republic’ (Simsir 
2000 cited in Göçek, 2008:101). In other words, Armenians in Turkey were asked to 
prove their loyalty to the state and convince the public that they were different from the 
diaspora Armenians. Besides this, the Turkish state intended to renovate its self-image 
in the eyes of the Western powers by making Armenians speak about their comfortable 
life in Turkey.  
The epoch between the late 1960s and 1970s also witnessed the confrontation of the 
rightist and the leftist groups in Turkey that resulted in an alarming rise in political 
violence (Toktaş, 2005:410). While the rightist fraction employed a nationalist discourse 
mainly resting on anti-communist ideas, the leftist fraction supported an anti-imperialist 
nationalism; but they shared a common interest in the primacy of the state and the 
nation. The military coup in 1980 put an end to this clash and targeted the 
depoliticisation of the society by employing ‘Atatürk nationalism’, which was depicted as 
an ‘authentic form of nationalism’ distinct from the nationalisms of the Left and Right 
cohorts (Kancı, 2009:363). However, in the 1980s the effects of globalisation in terms of 
questioning the supremacy of nation-states and the dominance of nationalism were also 
felt in Turkey. Bora (1998) draws attention to the escalation of a Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis, which postulated Turkishness and Islamism as complementary elements for 
the composition of Turkish nationalism. In contrast to the expectations of the state, the 
imagined national unity based on this idea of Turkish-Islamic synthesis moved into a 
‘process of disintegration along the lines of ethno-cultural cleavages’. The identity claims 
of the ethnic-Kurdish, Alevi-sectarian and fundamental-Islamist groups as Turkish-
Muslim citizens became a current issue (İçduygu et.al, 2008:377). Moreover, non-
Muslim minorities started to criticise the ‘non-egalitarian practices of the Republican 
regime and sought ways to accomplish substantive reforms that would relieve their 
‘second-class’ position in the country’ (Levi 1998; Saul 1999; Bali 2000 cited in ibid). 
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These identity claims and the demands for the recognition of the differences of both 
Muslim and non-Muslim citizens became prominent by the end of the 1980s. Although 
the 1982 Constitution aimed at restoring state authority and suppressing the citizens 
through militaristic measures, as in the case of the 1961 Constitution following the coup 
of 1960, the calls of both Muslim and non-Muslim groups for a new understanding of 
citizenship based on constitutional rights could not be repressed. The issue of human 
rights started to be discussed, along with the claims of those groups, by the early 1990s, 
and the positioning of the state with respect to minority groups took on a new form. 
2.5. The AKP Government Period  
From the 1990s onwards, the criteria of the European Union (EU) integration process 
added a new dimension to the status of the non-Muslim minority groups and the 
recognition of their rights in Turkey. Besides this, the Republic of Armenia as a new 
actor in the politics of the Armenian Genocide emerged by the end of Cold War. Although 
Turkey recognised the new republic in 1991, it closed the shared border due to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ever since then, Turkey 
has used this conflict to verify its denial of the Armenian Genocide and the issue of the 
normalisation of relations between Turkey and Armenia turned out to be an 
indispensable aspect of the ‘Armenian question’ (Dixon, 2010:118).  The well-known 
image of the Armenians in Turkey as an ‘internal threat’ came to be supported by its 
counterpart as an ‘external threat’.  
Under the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), since 2002 Turkey 
has been a state in which Islam has enjoyed its most visible form with a single-party 
government (Keyder 2004).The recent changes, such as the increasing visibility of 
political Islam, ‘the growing polarisation between the secularists and the Islamists in 
Turkey’ (Haynes, 2010: 319) and the notable steps taken by the AKP for widening 
religious freedom, were read by the Kemalist elite as evidence of the government’s 
hidden agenda to challenge the principles of secularism (Goltz, 2006:181). The 
criticisms of Kemalists were deepened by the presidential elections in 2007 where 
Abdullah Gül (one of the followers of the Islamic movement of the 1990s and a member 
of the Islamic Welfare Party) was nominated by the AKP. Consequently, mainly the 
opposition party in the Parliament, and other supporters of the Kemalist ideology, 
organised Republic Protests in 2007. Millions marched to Anıtkabir- the mausoleum of 
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Atatürk- with flags and mottos declaring that ‘Turkey belongs to Turks’ and ‘Turkey will 
remain secular forever’.  
Mardin’s account of the centre versus periphery debate can be helpful to understand the 
clash between secularism and Islam and also the Kemalist ideology and the AKP’s 
stance. In Turkish politics, the centre stands for an official ideology and the constitutive 
philosophy of the state advocated by the Kemalist political elite, whereas the periphery 
denotes the segments of the population who object to the current form of the system. 
According to the AKP, it is more important to bring the demands of the periphery to the 
centre than to be considered as a centre party (Akdoğan, 2006: 59-60). The main claim 
of the AKP is that Muslims were exposed to the constraints of secularism throughout the 
republic’s history and their presence, particularly in the public sphere, was ignored by 
the official ideology and also successive governments; thus, they were forced to stay on 
the periphery of the system and society. One AKP parliament member confessed that it 
is now their turn to ‘blacklist’ those who used to blacklist the Islamists in the 1990s.  The 
AKP constantly underlines its role in representing the periphery and its claims against 
the state. However, the conceptualisation of the periphery is based on the AKP’s 
perception of whom belongs to the periphery. Although PM Erdogan has continuously 
stated that the Armenians in Istanbul do not face any problems, the majority of 
Armenians still feel insecure in their daily lives, particularly after the Hrant Dink 
assassination, and when there arises a problem between Turkey, Armenia, France or 
USA, Armenians in Turkey become the defenceless targets of the Turkish nationalists’ 
acts of retaliation and hate campaigns, which in turn result in an increase in 
discrimination. (Ter-Matevosyan, 2010:99-100). The AKP’s overemphasis on the citizens 
on the periphery also fails to encompass the status of Armenians. 
The changes in the legal arena also revive the debates about the freedom of 
speech/expression with regard to the issues of the minority groups in Turkey. Since 
2005, Article 301 of the new Turkish Penal Code has charged more than sixty 
journalists, academics, intellectuals and even fiction writers for ‘insulting Turkishness’. 
According to White (2007: 127), ‘[t]his phenomenon reinforces at the same time as it 
restricts the development of free speech in Turkey at the cusp of a society balanced 
between EU accession and ultra-nationalist isolationism.’ The controversy concerning 
Article 301 began when journalists and authors who had expressed their ideas 
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concerning the ‘Armenian incidents’ were charged with insulting Turkishness, including 
the best known case, that of novelist and Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk  (BBC News 2005; 
Hurriyet Daily News 2006). Hrant Dink, an Armenian journalist and a defender of the 
rights of Armenian citizens, who was assassinated in 2007, had been also prosecuted for 
allegedly ‘insulting Turkishness’ under Article 301. This lawsuit ‘had made Dink a likely 
target of extremist violence’ (Uslu, 2008: 88) and he was ‘subjected to a steady stream of 
death threats - a total of 26,000 according to some writers in the Turkish press’. (Freely, 
2007:3). 
Furthermore in 2005, Boğaziçi University attempted to organise a conference entitled 
‘Ottoman Armenians of an Empire in Decline’ but it was harshly criticised by the Justice 
Minister who said that “[t]his is like stabbing the Turkish people in the back. I wish that, 
as justice minister, I had not given up the right to bring cases to court on my own."  After 
this statement, the conference was postponed and never carried out. This intervention 
of the government once again signals how any effort to start a discussion on Armenians, 
even in an academic environment, is perceived as a threat to Turkishness. All of these 
developments still reinforce the perception of Armenians today as a direct threat to the 
Turkish Republic, and they are used to legitimise the official narratives. Since the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the denial of the Armenian genocide is a 
‘part of the nation’s founding history [that] has become a fundamental (if silent) part of 
Turkey’s national identity’ (Dixon, 2010: 106). Turkey’s resistance to admitting its 
responsibility for the massacres also reveals itself in its uses of terms such as the 
‘Armenian question’, ‘1915 events’, ‘Armenian relocation’ and ‘Armenian allegations’. 
The Turkish version of the explanation of the genocide argues that the ‘civil war’ 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Armenians caused many deaths on both sides so it 
was not genocide. This belief is also held by much of the Turkish public that have been 
convinced by ‘decades of silence, limited access to historical material and more recently 
active propaganda campaigns’ (Cooper and Akçam, 2005: 84) Despite the existence of 
various governments, social actors, the means of communication and a civil society 
composed of different ideological backgrounds, in the nearly 90-year history of the 
republic, the Armenian genocide has remained as a taboo topic.  
Cooper and Akçam (ibid: 85) indicate the underlying reasons behind the persistence of 
the Armenian genocide as taboo in the Turkish state and among the Turkish public. At 
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an international level, the accusations of genocide are perceived by Turks as a 
‘continuation of the historical tendency of the Christian West to denigrate Turks as 
barbaric’ and a defamatory effort to equate Turkey with Nazi Germany and the 
Holocaust with the 1915 events. At a national level, ‘Armenians serve as a persistent 
symbolic reminder of the most traumatic event of Turkish history: the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the loss of most of its territory’. Despite the attempts to silence and 
suppress the claims about the Armenian genocide in Turkey, there is still remarkable 
political pressure coming from the international arena to acknowledge it. The House of 
Representatives in the United States proposed resolutions in 1999, 2007 and 2010, and 
some European states have passed resolutions ‘recognising the Armenian genocide’ in 
their legislative institutions. In 2005, the European Parliament said the recognition of 
the genocide is a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession to the European Union, and a 
deterioration in Turkey-EU relations followed (Açar and Rüma, 2007: 450-1). In 2006, 
despite Turkey’s warnings to France, the French National Assembly adopted a new bill 
defining the ‘denial of the Armenian Genocide’ as a crime- violation that carried the 
same punishment (a year in jail and a 45,000 euro fine) as that imposed for denying the 
Nazi Holocaust (BBC News, 12 October 2006). This bill was criticised heavily by the 
Turkish nationalists and intellectuals and it caused a heated discussion over the 
intervention of the French political elite in the EU membership of Turkey. Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan stated that “[t]his is an issue between Turkey and Armenia. It is none 
of France’s business” (BBC News, 9 October 2006) and ‘Turkish nationalists perceived 
this bill as another episode of genocide claims aimed at cornering Turkey in the 
international arena and reflecting prejudice against it’ (Aktan 2005). Although the 
Turkish executive organisations and the majority of the Turkish public oppose these 
international interventions about the genocidal history, the representations and 
experiences of the Armenian community in Turkey are still controversial and need to be 
explored.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
The THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The INTERSECTIONS of NATIONALISM, DISCOURSE and MEMORY 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings of the research with the intent of 
providing an overview of the debates and perspectives that are directly linked to the 
research questions and empirical findings. The first part of the chapter begins by 
revisiting the established literature on nationalism and national identity. Focusing on 
the classical distinction between ‘nationalism from above’ and ‘nationalism from below’, 
I readdress the question of the role of this artificial dichotomy for an understanding of 
nation-state formation in Turkey and the diverse forms of Turkish nationalism. This 
reassessment is also important to pinpoint the foundation of the official ideology of the 
Turkish state and its national narratives, and their positioning as ‘glorious’ national 
history, as well as to examine past atrocities against particular citizens of the Turkish 
Republic. In line with the importance of the construction and reproduction of national 
rhetoric for this research, I intend to concentrate on the discursive and quotidian 
aspects of nationalism. It is my aim to discuss the constant flagging of nationhood (Billig 
1995) and the articulation of nationalist discourses in order to provide a basis for my 
critical discourse analysis of news stories in the subsequent chapters. I also look 
particularly at the ways in which the ethnic and religious ‘others’ of Turkish 
nationalisms are formed in discourse.  
Following the first section, the second part revolves around the literature on news 
discourse because I see news discourse as fundamental to interpret nationalism through 
the lens of discursive approaches. First, I examine the debates over the discursive power 
of nationalisms and their interactions with media representations. While this 
examination points out the contextual conditions of the Turkish national newspapers, it 
also raises the issue of the discursive strategies that they adopt in their news coverage of 
Armenians. Second, I explore how ethnic and religious minority groups are depicted in 
the national newspapers. This field of scholarly debate sets out the background that my 
empirical findings on the news portrayals of three incidents draw upon. The third part 
of the chapter is concerned with the relationship between national identity and memory 
in order to provide a backdrop to the ideas of the Armenian interviewees regarding the 
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linkage between past, present and future. Furthermore, this theoretical line of inquiry is 
essential to comprehend how the national newspapers selected for this research 
associate currents events with the past or pass over their historical significance. 
Consequently, I deal with the issues of (trans) national forgetting and remembrance that 
lay the groundwork for the genocidal memories of the Armenian interviewees, along 
with their viewpoints about the connection between present and past attacks against 
the Armenian presence and collective identity. As a final point, this chapter also 
attempts to support the review in Chapter Three of the developments that occurred 
during the periods of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, and to justify the 
reasoning behind the selection of data collection methods in Chapter Four.   
3.1. A Re-examination of the Typologies of Nationalism  
 
In this section I mainly highlight two specific arguments from the conventional literature 
on nationalism and nationality in order to situate the debates surrounding the current 
forms of Turkish nationalism. By taking into consideration the active involvement of the 
state in the creation and representation of the ‘Turkish nation’ and Turkish national 
identity, this research engages in discussion oriented towards the discrepancy between 
‘nationalism-from-above’ and ‘nationalism-from-below’. Since Turkish nationalism as a 
foundational ideology of the state and the Armenian Genocide as a ‘foundational 
violence in the constitution of the Turkish Republic’ (Göçek, 2015: 19) were major 
components of nation-state building, their historical link provides important insights 
into their present encounters. Following this, I reconsider the distinction between civic 
and ethnic nationalisms in order to comprehend the inner mechanisms of Turkish 
nationalism and citizenship.  
 
First, I re-examine the process of Turkish nation-state formation based on the 
understanding of ‘nationalism-from-above’ in order to emphasise the limits of this 
approach.  This perspective, identified as ‘state-led nationalism’ (Tilly 1994:133) or as 
‘state-building nationalism’ (Hechter et.al, 2006:89), argues that nationalism operates as 
an instrument to reinforce homogenisation of the population and promote a nationalist 
ideology to provide the state rulers with a claim to rule on behalf of the people. 
Accordingly, the far-reaching and coercive nation-building process of a state results in 
the establishment of a national consciousness and the cultural homogenisation of the 
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people within its national borders (Aslan, 2007: 247-48). Despite the multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious and multi-cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish state has 
insistently turned a blind eye to the heterogeneous composition of the population and 
their diverse identities and claims while carrying out the nation-state project. In the 
Turkish case, many scholars (Keyder, 1997; Çolak, 2003; Keyman, 2006; Üngör, 2011; 
Kadıoğlu, 2011) have reached an agreement that Turkish nationalism was enforced from 
above and that the implementation of nationalism-from-above also constructs the 
founding ideology of the Republic (Keyder, 1997: 42). More notably, Turkish nationalism 
signifies ‘an extreme example’ throughout the intense moments of state formation as 
‘the masses remained silent partners and the modernizing elite did not attempt to 
accommodate popular resentment’ (Keyder, 1997:42-3). This also comes to mean that 
the nation-state building project predicated on the dominant form of Turkish 
nationalism as the official ideology and the idea of Turkish national identity as a unifying 
force leads to the exclusion of particular ethnic and religious identities despite their 
citizenship ties with the Turkish state. With the purpose of achieving homogenisation 
and imposing a particular form of national belonging, the nation state formation process 
in Turkey has been targeted at removing and silencing ‘unwelcome citizens’.  
 
According to Kadıoğlu (2007: 286-9), there are mainly three sets of ‘others’ for Turkish 
national identity; these encompass the non-Muslims (the Jews, Armenians, and Greeks), 
non-Turkish Muslims, recognised as being different owing to their language and 
religious sects (Kurds, Arabs, Alevis, Circassians, and Georgians), and ‘the backward 
representations of its Ottoman past’ (Bora 1996).  Under these circumstances, along 
with the other non-Muslim populations, the status of the Armenian community falls into 
two categories. On the one hand, their distinct religious and ethnic identity challenges 
the fundamental idea of Turkish-Muslim national identity. On the other hand, their 
existence interrupts the efforts of the Turkish nation-state to detach itself from its 
Ottoman past as ‘Armenians serve as a persistent symbolic reminder of the most 
traumatic event of Turkish history: the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of 
most of its territory’ (Cooper and Akçam, 2005: 85). In other words, the nation-building 
process in Turkey rested upon a belief in the discontinuity between the new Turkish 
state and the Ottoman Empire in terms of regime, policies and citizenship, and a 
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complete break from its Islamic legacy. In the present day, the official denial of past 
atrocities against Armenians still points to the responsibility of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
However, from the perspective of primordialism, the idea of the antiquity of the 
(Turkish) nation, the theme of the golden age, the superiority of the national culture, the 
periods of recess from which the nation is destined to ‘awaken’, and the concept of the 
national hero, all contribute to the construction and representation of Turkish national 
identity. They indicate the representation of the nation as a mystical, temporal and even 
transcendental entity. Accordingly, the survival of the nation is more significant than the 
survival of its individual members (Özkırımlı, 2010:50-2). It might be further claimed 
that the official ideology puts forward the six hundred year-old national and cultural 
heritage of the Ottoman Empire and the sovereignty of the empire in three continents as 
evidence for its entrenched national power. By excluding the status of the Ottoman 
Empire during the recession period (17th and 18th centuries), and its situation as the 
‘sick man of Europe’ in the early 20th century, from its national narratives, Turkish 
nationalism attempts to acclaim a robust Ottoman heritage and nostalgia. According to 
state ideology, the Turkish War of Independence, the foundation of the Turkish Republic 
and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as the founder of the Republic, are also regarded, 
respectively, as the end of a period of corruption, the awakening moment for the Turkish 
nation, and the figure of a national hero.   
 
This contradictory self-identification and representation of Turkish nationalism and 
national identity, mobilised by the enactment of ‘nationalism-from-above’ also came to 
light in the recognition and treatment of minority groups. While Armenian, Greek and 
Jewish communities gained legal minority status through the Treaty of Lausanne in 
1923, assimilatory policies of the state continued in the following years. Despite official 
educational, social and religious rights granted to these groups, the Turkification 
policies and practices of the state to build ‘a society united in a common language, 
culture and religion’ ensued ‘at the expense of distinctions which ideally were thought 
outside the mainstream identity category of nation’ (İçduygu et.al, 2008: 366).  For 
instance, the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign to achieve linguistic unity, the Law on 
Settlement to arrange the settlement practices of non-Muslim groups, the Incident of 
Reserves to control the recruitment of non-Muslim men into the Turkish Armed Forces, 
44 
 
and the Law on Capital Tax to remove non-Turkish capital from the national economy, 
were mainly aimed at the homogenisation, Turkification and Islamisation of the 
population within the national boundaries. Thus, non-Muslim minorities were not 
acknowledged as natural members of the Turkish nation, but have remained as ‘others’ 
in the Turkish-Muslim nation (Bora, 1995; Keyman and İçduygu, 1998 cited in İçduygu 
et.al, 2008:359).  
 
The implications of this ‘othering’ process, along with ‘top-down’ nationalism with 
regard to the status of the Armenian community, are notable in two respects. On the one 
hand, to describe the ‘1915 events’ as genocide and to express genocidal experiences 
once again leads to a questioning of the ‘loyalty’ of Armenians to the Turkish state and 
nation. Since, from the very beginning of the formation of the nation-state, they were 
characterised as unreliable and disloyal ‘subjects’ of the state due to their ethnic and 
religious identities and assumed collaboration with the enemy forces during the First 
World War, their genocide ‘claims’ justified national security concerns and the idea of 
the ‘inner enemy’. Moreover some Armenians’ ways of describing their experiences as 
evidence of state violence is interpreted by the official ideology as a failure of 
assimilatory policies. This also reveals the existence of citizens that challenge the 
practices and rhetoric of the Turkish state. On the other hand, the elimination of 
heterogeneous constituents in the name of a single national identity, history and 
discourse results in the erasure of the Armenian community from official 
historiography. The period of massacres, deportation and other acts of violence against 
Armenians are totally overlooked in Turkish historical recollection and in the history 
textbooks in schools (Kadıoğlu, 2007: 287).  That is to say, one of the aspects of the 
imposition of Turkish nationalism by the founders and elites of the state is also the 
absence of Armenians and their sufferings from ‘national’ collective memory.  
 
Secondly, in line with the inherently conflicted nature of Turkish nationalism and 
national identity, I reassess the other controversial facet of Turkish nationalism and 
citizenship. Although the dual categories of ‘civic nationalism’- a French style conception 
of nationalism’ and ‘ethnic nationalism’, a German style conception of nationalism - are 
themselves problematic, Brubaker’s opinions on this distinction allow one to 
comprehend the construction of citizenship in Turkey as well as the central 
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inconsistencies within the forms of Turkish nationalism. Since citizenship in Turkey 
epitomises ‘an uneasy marriage between ethnic and civic conceptions of national 
identity and belonging’, both the French conception based on territory and the German 
conception based on blood define Turkish citizenship (İnce, 2012:24). The constitutional 
definition of Turkishness denotes that ‘one who is connected to Turkish people in terms 
of Turkish citizenship regardless of religion and race is a Turk’ (Yeğen, 2006:69). 
Nevertheless, Yeğen (ibid:72) demonstrates how this description is ethnicity-oriented 
and discriminatory in terms of deciding who is a Turk; the expression ‘in terms of 
Turkish citizenship’ is itself problematic, in that the non-Muslims and Kurds can only be 
Turks in terms of citizenship, but cannot be ‘real Turks’. This state-defined citizenship 
also coincides with Bora’s conceptualisation of the ‘official nationalism’. As Bora (2011: 
62) considers Turkish nationalism as ‘a series of discourses with a vast lexis’ rather than 
a homogeneous discourse, he provides a topography of the nationalist discourses and 
regards the language of the official (Kemalist) nationalism as the ‘root language’ of 
Turkish nationalism. More notably, he draws attention to the ideological ambiguity of 
this official nationalism, in which the French-style conception of nationalism based on 
the principles of citizenship and territoriality is in a continuous tension with the 
German-style nationalism based on ethnicity-centred postulations (ibid:63). 
 
In a similar vein, Kadıoğlu (2011:45) reflects on the importance of the distinctions 
between French and German nationalisms and the conceptualisations of citizenship, and 
suggests the idea of the paradoxical nature of Turkish nationalism. The reason behind 
this cohabitation of civilisation and culture within the Turkish nationalist discourse is 
the Turkish intellectuals’ task of transforming a popular consciousness, in Chatterjee’s 
words, ‘steeped in centuries of superstition and irrational folk religion’. In the process of 
nation-building, in other words, the Republican elites have a pivotal role in enhancing 
national consciousness and promoting political mobilisation (Smith, 1991; Gellner, 
1983; Chatterjee, 2006). However, the incompatibility between the objectives and 
attitude of state elites and the religious and ethnic configuration of the people of the 
Republic ended in the contradictory disposition of Turkish nationalism. This constructed 
synthesis within the discourse of Turkish nationalism also marked the ‘balance between 
modernity and tradition, Western materialism and Eastern spirituality, and civilization 
(based on the premises of the Enlightenment) and culture (based on the premises of 
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Romanticism)’ of Turkish modernisation. The striking point here is that Turkish 
nationalism generates obligations for  the Turkish citizens, rather than empowering 
them, and regards them as the ‘dutiful servants of the state’; unlike the French case, 
Turkish nationalism advocates a language of obligations rather than a language of rights 
(Kadıoğlu, 2011: 41-6). The discourse of nationalism and national identity in Turkey, 
predicated on statist ideas, also poses questions about the status of the non-Muslim and 
the non-Turkish groups and their civil, political and social rights. The interconnected 
identity, and the temporal and spatial claims of nationalist discourse (Özkırımlı, 2010: 
208-9), revive issues of the contestation and negotiation of zones of nationalism(s), and 
the discursive aspect concerning relations to minority groups such as Armenians in 
Turkey.   
 
Although it might be maintained that a ‘language of obligations’ instead of a ‘language of 
rights’ is applied to all the citizens of the Turkish Republic, and that ‘the nation-building 
project promoted a process of assimilation for everybody defined as citizen’, this project 
simultaneously decided on ‘a public good and identity only accessible to those who 
internalised the new value system’ (Çolak, 2003:15). When viewed from this point of 
view, the citizenship ties of the Armenian community with the Turkish state are unable 
to protect Armenians from being excluded or being ‘unnoticed’ in the public sphere. 
Recent studies on Turkish nationalism and the formation of Turkish national identity 
have also unveiled how actual state practice reflected an ethnic nationalist view,  in 
contrast to the official discourse, which alleges that Turkish national identity is 
identified in civic-territorial terms (Aslan, 2007:249). Although ‘the official discourse of 
Turkish Republicanism may stress an inclusive conception of national affiliation’ (Parla 
and Davison, 2004:68), an exclusive perception also comprises the racist face of Turkish 
nationalism that spotlights ethnic and racial characteristics.  
 
More importantly, ethnic and racial thoughts are activated in order to illustrate the 
unique features of the Turkish nation, which contradicts with ‘more open conceptions of 
national citizenship’ (Parla and Davison 2004 cited in Maksudyan, 2005: 292). For 
instance, the research and publications of the scholars associated with the Turkish 
Review of Anthropology uncovers how the government encouraged research that 
supported an ethnic-racial version of nationality in which the Turkish race had a sense 
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of proprietary ownership of the nation and national identity (Maksudyan 2005). 
Furthermore, it is claimed that the racialist stance of the nationalist ideology was not 
only visible in practical terms, for example granting privileges to Turks and excluding 
others, it also operated by utilising the theoretical grounds arranged by the scientific 
racist elite of the Review in order to create ‘the tyranny of nationalism over science (or 
rather pseudoscience) and to ‘translate ideological arguments into scientific facts’ (ibid: 
314; emphases in original). Therefore, ‘the nationalisation of citizenship in Turkey’, 
incorporating both practical and discursive aspects, comes to stand for the exclusion and 
assimilation of various ethnic, religious and  language-related differences represented 
by Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Kurds, Arabs, Alevis, Circassians, Georgians, Lazes, etcetera 
(Kadıoğlu, 2007: 291).  This discussion revolving around the distinction between civic 
and ethnic nationalism in Turkey, ethnic-racial or nationalist comprehension of national 
identity and the nationalisation of citizenship is apparently pertinent to the process of 
nation-state building. However, it is this contradictory socio-political, legal and even 
‘scientific’ setting that is at the basis of current forms and representations of Turkish 
nationalism.  Correspondingly, the three cases against Armenians scrutinised in this 
research are claimed to be a repercussion of the deep-rooted ambiguities inscribed in 
Turkish nationalisms and Turkish citizenship and contemporary acts of violence and 
discrimination. In a similar way to how state elites and pseudo-scientific works were 
employed in order to consolidate specified image of the Turkish state and Turkish 
nation and a particular interpretation of Turkish nationalism, now discursive and 
quotidian fields contribute to uncompleted process of the construction and reproduction 
of diverse forms of Turkish nationalism.   
 
3.2.   The Discursive and Quotidian Aspects of Nationalism 
By challenging the classical debates on nation, nationalism and national identity, the 
‘new approaches to nationalism’, as Özkırımlı (2010) terms them, underline the 
discursive and contested traits of nationalism and national identity. These approaches 
were mainly affected by the ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences, which ensued with the 
increasing number of social movements in the late 20th century that questioned the 
homogeneity of national cultures and identities (ibid: 169). This emphasis on the 
heterogeneity of culture and identity also led to the academic enlightenment and the 
search for new forms of nationalisms and national identity in context. The variety of the 
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contexts stands not only for studies on numerous states and their national traits, but 
also for the discursive, representational and exclusionary facets of nationalism(s) and 
their relation to other social and political domains, such as the media, education or 
citizenship rights. Moving beyond the analyses on the repressive and restrictive aspects 
of nationalisms and states, critical scholars draw attention to ‘how nationalisms are 
lived out in quotidian life, how these become part of the taken-for-granted social 
environment, how nationalisms produce particular accounts of history and cultural 
identity and how state policies deny some people equal citizenship not through 
proscription but through prescription’ (Puri, 2004:60). In line with these questions, the 
encounter between national narratives and citizens, the discursive aspects of 
nationalism, and the unequal status of minority groups, have come into prominence. 
This section is briefly concerned with the importance of these ‘new’ and critical 
approaches for the objectives of the study.  
 
In this research I draw attention to the discursive and quotidian aspects of nationalism 
in the Turkish context by analysing news discourse in national newspapers and the 
readings of Armenian interviewees on the discourses of nationalism and national 
identity. The Turkish nation-state presents a good example of a ‘nationalizing state’ 
rather than a ‘nation-state’ for the reason that ‘the latter implies an achieved or 
completed condition, while the former usefully implies that this completed condition has 
not been achieved… [a] nationalizing state is one conceived by its elites as a specifically 
unfinished state’ (Brubaker 1996 cited in Yumul, 2009: 265-66). This nation-state in 
progress is also in constant need of ‘nationalizing’ for its survival and is recognised 
under incessant internal and external threats. More importantly, the justification and 
rationalisation of the duty ‘of using state power to promote the specific (and previously 
inadequately served) interests of the core nation’ (Brubaker, 1996:5) are realised 
through these perceived threats along with ‘the sense of injustice the “core nation” had 
experienced in the past’ (Yumul, 2009: 265-66). By taking these points into account, I 
consider that news discourse in the Turkish national newspapers fulfils the need of 
‘nationalizing’ the Turkish state on a daily basis. The repetitive emphases on the idea of 
the Turkish nation, national identity and nationalisms in news stories, facilitate the 
process of the self-actualisation of Turkish nationalisms. In the following chapters I 
explore how discursive strategies are employed to portray attacks towards Armenians, 
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who constitute one group of ‘acknowledged’ internal threats against the Turkish state. 
This exploration is also significant in the sense that the combination of perceived 
internal threat (the Armenian community in Turkey) allied with external threat (the 
Armenian Diaspora) and ‘the sense of injustice’ that the ‘core nation’ (the Turkish 
nation) still undergoes due to ‘genocide claims’ becomes evident through the critical 
discourse analysis of news coverage of designated incidents. In addition, the micro-level 
analysis of nationalist discourses in the media representations of minority groups 
indicates the patterns of national insecurity.   
 
In particular, the works of Hobsbawm and Anderson have paved the way for an 
understanding of nationalism and national identity as fabricated arrangements that 
impose themselves as ‘normal’ and ‘indispensable’ parts of a modern state. Both of them 
share what might be called the ‘constructionist’ approach to nationalism and they agree 
on the idea that the nation is ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ and is represented to the majority 
by a variety of cultural media and social rituals (Smith, 2000:52). Hobsbawm (1992, 
2000) claims that what people come to perceive as natural, such as their national 
identities and their practices/rituals, are in fact ‘invented’ through repetition and 
imposition by the state. The notion of an ‘invention of tradition’ was initially intended ‘to 
provoke, to demystify what was taken for granted’ (Burke, 2002:6) and was employed to 
indicate how ‘nations, nationalism, the national state, national symbols and histories are 
types of recently invented traditions and that any seeming continuity with the past is 
largely fictitious’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:1-14). Correspondingly, Hobsbawm and 
Ranger (ibid: 12) maintain that the nation and its paraphernalia are the most pervasive 
of those invented traditions which ‘use history as a legitimator of action and cement of 
group cohesion’. As they underline the importance of the nation state as the political 
outcome of nationalism and the role of political elites and political institutions, Puri 
(2004: 56-57) calls attention to nationalism from the perspective of ordinary people. 
This fictitious character ascribed to the nation and national identity by Hobsbawm also 
resembles Anderson’s depiction of the nations as ‘imagined communities’. Employing a 
similar theoretical frame, Anderson’s (1991:4) point of departure is that nationality and 
nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind; and more importantly, the real 
challenge lies in showing why and how these cultural artefacts have aroused such deep 
attachments (Özkırımlı, 2010:106). What seems to be obvious is that both of these 
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theoretical standpoints aim to reveal how national identity or nationalism is an artificial 
conception in the modern world and is attributed to inherent characteristics to 
legitimise the hegemonic power of the state and political elites.  
 
Moreover, Calhoun (1997) considers nationalism as an issue of identity embodied in a 
Foucauldian sense of ‘discursive formation’, through which people are able to speak in 
everyday life by reproduction of the binary oppositions of ‘who we are’ in comparison 
with ‘who they are’. By calling attention to the discourse of nationalism, Calhoun (1993: 
214) notices the involvement of many categories and presumptions of this discourse 
that are deeply rooted in everyday language and also academic theories. More notably, 
this discourse is “inherently international”, in that  its claims to nationhood are not just 
internal claims to social solidarity, common descent, or any other basis’ but ‘also claims 
to distinctiveness vis-à-vis other nations’. Despite the various ‘internal nature of 
nationalisms’, they unite by ‘common external frame of reference’. The claims of 
nationalism highlight that ‘certain similarities should count as the definition of political 
community’ and ‘internal homogeneity throughout a putative nation’ should be provided 
(ibid: 216-29). Calhoun’s interrogation might be regarded as instructive in terms of 
recalling the ethnic, cultural or religious differences and identities other than the 
dominant national identity. The discursive and quotidian reproduction of nationalism 
based on certain presuppositions and claims has also led to the problematic status of 
minority groups in a given nation-state. The dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ operates 
not only by indicating the divergence from other nations outside the national borders; 
the citizens with different ethnic, cultural or religious belongings are also seen as threats 
to the homogenous political community and genuine nationhood.   
 
Billig’s study, Banal Nationalism (1995), has also led to a shift in the research focus from 
macro-scale theorising on nationalism to more empirically-based studies that have 
concentrated on issues of representation, contestation and localised meaning-making 
and contextualised case studies (Skey, 2009: 333). Billig (1995) emphasizes the 
everydayness of nationalism, which is defined as an ideology embedded in everyday life 
through constant and unconscious encounters with the symbols of the nation. According 
to Billig (ibid:8), there is a constant flagging of nationhood in established nations and he 
introduces the term ‘banal nationalism’ to cover all those unnoticed, routine practices, 
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ideological habits, beliefs and representations which make the daily reproduction of 
nations in the established states of the West possible. While Billig opposes the 
conventional approaches to nationalism, which concentrate on its extreme 
manifestations and project it on to ‘others’ (Yumul and Özkırımlı, 2000:787), the 
supposed dichotomies between ‘our’ civilised societies and ‘their’ violent ones (Skey, 
2009:334), and also ‘our’ nationalism and ‘their’ nationalism, are challenged. The 
manifold ways in which the nation continues to be flagged also point out the on-going 
production of a hegemonic discourse whose power comes from being seen as natural, 
taken-for-granted, common sense (Sutherland, 2005:196).  
 
Billig’s contentions are revealing for the goals of this research because I intend to 
interrogate how the Armenians in Turkey perceive and interpret their constant 
encounters with the symbols of the nation and nationalism. As national newspapers 
constitute one of the main domains in which the nation is flagged and a hegemonic 
discourse is constructed and reproduced, I concentrate on three Turkish national 
newspapers (Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman) with supposedly different ideological 
backgrounds in order to unmask nationalisms in their divergent forms. Focusing on 
three recent events, I look at the ways in which discursive spheres are created in 
selected national newspapers. As I also ask questions about recent attacks against 
Armenians during the interviews, the ideas of the interviewees expose how they 
construct, represent and/or challenge the discourse of nationalisms. This is equally 
crucial to observe the differences and/or similarities between media representations 
and the perceptions of interviewees in terms of the construction and consumption of 
discourses of nationalism.  
 
Since both the academic and public discussions on nationalism and national identity in 
Turkey usually revolve around the theme of the ‘rise of nationalism’, the increase in 
nationalist sentiments and manifestations are presented as a menace to the 
democratisation process in Turkey. The claims about the rise of nationalism in Turkey 
also overlap with ‘the return of the repressed’ (Ignatieff 1994; Brubaker 1998) 
perspective which became prominent following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in 
1989. Briefly, this perspective refers to the idea that the ingrained national identities 
and national conflicts in the pre-communist history of Eastern Europe, which were 
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‘frozen or repressed’ by the anti-national communist regimes, returned with redoubled 
force after the collapse of communism. It is also suggested that the communist regimes 
did not only repress nationalism but also nationhood, so they were anti-national 
(Brubaker, 1998: 246-7). Correspondingly, Schwarzmantel (2004: 392) supports the 
view of the proliferation of nationalisms since 1989, but broadens its scope to the world 
rather than confining it to post-communist states. However, ‘the return of the repressed’ 
perspective restrains nationalism to a tidal force that strikes settled nations on special 
occasions or regards it as an exotic force located on the periphery and which threatens 
the stability of existing states (Billig 1995; Özkırımlı and Uyan-Semerci, 2011:61). 
Therefore, in line with the emphases of Özkırımlı and Uyan-Semerci (2011: 65), this 
research adopts the conceptualisation of nationalism  as ‘a particular way of seeing and 
interpreting the world’, ‘a frame of reference’, ‘a hegemonic language common to all 
political actors’ which enables me to scrutinise the discursive sphere in the national 
newspapers under examination.  In order to comprehend the views of the Armenians 
and provide an assessment of the claim of ‘the rise of nationalism’, I pose the following 
question during the interviews: ‘As a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, do you think 
there is a prevalent/increasing discourse of nationalism and national identity in Turkey? 
If yes, how do you describe/experience it? Do you think it excludes Armenians?’ This 
question is important in two respects; first, it aims to disclose how nationalism and 
national identity and the claim about their escalating effects are delineated by 
Armenians; and secondly, how do they interpret their own social and political status 
with regard to Turkish nationalism. I will elaborate these points in the following 
chapters.  
 
In addition to critical theorising on nationalism, the arguments of the 
postmodern/postcolonial studies’ approach, which concentrate on nationalist 
discourses, have shaped the theoretical framework of this research. The endeavour of 
these discourses is ‘to produce the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative of 
national progress’. The idea of the nation is ‘haunted’ by a particular ambivalence of ‘the 
language of those who write it’ and ‘the lives of those who live it’ (Bhabha, 1990:1). 
Inspired by Bhabha’s work, Hall (1992) draws attention to diverse discursive strategies 
employed by nationalist projects. Firstly, the story of the nation is narrated through 
history books, symbols and rituals to construct and reproduce the past and future of a 
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national destiny. Secondly, the emphasis on ‘origins, continuity, tradition, timelessness’ 
generates the characterisation of the nation as unchanged and unchanging throughout 
its history. Finally, a historical continuity for the nation is fabricated by the invention of 
tradition along with a foundational myth (Spencer and Wollman, 2002: 49-50). As I 
attempt to indicate in the contextual background chapter, the historical continuity of the 
nation-state formation and its reproduction in Turkey revives the issue of national 
‘others’ with different ethnic and religious identities. A critical gaze at the discriminatory 
political, social and civil implementations towards the historically marginalised groups, 
as well as their representation in the different domains, also sheds light on nationalisms 
in divergent forms.   
 
Although Chatterjee’s analysis deals with the anti-colonial resistance and the post-
colonial setting, mostly focused on India, his criticisms of the discussions on nationalism 
which fail to take the non-European world into account are relevant to the debates on 
nationalism and its prevailing discourse in Turkey. According to Chatterjee (1986: 50), 
there are mainly three moments -the moment of departure, the moment of manoeuvre 
and the moment of arrival- of nationalism in the non-European world. For the Turkish 
case, particularly, the moment of departure and the moment of arrival are relevant and 
explanatory. The moment of departure is positioned in the encounter of a nationalist 
consciousness with the framework of knowledge created by post-Enlightenment 
rationalist thought. This results in the awareness and the acceptance of an essential 
cultural difference between West and East; the former has attributes of power and 
progress, whereas the absence of these features leads the latter to be doomed to poverty 
and subjection. Yet the nationalist’s claim is that this backwardness is not historically 
immutable; it can be surmounted by adopting all the modern characteristics of the 
European culture. At this moment of departure, nationalist thought expresses the 
distinction between the West as superior in the materiality of its culture and the East as 
superior in the spiritual aspect of culture. In the moment of arrival, nationalist thought 
attains its full development and becomes a discourse of order and the rational 
organisation of power. The success of this discourse lies in its capability to dismiss all 
earlier contradictions, divergences and differences and to incorporate them within the 
body of a unified discourse instead of simply introducing a single, consistent and 
unambiguous voice (ibid: 51). Moreover, from the viewpoint of post-colonial studies, the 
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duality between being spiritual, religious and Eastern, and becoming rational, modern 
and Western is subordinating, because the Western conceptual framework is the 
ultimate and universal model for the imagination of the nation. However, 
simultaneously it is liberating, as the spiritual and religious elements of the East disrupt 
the Western hegemonic structure and the secular character of national identity (Bhabha 
1990; Chakrabarty 2001). The encounters with the West generated the effects of anti-
colonial nationalism in Turkey, which became visible in the attempts to enact top-down 
modernisation and Westernisation processes, while at the same time discarding the 
cultural superiority of the West (Breuilly, 1993: 230).  
 
3.3. The Interplay between Nationalism and Media Representations 
 
Critical theorising on the different facets of nationalism and national identity has also 
revived discussions on their relationship with media representations. Given the role and 
influence of the media, particularly national newspapers, in shaping public opinion and 
constructing/reproducing nationhood in Turkey, it is crucial to focus on the interaction 
between nationalism and media representations. Since Anderson (1991:24-46)  
introduced the idea that ‘the nation’ is an ‘imagined community’ and the mass media are 
primarily, though by no means exclusively, agents of its imagining,  debates over the 
dominant discursive power of nationhood, and the role of mass media within nation-
states,  have been given scholarly attention. With regard to national identity building, a 
group of theorists have underlined the role of media coverage (Anderson, 1991; 
Schlesinger, 1991a, 1991b; Billig, 1995; Higson, 2002; Polonska-Kimunguyi and 
Kimunguyi, 2011). Underlining the role newspapers play in the reproduction of 
nationalism, Anderson (1991) claims that as all newspaper readers know they perform 
the same daily routine of reading the same newspaper at the same time as other readers, 
so the feeling of a national community emerges, despite the different identities of the 
readers. The narratives of national identity and the hegemonic socio-political landscape 
based on the ‘discourse of difference’ (Hall 1989 cited in Erjavec, 2001:703) might serve 
to exclude certain groups and raise issues of ethnic/ religious discrimination. The 
cumulative media representations, which are implicitly national, present individuals 
with a version of what their societies look like as a whole and convey the message of 
how society is and how one is located within it; Charles Taylor has described this as ‘the 
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social imaginary’, which refers to ‘the ways in which people imagine their social 
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their 
fellows’ (Frosh and Wolfsfeld, 2006:106). This research also looks at the ways in which 
‘the social imaginary’ concerning Armenians is portrayed in Turkish national 
newspapers. The analysis of news discourse with respect to three specific cases 
accordingly unveils how discursive strategies position Armenians in relation to forms of 
Turkish nationalism and ‘imagine their social existence’ in the Turkish nation-state. 
Since the media is a ‘battlefield’, a space ‘in which contests for various forms of 
dominance take place’, within ‘the communicative space of the nation-state’ 
(Schlesinger, 1991b:299), it plays a crucial role in the formation of a collective national 
identity and the identification of the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ‘their 
potential threat’ to ‘our’ territory, society and culture. One of the focal points of this 
research is, thus, the role of national newspapers ‘in the discursive construction of 
nations and national identities’ together with ‘the construction of 
difference/distinctiveness and uniqueness’ (Hall, 1994, 1996; Martin, 1995 cited in De 
Cillia et.al, 1999: 153; emphasis in original).  More importantly, it is my aim to illustrate 
‘the construction of difference and uniqueness’ in Turkish national identity and national 
symbols through the exploration of representations of ‘Armenianness’ and the Armenian 
community. This should be conceived as a reciprocal process in which the difference of 
the Armenian identity is designed by ascribing certain characteristics in news coverage. 
Although the use of the term ‘national identity’ seems as if there is ‘only one national 
identity’, depending on ‘the situational setting of the discursive act and the topic being 
discussed’ different identities are discursively formed. Therefore, national identities are 
to be recognised as ‘dynamic, fragile, vulnerable and often incoherent’; but ‘there are 
certain relations (of transfer and contradiction) between the images of identity offered 
by political elites or the media and ‘everyday discourses’ about nations and national 
identities’ (De Cillia et.al, 1999: 154). In a similar way to the discussion of the Turkish 
nation-state as a ‘nationalizing state’ in need of ‘nationalizing’, Turkish national identity 
composed of multiple identities also requires continuous self-referential discourses. 
This requirement also brings its vulnerability to light, in that both ‘the images of 
identity’ produced by the media and ‘everyday discourses’ endeavour to camouflage the 
unfinished and imperfect condition of Turkish national identity. Accordingly, the 
incidents concerning the Armenian community provide an opportunity for news stories 
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to reinforce the understanding of a stable, powerful and coherent Turkish national 
identity since the Armenian question as an unresolved problem continues to challenge 
national myths, narratives and discourses.   
By focusing on the construction and reproduction of a national community in Banal 
Nationalism, Billig (1995) scrutinises how a national frame of reference is flagged in 
explicit or implicit ways in the content of newspaper texts.  He emphasises the way in 
which British newspapers effectively nationalise the news and position their readership 
in national terms by ‘the pervasive use of direct national reference (e.g. using terms such 
as British or Britain); by dividing the news into separate ‘home’ and ‘international’ 
sections; by concentrating on events located within Britain, and by using nationalised 
deixis, whereby terms such as ‘we’ and ‘here’ were understood to pertain to the British 
and to Britain’. More notably, he asserts that ‘the naturalness of a national-specific frame 
of reference was signalled implicitly through its unmarked status: that is, by failing to 
name it’ (Rosie et.al., 2004:438; emphasis in original).  In order to underline the banality 
of the nation, Billig (1995) conducts a survey of British daily newspapers on a randomly 
selected day and shows how the nation is flagged everyday by means of the newspapers. 
Replicating this study in Turkey, Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000: 789) conducted a survey of 
38 Turkish daily newspapers on a randomly selected day. They highlight the importance 
of selecting an ordinary day because it allows them to observe ‘to what extent and in 
what forms nationhood is flagged or reminded daily by the media even when there is no 
major crisis’. The most evident indicators of banal nationalism were detected in almost 
one third of the newspapers that used the Turkish flag or a map and/or slogans, 
reminding readers of ‘our’ homeland and national identity. They also emphasize how 
any news story (sports, weather, economy, religion) is framed within the Turkish 
nationalist discourse by its unquestioned assumptions and conclude that the discourse 
employed by the Turkish press is packed with the essential elements of nationalist 
ideology (ibid: 801). For example, in the economy section, the presentation of the news 
about the pending arrival of the credit rating institution Duff and Phelps marks ‘our’ 
nationhood: “Duff and Phelps is coming for an oral examination” (Yeni Yüzyıl), 
“American graders are coming” (Yeni Şafak), “Turkey is being evaluated” (Emek). Yumul 
and Özkırımlı (ibid: 799) highlight that the way this news is presented in the 
newspapers sends a message that ‘our’ country, ‘our’ economy is going to be evaluated 
by the ‘foreigners’, by institutions of imperialist countries whose decision will affect 
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‘our’ future. In a similar vein, the weather sections report national and foreign weather 
in separate sections, and in line with Billig’s observation (1995:116-7), newspapers use 
a map of Turkey in reporting the weather. Supposing the shape of the national 
geography to be familiar to the readers, the presentation of the weather contributes to 
naturalising, at the level of the unconscious, the geographical shape of the homeland 
(Yumul and Özkırımlı, 2000: 790).  
In a similar study, Köse and Yılmaz (2012) analysed 36 daily newspapers of the Turkish 
media on an ‘ordinary’ day by employing the content analysis method to expose how 
various key words, concepts and themes incorporate the idea of nationhood within the 
discourse of the daily news. Seventeen years after Billig’s original survey, in order to 
disclose how the press produces nationalism on an ordinary day, this study focused on 
all the newspapers from different ideological backgrounds, publishing policies and 
owning styles. Thus, 3,146 news items and 462 columns were examined and evaluated 
under five categories: the newspapers’ logos, the use of the words evoking nationalism, 
the expressions that instil a sense of the nation and national achievements, the emphasis 
on common interest and history, and the news dichotomies of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (ibid:912). 
Consequently, Köse and Yılmaz reached the same conclusion as Yumul and Özkırımlı 
(2000), namely that the newspapers in the samples sensationalise the news and 
reproduce nationalism through explicit ideological references, inferences and specific 
contrasts. Moreover, despite their different positions along the political spectrum, 36 
newspapers seemed to find a common denominator about nationalism, in that there 
were no significant differences among them in terms of constructing nationalistic 
semantics (ibid:924).  
Both of these studies provide an idea about the present conditions of Turkish national 
newspapers and the dominant discursive sphere of nationhood, nationalism and Turkish 
nationalist ideology in particular. For the purposes of this research, it is vital to recall the 
common argument shared by these two studies, that the dichotomy between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ in the news discourse continuously produces and reproduces the idea of 
‘othering’. More importantly, the identification of internal (e.g. Armenians, Jews, Kurds, 
LGBT) and external (e.g. neighbouring countries, Western powers) enemies in the 
Turkish national newspapers reveals, as Brookes (1999:248; emphasis in original) 
highlights, how the symbolic power of ‘the dominant representations of nationhood’ 
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characterises ‘the nation as the natural political and cultural unit’ and ‘requires the 
denial of difference within the nation and the subordination of other possible 
identifications with the communities based on locality, ethnicity, etc.’. Rather than 
selecting an ordinary day to examine the discursive sphere in national newspapers, this 
research focuses on extraordinary events. As the ‘flagging of the nation’ and the 
dominant prejudices and the discriminatory ideas about the Armenians/Armenian 
genocide can be found in Turkish national newspapers on a daily basis, the peak events 
might suggest an alternative means to explore whether this prevailing discourse about 
the nation and national identity is maintained. 
Critically addressing Billig’s notion of banal nationalism, Law (2001) also scrutinises the 
national rhetoric of the press. He points out how national identity and newspapers in 
Scotland are mutually constitutive of each other and indicates the need for a revision of 
Billig’s remarks on nationalism in the context of Scotland. This is mainly because the 
scope of nationalism in Billig’s analysis cannot be directly applied to a ‘stateless nation’ 
like Scotland where a semi-autonomous media exist (Law, 2001: 300). One of the most 
notable conclusions he draws is that ‘the generic idea of nation remains banal enough 
[and] each national identity must be generated daily with particular, though mutable, 
semiotic material’. Therefore, by routinely carrying the stories that flag nationhood, 
‘newspapers provide a daily index to shifts within the nation/media problematic’ (ibid: 
314).  
In addition to the points raised by these studies, there are two interrelated issues that 
have to be taken into account in reflecting on the Turkish case. Firstly, the freedom of 
the press is still a controversial topic in Turkey due to the repressive laws, particularly 
in the Turkish Penal Code, and the mass imprisonment of journalists who generally 
write on delicate topics and have a critical stance towards the government. Thus, it is 
becoming difficult to talk about even a semi-autonomous media in Turkey. According to 
the report by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) (2012:6), 76 journalists are in 
prison and at least of 61 of these journalists are being held in direct relation to their 
published work or newsgathering activities. In addition, the efforts of the government to 
disrupt the media’s watchdog function and suppress the dissident views make it difficult 
for Turkey to achieve its long-term strategic goals (ibid: 7). It might be argued that the 
situation of press freedom in Turkey continually conflicts with Turkey’s efforts at 
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integration into the European Union, and the claims of the current government of the 
Justice and Development Party that ‘advanced democracy’ is being experienced and 
Turkey has become a role model for other countries, particularly in the Middle East. 
Secondly, the relationship between media ownership and the government raises the 
issue of censorship, especially on certain subjects, such as the recognition and rights of 
Kurds, Armenians and other minority groups, the arrested journalists or criticisms 
about ‘Turkishness’ and/or Islam. As Algan (2003: 188) mentions, the state chooses to 
ignore the monopolistic practices of media corporations as long as their broadcasts do 
not conflict with the state’s official stance on critical issues, such as the Kurdish struggle. 
It should be noted that a similar attitude is also reinforced in the newspapers towards 
Armenians and, as Human Rights Watch (1999:82) underlines, self-censorship is 
imposed when the sensitive issues, namely the role of military, political Islam, the 
conflict in south eastern Turkey, subsequent massacres of Armenians, are covered. 
Therefore, it is crucial to point out how the media remain silent about topics connected 
with minority groups and in what ways the news stories about these groups are 
neglected and/or different discursive strategies are developed.    
3.4. The Portrayals of the Minority Groups in National Newspapers  
From the late 1960s onwards, the academic literature devoted to the media portrayal of 
minority groups has mainly been concerned with analysing the two main ways in which 
ethnic minorities are problematically presented in media accounts. First, studies about 
the under-representation (or absence) of ethnic minorities, and second, the research on 
the mis-representation (or negative portrayal) of ethnic minorities, were prevalent 
(Mahtani, 2001: 101). According to Gandy (1998), until the late 1990s, the theoretical 
debates concerning media-minority relations were dominated by the idea that the 
mainstream media had not only been inaccurate but also individually, institutionally and 
culturally prejudiced in its news stories about the marginalised groups in a society. In all 
ways, this attitude of the media has not been detached from the overriding socio-
cultural and political settings and the government’s constraints.  
Ungerleider (1991: 160) distinguishes three mechanisms that determine the ways in 
which the minorities are represented in the news media. Firstly, the reliance on the 
government and corporations as sources of news is reinforced by the assumption that 
those who exercise authority in political, social and economic or social institutions may 
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speak authoritatively about issues and events (ibid: 159). In the case of Turkey, this 
authoritative treatment of the current government under the leadership of Erdoğan and 
its effects on news making and self-censorship of the media have become a hot topic. 
More recently, the Gezi Park protests have revealed Erdoğan’s domination over the 
mainstream media as many journalists reporting the protests were subjected to police 
violence and/or were compelled to quit. These protests also revived discussions on the 
reliability of the Turkish media, because TV channels such as CNN Turk and NTV 
preferred to broadcast a cooking program and a documentary about penguins whilst 
there were severe clashes between the protesters and the police, who used brutal force 
and tear gas. At least 6 newspapers also carried the same headline, ‘Democracy 
Demands Sacrifice’ by referring to Erdogan’s speech2 instead of reporting the events, the 
police violence or the injured people. In such an atmosphere, focusing on the media 
representation of the minority groups, particularly the Armenians, and the events 
concerning their recognition and rights might demonstrate how the collusion of the 
government and the media owners makes the national newspapers unable to report the 
news autonomously. Thus, the Armenian question provides a productive theoretical 
ground for exploring the self-censorship of the media and the intervention of the official 
ideology.  
Secondly, ‘pack’ and ‘copy-cat’ journalism contribute to the under-representation of 
minorities in the media because, given the expense of news gathering and tight 
timelines, the media often disseminate information gathered by other news media 
(Ungerleider, 1991:159). In other words, the decisions about which issues related to 
minority groups will and will not be covered in the newspapers are mutually dependent. 
Thirdly, the narrative structure of the news classifies people as heroes, villains, and 
victims, and the issues are framed as conflicts between these figures. As Manoff (1988) 
underlines, a narrative structure creates unity among events separated by time and 
space and creates the impression that separate events share a common ‘meaning’ and so 
provides a single interpretation of many events (ibid:160). This also opens the way for 
stereotyping minorities in the news media and for the denial of ethnic/religious 
diversity in a given society.  In that respect, the media would repeat rather than 
challenge a highly inaccurate and negative public image of the minorities (Spoonley 
                                                          
2 Retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/09/turkey-social-media-smartphones-
occupy-gezi-protests_n_3411542.html 
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1990), and the media’s causal role is noticeable in terms of replicating and confirming 
the dominant ethnic discourse towards the minorities (Gans, 1979; Holtzman, 1980 
cited in Koldaş, 2013:206).  
However, Mahtani (2001: 108) criticises these binary conceptual frameworks based on 
the under-representation or mis-representation of the minorities in the media as they 
do not necessarily create ample room to reflect on other complicated theoretical 
discussions to comprehend media-minority relations. In line with this critique, in the 
past ten years the research in this field has started to move beyond citing examples of 
under-representation or mis-representation in the media towards an attempt to 
understand why these images are tolerated and produced at all. Moreover, Mahtani 
(ibid) claims that the works of Hall (1981), Gilroy (1993), Wilson and Gutierrez (1985) 
and Bhabha (1994) have also encouraged researchers to concentrate on the reasons 
behind the prolonged persistence of stereotypical portrayals of minorities in the media 
and their involvement with multiculturalism, discrimination, and the re-circulation of 
racist discourses.  
Echoing these claims, it is also important to point out the construction and reproduction 
of the media portrayals of Armenians in Turkey by investigating their relation to 
prevailing discourses of nationalism and national identity. Thus, news discourse based 
on a particular meaning system, needs to be understood, as Hartley (1982:6) asserts, by 
a closer glance at the social, political, and historical conditions of its production and 
consumption, because these ‘determinants’ will affect what it says, the way it develops, 
the status it enjoys, and the people who use it. This emphasis on the consumption aspect 
of the relation between media representations and minority groups is also illuminating 
for this research as the audience reception of the media, particularly the national 
newspapers, might differ. At this point, it is crucial to recall Hall’s (1973) most widely 
circulated and debated argument that there is a lack of fit between the moment of the 
production of the message (encoding) and the moment of its reception (decoding); these 
moments of encoding and decoding are also the points of entrance into and exit from the 
systems of the discourse. Borrowing the concept of discourse from Foucault, Hall is 
interested in how discourse works to govern and empower certain understandings of a 
subject while ruling out or delegitimising the others (Procter, 2004:59-60). In addition 
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to the construction process of discourse in the moment of decoding, the perceptions of 
certain portrayals and images by the audience has become a current issue.  
The studies concentrating on the relations between the media, nationalism and minority 
groups seem to regard media audiences as homogenous and passive recipients. The 
researchers also assume that the misinformation provided by the mass media can be 
received by the audience directly and uncritically (Ericson, 1991:220). However, Jewkes 
(2004: 11) criticizes these media-centred assumptions and argues that this approach 
cannot sufficiently touch upon the ‘subtleties of media meanings, the polysemy of media 
texts, the unique characteristics and identity of the audience member’. Entman (1993: 
52) points out that the news frame ‘selects some aspects of a perceived reality and 
makes them more salient in a communicating text’. Therefore, specific information and a 
certain line of reasoning are developed through legitimising particular ideas and 
overlooking ‘other’ ones. News frames as ‘interpretive packages’, giving meaning to an 
issue (Gamson and Modigliani 1987), and the packages of key concepts, stock phrases 
and stereotyped images to underpin the particular interpretations (Norris 1995), are 
not value neutral according to critical media theorists; they ‘reproduce the ideological 
orientation of the larger socio-political system’ (de Souza, 2010:478-9). Madianou 
(2005:7) also argues that the audience cannot simply be seen as ‘empty’ vessels who 
uncritically absorb the media messages that they encounter, and suggests unpacking the 
concept of the audience by asking ‘what role-if any- the media play in the articulation of 
identities’. In a similar vein, Mahtani (2001:115) calls attention to the need for a greater 
understanding of the ethnic minorities’ comprehension of their treatment in the media; 
thus, more research, including interviews with minorities to discern their opinions 
about their representation in the media in relation to identity formation in particular, 
needs to be carried out. By taking these remarks into account, the reception of the 
Armenians, as active agents of the issue, to the media portrayals of the three incidents 
outlined above are included in this research, as well as an analysis of the media 
representations. Following Mahtani’s (ibid: 116) warning about the risk of regarding 
minority groups as homogenous entities and ignoring other facets of identity that play a 
role in minority consumption of media, the interviews shed light on how gender, class, 
age, educational background and other characteristics of the interviewees play decisive 
roles in their opinions. This attempt to investigate the ‘decoding’ moments of the 
Armenians also reveals their critical viewpoint towards the mainstream media and 
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alternative ways of gathering information in order to avoid degrading and biased news 
stories.  
3.5. (Collective) Memory, National Myths and Historiography  
In line with aforementioned theoretical discussions on nationalism, national identity 
and media representations, in this part I scrutinise the collective memory debate that 
problematizes the notions of memory, myths and their relationship with national 
historiography. This examination provides a fertile ground for exploring the 
remembrance and forgetting of past atrocities in the present. The construction of 
patterns of confrontation with the past in nation-building institutions also reveals how 
memories are repressed or totally erased in a public space. In particular, the Armenian 
question might be regarded as a constant reminder of past injustices committed by the 
Turkish state, as well as the passing on of the experience of state violence across 
generations of the Armenian community. The contemporary politics of denial with 
respect to the Armenian Genocide is also nourished by the continuity between past and 
present national narratives that legitimise and promote particular interpretations of 
historical and current events.   
Although there has been disagreement over the concept of collective memory and 
pervasive criticisms concerning its abundant and imprecise usage, academic interest in 
this notion, which is usually defined as ‘memory boom’ or ‘memory wave’, is still 
predominant across many disciplines. However, some scholars have attempted to 
replace this notion with other terms, namely ‘social memory’ (Fentress and Wickham 
1992), ‘collective remembrance’ (Winter and Svan 1999), and ‘popular history making’ 
(Rosenzweig and Thelen 1998), or have continued to employ the old- fashioned concept 
of ‘myth’ (Gedi and Elam 1996 cited in Kansteiner, 2002: 181). Despite this 
terminological diversity, most academic explorations in the field of memory studies 
follow similar ‘research agendas that used to sail under separate colours’ (ibid: 182). In 
addition to an increasing focus on this topic, careless use of the concept of memory has 
come under heavy criticism. According to Gillis (1994:3) ‘memory seems to be losing 
precise meaning in proportion to its growing rhetorical power’ and the close 
relationship between memory and identity emerges in the way in which ‘a sense of 
sameness over time and space is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is 
defined by the assumed identity’. In the same vein, Gedi and Elam (1996: 40) argue that 
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“‘collective memory’ has become the all-pervading concept which in effect stands for all 
sorts of human cognitive products generally’. This situation, accordingly, may lead the 
concept of memory to ‘become indistinguishable from either identity or culture’ (Fabian, 
1999:51). Berliner (2005) thus draws attention to the ‘abuses of memory’, in which the 
process of conceptual overextension of (collective) memory might remove the 
boundaries of the notion. He (ibid:202) further asks, ‘if memory is how the past persists 
in and invests the present’ and ‘if it is defined as “the pattern-maintenance function of 
society or as social reproduction per se (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 112)”, then isn't 
memory the process of culture itself?’ It follows that this process of broadening the 
conceptual limits of memory converts this notion into ‘everything which is transmitted 
across generations, everything stored in culture’ (ibid: 203). Therefore, it becomes 
crucial to clarify what is meant by the term ‘collective memory’ and how it differs from 
history, historiography and mythology as another means of encountering and 
representing the past in a nation-state.  
By taking Halbwachs’ (1992) framework of memory, in opposition to the theories of 
Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud, as a starting point, this research adopts the idea that 
individual memories are embedded in collective interaction. It is suggested that 
collective memory is beyond a series of individual memories or a ‘constructed reservoir 
of ideas and images, but rather is a socially articulated and socially maintained ‘reality of 
the past’” (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994: 54). Thus, it is ‘the experience mediated by 
representation of the past’ that comprises collective identities and boundaries that are 
national, cultural, ethnic or religious (Misztal, 2010:28). Along the same lines, for the 
formation of collective memory, Kansteiner (2002:180) puts emphasis on ‘the 
interaction among three types of historical factors: the intellectual and cultural 
traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the memory makers who 
selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory consumers who use, 
ignore, or transform such artefacts according to their own interests’. When considered 
from this point of view on the production side, this research views Turkish national 
newspapers both as institutions of myth-making rather than memory-making, and as 
powerful tools in the hands of the myth-makers, as well as mediators between different 
social and political actors. The objections and reactions of the members of the Armenian 
community as addressees of prevailing ‘traditions’ and attitudes concerning the 
representations of the past and present also illustrate the consumption side.  
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More notably, Halbwachs ‘emphasis on the function of everyday communication for the 
development of collective memories’ (Kansteiner, 2002:181) reveals the significance on 
a daily basis of media representations in the construction and reproduction of collective 
myths instead of memories. From this perspective, the present discourses and images 
that have appeared in national newspapers with respect to Armenians might be 
considered as reflections of a cumulative body of knowledge produced by Turkish 
national historiography. Regardless of the attempts of a few authors to engage in 
forming a realm ‘in which memory can serve as an alternative to history’, as Klein 
(2000:128) asserts, ‘much current historiography sets memory against history’. On the 
subject of the Armenian Genocide and its repercussions for Turkish national 
historiography, Klein’s argument draws a boundary between the so-called historical 
facts and fictional memoirs of the survivors. Göçek’s (2015) historical research 
interestingly points out ample evidence based on over three hundred contemporaneous 
memoirs, particularly of Turkish Muslim officials and officers, which unmask the 
devastation of the Armenian population and the subsequent expropriation of Armenian 
properties. This study is correspondingly significant in the sense that it challenges ‘the 
main contention of the Turkish official narrative’ which is predicated on the premise 
that ‘almost all of the literature on the collective violence against the Armenians in 
general and in 1915 in particular had been produced outside of Turkey in Western 
languages with the express intent to “undermine the Turkish state and society”’ (ibid: 
56).  Therefore, the utilisation of source material produced in Turkey, especially by 
ethnic Turks, as the verification of state violence not only confronts national 
historiography but also discloses the selective representation of the past.    
Consequently, the distinction between memory and myth comes into prominence as 
‘subsuming them under the monolithic notion of collective memory’ masks the function 
of memory ‘as a counter-hegemonic site of resistance, a space of political opposition’ 
(Bell, 2003: 66). By taking this difference into account, this research on the one hand 
uncovers the ways in which national newspapers, as one of myth-making mechanisms, 
develop discursive strategies concerning the interaction between forms of Turkish 
nationalism and the Armenian question; and on the other hand, it reveals how the 
Armenian question, including past atrocities and present violent attacks against 
Armenians, becomes a site of resistance, as the remembrances of some Armenian 
respondents challenge hegemonic myths enforced by national actors and institutions. 
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This is also why the analysis of the Armenian question in Turkey sheds light on the idea 
of the ‘mythscape’, which refers to ‘temporally and spatially extended discursive realm 
wherein the struggle for control of people’s memories and the formation nationalist 
myths is debated, contested and subverted incessantly’ (Bell, 2003: 66). This discursive 
sphere, therefore, stands for an intersection point between constitutive myths of the 
Turkish nation-state and the ongoing mythical construction and reproduction of the 
Armenian Genocide. More notably, this mythscape characterises how ‘the 
representation of the past’ is rewritten ‘for the purposes of the present’ (ibid).  
Moreover, there are two aspects that need to be addressed. First, the Armenian question 
in Turkey has been persistently viewed as an issue of contest for a ‘nationalist governing 
mythology’ which imposes ‘a definite meaning on the past, on the nation and its history’ 
(Bell, 2003: 74). This might be interpreted as a reason behind the efforts of national 
newspapers to take an active role in sustaining the governing mythology in the present-
day, even though news stories do not directly deal with the past atrocities against 
Armenians. Second, subaltern myths coexist and also continuously challenge the 
governing myth, and they generate ‘their own traditions and stories’ that are pertinent 
to ‘past oppression and suffering at the hands of the dominant groups as by tales of 
national glory’ (ibid). In this respect, some of the narratives of the Armenian 
interviewees in this research exemplify this coexistence between the governing myth 
and subaltern myths. In addition, some interviews epitomise ‘organic’ forms of collective 
remembrance that question the governing mythology and ‘the alleged repository of 
national collective memory’ (ibid: 66). A number of accounts thus unveil how a 
traumatic genocidal process and mentality affect the patterns of remembrance and 
forgetting as coping strategies contrary to stories of national glory and heroism. The 
interviews congruently demonstrate that particular members of the Armenian 
community are captured by the 1915 events, and their sense of temporality and 
spatiality seems to be eliminated. In other words, memory transmissions of trauma and 
suffering among the Armenian generations still haunt their contemporary perceptions.  
Regarding the specific and unusual experiences and memory challenges of survivors and 
their descendants, Kansteiner (2002:187), however, asserts that both the concepts of 
trauma and repression are unable to capture and illustrate ‘the forces that contribute to 
the making and unmaking of collective memory’. This is mainly because the members of 
67 
 
small groups, as the victims of traumatic experiences, are capable of influencing ‘the 
national memory if they command the means to express their visions, and if their vision 
meets with compatible social and political objectives’ (ibid). In a similar manner, 
Zerubavel (1995:5) argues that ‘collective memory continuously negotiates between 
available historical records and current social and political agendas’ and the 
interpretations of these records are shifted and selectively emphasised and suppressed. 
These contentions intriguingly mention the importance of the access to political power 
for historically victimised groups to make their distressing experiences seem legitimate 
in the eyes of the national public. More importantly, the compatibility between the 
collective memory of these groups and existing social and political agendas determine 
whose experiences and encounters of the past are recognised as valid and valuable. This 
discriminating approach towards reminiscences, unlike national governing myths, is 
equally noteworthy for understanding the wider implications of ongoing nation-state 
building project on the efforts to standardise and manipulate national acts of 
remembrance and forgetting.  
3.6. (Trans) National Remembrance and Forgetting  
In addition to the academic focus on the control over what is to be remembered and 
forgotten by political and social dynamics within national borders, in recent years, 
states’ level of democratic governance has started to be measured by their efforts to 
recall their undesirable past. A growing body of research on national and regional cases, 
such as post-war Japan and Germany, post-apartheid South Africa, post-communist 
Central and Eastern Europe, and post-dictatorial South America, revolves around ‘the 
question of how countries deal with the material and symbolic legacies of totalitarian 
rule, genocide and civil war’ (Adam 2001; Barkan 2000; Baruma 1994; McAdams 1997; 
Minow 1998; Schwan 2001; Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd 2000 cited in Moses, 2001: 
91). Although this might be recognised as a positive development in terms of coming to 
terms with the past, the question of which legacies are remembered and which ones are 
not opened up for discussion still remains important. Since ‘what is to be remembered 
and forgotten becomes ideological, symbolic and rhetorical’, ‘in the articulation of 
memories’ ‘some “storytellers” are listened to more carefully as they are thought to be 
more powerful and authoritative’ (Middleton and Edwards 1990 cited in Crawford and 
Foster, 2007:6). In addition, even if particular acts of violence are ‘selected’ for the 
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reconciliation process of a state, it is disputed how key components, for instance the 
political and social actors, contextual factors, and consequences, are addressed and 
which aspects of hostility are revealed or ignored.  
Regarding the Turkish case, the legacy of acts of violence against Armenians has been 
persistently bounded by particular patterns of selective remembrance and forgetting. 
The Turkish state’s official narratives towards the Armenian genocide as integral parts 
of national historiography authenticate the idea of denial as ‘the final stage of genocide’ 
(Stanton 1998). The earlier formal attempts to eradicate not only material, but also the 
cultural heritage of Armenians, also play a part in the current understanding of the 
Armenian question. Since the crucial question, ‘how did the Armenians so swiftly and 
near totally disappear from their ancestral territories’, cannot be responded to 
sufficiently despite the evidence of a massive corpus delicti, ‘the Turkish denial 
syndrome’ benefits from ‘a repertoire of rationalisations, distortions and falsehoods’. 
This is also the reason behind ‘a political end-game bent on reducing the Armenian 
genocide to a “debatable” issue’ (Dadrian, 2003: 270). What is more notable about this 
state-led commitment to repress and eliminate the traces of mass violence is ‘the active 
enforcement of denial’ which goes along with ‘the policy of silencing alternative 
historical narratives’ (Bakiner, 2013: 696).  These two concurrent processes that aim to 
regulate memory practices also signal the incapability of the Turkish state, as a 
‘nationalizing state’ in an incomplete condition (Brubaker 1996), to critically reflect 
upon its past and rearrange its prospective policies towards minority groups. In 
addition to ‘internally generated obstacles to self-reflection’ Zarakol (2010: 3-4) argues 
that ‘the ontological insecurity of the state’, which refers to a lack of a consistent sense of 
‘self,’ makes the state refrain from apologising for past crimes. She draws attention to 
the insecure status of Turkey, as well as Japan, within international society, which is 
embedded in the national identities of both states, and the intersubjective ontological 
security pressures for an apology which entails two major transfigurations in the self-
perception of the state. The transformation from ‘peaceful’ or ‘peaceful when 
‘unprovoked’ to ‘one that is capable of unjustifiable violence’, and also from ‘righteous’ 
to ‘apologetic’, would inevitably ‘challenge the integrity of the narrative of state identity’. 
More importantly ‘the past crime, which has been already figured into the state 
narrative in a certain way, has to be rearticulated in another manner’ (ibid: 7). This 
comes to mean that both the Turkish state’s self-narratives and the positioning of 
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Turkey with respect to the international society dominated by Western European states, 
enforces limits on the commemoration of the Armenian genocide. It might be further 
claimed that the continuous need for ‘nationalizing’ through discursive and non-
discursive realms and the enduring ‘ontological insecurity’ based on both endogenous 
and exogenous identity pressures, lead the ‘Armenian question’ to embody the tension 
between national and transnational memory practices.  
This clash concerning the acts of remembrance and forgetting of the Armenian genocide 
and its present implications also stems from the existence of multiple actors. Along with 
the Turkish state and Armenians in Turkey as the major interested parties, the 
Armenian Diaspora, the Armenian state, Armenian civil society, transnational civil 
society and the international community, confront and rearticulate the official narratives 
which immobilise reminiscences of the genocidal process in the year 1915. Although 
‘until recently, the dynamics of memory production unfolded primarily within the 
bounds of the nation-state; coming to terms with the past was largely a national 
project… under the impact of global mobility and movements’(Assmann and Conrad, 
2010: 2) transnational interventions and condemnations of both past and present 
injustices against particular groups has become a human rights issue. It is thus vital to 
concentrate on the Armenian question within the field of memory studies which has 
witnessed the shift from ‘static sites of memory to the dynamic movement of memory’ 
(Craps, 2012: 74). In particular, the mass media contributes to this change on a 
transnational level by synchronising ‘the witnessing of worldwide events for a global 
spectatorship’ that gains ‘the power to critique and challenge national myths and 
authorities’ (Assmann and Conrad, 2010: 4). As memories of violence across states 
might be depicted as the meeting point for national audiences and transnational 
spectators, it has become conceivable to mention a shared understanding of oppression 
and justice. The mobility of memory beyond territorial boundaries, and possessing a 
range of viewers, has also become visible via the increasing awareness towards the 
remembrance of the Holocaust since 1980s. This universal growth of the memory of the 
Holocaust, has, according to Levy and Sznaider (2006: 4), resulted in a ‘cosmopolitan 
memory’ which ‘harbours the possibility of transcending ethnic and national 
boundaries’. More importantly, the American media has converted the Holocaust into ‘a 
universal imperative, making the issue of universal human rights politically relevant to 
all who share this new form of memory’ (ibid: 132). While Levy and Sznaider (2006) 
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transform the traditional nation-state framework with respect to memory into a local-
global understanding of memory, they also portray the Holocaust as being emancipated 
from its spatial and temporal limitations and as being a mutual moral standard (ibid:18).    
Regarding this interpretation of cosmopolitan memory, Mistzal (2010:37) calls attention 
to its relationship with the emergence of the human rights regime. She underlines 
Turner’s (2006) argument that ‘human rights are rooted in our awareness of our 
common vulnerability, which is increased by our remembering lessons from the past’. 
Thus, the memory of past atrocities is an indispensable trait of the human rights regime 
(ibid). From this viewpoint, the global dissemination and de-contextualisation of the 
experiences of the Holocaust are understood as progressive developments in terms of 
human rights and global justice. Moreover, it is assumed that prospective mass atrocities 
might be prevented by means of the creation of awareness with regard to the traumatic 
memories and representations of the Holocaust and its global implications. In 
accordance with this research, however, there are mainly two aspects which require 
close attention.  
First, the pervasive adoption of the Holocaust as an exemplary case for genocides and 
collective suffering and trauma runs the risk of assessing the devastation of other 
massacres in a comparative analysis. Since the Holocaust ascribes itself ‘like a floating 
signifier to historically very different situations’, Huyssen (2003:99) warns about 
references to the Holocaust, because they may either enable ‘a strong memory 
discourse’ and bring ‘a traumatic past to light’ or block ‘any such public reckoning by 
insisting on the absolute incommensurability of the Holocaust with any other historical 
case’.  In the Turkish context, unsurprisingly, this incommensurability argument has 
been principally promoted by official narratives, as well as scholars who underscore the 
differences between the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide in order to refute 
‘Armenian claims’. For example, Hitler’s infamous question of ‘[w]ho speaks today of the 
extermination of the Armenians?’ in 1939 before the invasion of Poland (Lochner 1943 
cited in Travis, 2013:27), has become a matter of debate. In particular, some scholars, as 
supporters of the Turkish national historiography, have attempted to counteract this 
idea that connotes the historical linkage between these two human catastrophes. 
According to Ataöv (1999), Hitler’s quote is absent from Nuremberg documents and the 
Armenian genocide did not take place and ‘Armenians collaborated with the Nazis 
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whereas Jews were welcomed by Turks’ (Travis, 2013: 30). In a similar vein, Lowry 
(1985) believes in the inadequate evidence of this alleged statement and argues that ‘the 
Armenian genocide was simply a type of ‘propaganda’ and ‘vilification against the 
Republic of Turkey’, and Lewy (2005) insists that ‘any attempt to link the anti-Armenian 
massacres and the Holocaust rests ‘on a shaky factual foundation’ (ibid:31).  It is thus not 
very uncommon to encounter the discourse of denial articulated through the 
comparison and contrast of the inhumane and intentional aspects of the Holocaust and 
the systematic slaughter of Jews in Hitler’s Germany, and the ‘unexpected’ consequences 
of deportation of Armenians during wartime and the tolerant approach of the Ottoman 
Empire towards all ethnic and religious communities. In other words, it is difficult to 
operationalise the concept of cosmopolitan memory vis-à-vis the Armenian question in 
Turkey. This is related not only to its identification with the Holocaust remembrance, 
but also the dominant rhetoric that propagates the recollection of the Armenian 
genocide as a matter of Turkish national struggle and pride rather than a human rights 
issue.  
The second problem with the notion of cosmopolitan memory involves attributing 
importance to memories depending on the existing hierarchy among different states. 
Margalit (2002: 80) contends that ‘our memory of Kosovo overshadows our memory of 
Rwanda’ as ‘the atrocities of Europe will be perceived as morally more significant’. This 
assertion implies asymmetrical portrayals of regions of the globe in the cosmopolitan 
memory since memories and events from Third World countries are subjected to being 
suppressed by memories and events from the First World (Margalit 2002 cited in 
Misztal, 2010:39). If the memory narratives of the Armenian Genocide are considered 
within the context of the cosmopolitan memory, one can identify incompatible access to 
passing on genocidal memories between the members of the Armenian Diaspora and 
Armenians in Turkey and Armenia. This might predictably be caused by distinct 
experiences and patterns of remembrance and forgetting past atrocities among those 
groups. However, the valorisation or trivialisation of their recollections in both national 
and transnational political and social realms is quite dissimilar. For the Armenians in 
Turkey, for instance, it is not very ‘easy’ to speak out about their past sufferings and 
present problems encountered in their relationships with the state, in comparison with 
the members of the Armenian Diaspora in France or United States. Although the 
Armenian Genocide, in the same way as the Holocaust, might open up a space for 
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discussion about the confrontation of a national historiography with past atrocities, 
memory transmissions among the Armenian generations in Turkey are still compelled 
to remain within the boundaries of the national historiography. In other words, the 
construction of a cosmopolitan memory with respect to the Armenian Genocide might 
pose a question of whose memories and whose victimhood is more significant and 
legitimate than others.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Methodological Considerations about the Research Methods 
In line with the research questions and objectives of this qualitative study, critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews constitute the methods of 
inquiry. This study draws on data from both CDA of three Turkish national newspapers 
and forty five interviews with Armenians living in Istanbul. There are a number of 
reasons for deciding on this research design to investigate the discursive formation of 
nationalism(s) in media representations and unveil the perceptions and experiences of 
Armenians. First, the persistent influence of print media in Turkey on the dissemination 
of information and the construction of public opinion, as well as the intervention of the 
current government in ‘adjusting’ the content of the news stories concerning delicate 
topics (namely, the Kurdish issue, the status of Alevis, political and military relations, the 
Armenian issue, and the headscarf issue) led me to concentrate on national newspapers. 
Second, the way in which Turkish national newspapers’ make news stories about 
incidents concerning Armenian citizens and create dichotomies in terms of ethnic-
religious belongings and nationalism(s) might be regarded as a reflection of the official 
ideology and tradition of the Turkish state. Finally, the sensitive and taboo aspects of the 
‘Armenian question’ in Turkey raise the question of self-censorship in the national 
newspapers. 
Therefore, CDA is an appropriate method to reveal the underlying messages, power 
relations, stereotypes and discursive manoeuvres of the newspaper texts. By applying 
CDA my aim is to enquire into ‘the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge 
of dominance’, ‘different modes of discourse-power relations’ and ‘discursive strategies 
of elites for the maintenance of inequality’ (Van Dijk, 1993:249-50) in the news stories 
of three Turkish national newspapers with reference to the particular events focused on 
in this study. Moreover, this approach enables me to pinpoint how national newspapers 
with different ideological standpoints and journalistic ethics and standards employ both 
distinct and common linguistic and visual tools while reporting news about Armenians. 
Although it might be argued that all over the world the press has a general tendency to 
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be prejudiced and to act in collusion with the established order, CDA will allow me to 
identify new findings which apply uniquely to the Turkish context.  
In addition to the CDA of three Turkish national newspapers with respect to the events 
under analysis, this qualitative research also includes semi-structured interviews with 
Armenians. The motives behind the choice of semi-structured interviews as a tool for 
collecting data were threefold. First of all, I preferred the technique of semi-structured 
interviews as they have the potential to provide valuable insights which cannot be 
offered by any other methods. The ideas, perceptions and experiences of Armenian 
interviewees helped me to uncover the various dimensions of my research questions 
and revise the focal points of this research. Secondly, this interactive encounter gives me 
the opportunity to recognise the peculiar ‘realities’ and interpretations of the 
interviewees and also reconsider my position as a researcher. In very practical terms, 
this technique seemed a way to divulge the past and examine how specific occurrences 
shaped the thoughts and feelings of people, and to provide information about social 
settings which are otherwise inaccessible for a researcher (Weiss 1994). Finally, in 
order to intensify the scope and validity of this qualitative research I decided to take 
account of both the media representations as the production side of certain images, 
patterns and prejudices, and also the opinions of Armenian interviewees on the 
consumption side of their own representations in the newspapers. This combination of 
data collection methods correspondingly exposes the differences and/or similarities 
among the media representations and the attitudes of interviewees. Moreover, my 
changing researcher roles during the interviews and the inspection of the newspapers 
point out the dissimilar facets of this research.  
4.2. Data Collection Methods 
In order to employ CDA, following the decision to set the national newspapers as the 
object of analysis, I agreed to focus on only three incidents, the assassination of an 
Armenian journalist (Hrant Dink) in 2007, the murder of an Armenian soldier (Sevag 
Balıkçı) during his military service in the Turkish Armed Forces in 2011 and the protest 
in Taksim Square against the Khojaly Massacre in 2012. The main rationale behind the 
choice of these cases is that they stand for both distinct and common aspects of the 
debates over the ‘Armenian issue’ in general, and the status of Armenian citizens in 
Turkey, as well as the divergent forms of nationalism(s). As I intend to unmask a more 
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up-to-date understanding of the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkey and also the problematic 
and fluctuating interaction between the Turkish state and Armenian citizens, these 
latest events are timely indicators for the ongoing relevance of this subject matter.  
For CDA I selected a sample of news stories regarding these events in three Turkish 
national newspapers. In order to broaden my analytical perspective vis-à-vis these 
events I opted for Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman as the three Turkish national 
newspapers, in order to scrutinise news stories and identify both prevailing and 
suppressed news discourse, and to disclose journalistic strategies. With the purpose of 
doing more focused and comprehensive research, the CDA covers only one week after 
each of these incidents. By applying CDA I aim to explore the following questions: 
• How do Turkish national newspapers that seem to be ideologically different 
depict the events concerned with Armenian citizens in Turkey? 
• What sort of discursive spheres are developed by the national newspapers in 
terms of constructing and reproducing Turkish nationalism(s) with regard to the 
media representations of Armenians? 
• How does the editorial language disseminate the dominant official ideology 
pertaining to Armenians?  
Using this method my goal is to probe and expound the reasons why Armenians and/or 
the incidents concerning Armenians are portrayed in particular ways in Turkish national 
newspapers and to delve into what forms these media representations take. This 
attempt also suggests how the interaction between news discourse and hegemonic 
power relations and socio-political context plays a pivotal role in writing style 
(language, tone, style, and attitude) and visual preferences (photos, colour, font type, 
font size) of journalistic texts.  
Along with a CDA of the media representations, I conducted interviews with Armenians 
who are Istanbul dwellers. For the interviews one of my main concerns is to assure the 
diversity among the interviewees in terms of age, gender, occupation, social class and 
political stance as much as possible. In parallel with a CDA of the news stories covering 
the murders of an Armenian journalist and an Armenian soldier and the protest in 
Istanbul against the Khojaly Massacre, these cases are also located at the centre of my 
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interview guide. Moreover, the interviews undertaken for this research aspire to map 
out both general and particular inclinations of the interviewees with regard to their 
reading habits of Turkish national newspapers with different ideological backgrounds 
and their views on their own media representations. The intermingling phases of these 
two methods, additionally, led me to grasp various theoretical and methodological 
dimensions.  
4.3. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
First of all, it needs to be emphasised that diverse theoretical and methodological 
frameworks of the scholars working with CDA has resulted in various approaches. In 
particular, the dialectical-relational approach of Norman Fairclough, the discourse-
historical approach of Ruth Wodak and the socio-cognitive approach of Teun Van Dijk, 
have been influential within this interdisciplinary field and opened up a novel area of 
investigation. As the analysts themselves highlight, there is no single, homogeneous 
version of CDA. It is common to categorise a whole range of critical approaches (e.g. Gee, 
1990; Scollon, 1998; Rogers, 2004; Jeffries, 2007; Richardson, 2007) as CDA (Machin 
and Mayr, 2012:4). However, the mutual interests in ‘the semiotic dimensions of power, 
injustice, abuse, and political-economic or cultural change in society’ (Fairclough et.al, 
2011:357) and ‘the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures’ 
(Machin and Mayr, 2012:4) are the unifying points for various attitudes with respect to 
CDA. Moreover, all these approaches are concerned with ‘de-mystifying ideologies and 
power through the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, 
spoken or visual)’ (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:3; emphasis in original). 
These key objectives of CDA, regardless of the dissimilar positions, are also crucial for 
this study since news texts as hegemonic discourses (Hall 1982; Van Dijk 2003) 
constitute the objects of analysis and their relationship with the social forces that 
underlie a discursive regime (Wodak, 2001:9) stands at the centre of this inquiry. 
Through CDA I intend to explore how news discourse mirrors the social reality. 
Congruently, this research unveils the reflections of the prevailing power relations and 
socio-political and cultural structures on the discursive sphere of Turkish newspapers, 
along with a specific focus on Armenians as an ethnic-religious minority group. Both 
written and visual forms of semiotic data in the national newspapers are analysed in 
order to point out how news discourse about Armenians and the Armenian question is 
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produced and reproduced. More notably, ‘a dialectical relationship between a particular 
discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s)’ (Fairclough 
et.al, 2011:357) is investigated by addressing certain incidents, such as the assassination 
of Hrant Dink, the murder of an Armenian soldier and the protest against the Khojaly 
Massacre.  
Rather than following a particular path of CDA, this research takes into account different 
arguments from the dialectical-relational approach, the discourse-historical approach 
and the socio-cognitive approach. Although this might give the impression of a jumbled 
understanding of CDA, I consider these diverse interpretations as complementary and 
their critical stances pertaining to discourse, power relations, social structures and 
ideology as the common denominator for their explorations. In order to elucidate on 
which grounds these notions are utilised in the CDA of this research, I refer briefly below 
to these main approaches.    
In their critical studies, Van Dijk, Fairclough and Wodak, the most prominent scholars in 
the CDA field, attach great importance to the symbiotic relationship between discourse 
and power relations. Both Fairclough and Wodak deal with the question of ‘how power 
relations are exercised and negotiated in discourse’ and assert that CDA can indicate 
‘how the kinds of power relations involved in racism are maintained through news texts’ 
(Machin and Mayr, 2012:5). Regarding the relations between discourse and power, in a 
similar vein, Van Dijk (2003:355) argues that access to specific forms of discourse, e.g. 
those of politics, media or science, is itself a power resource. He then elaborates his 
claim and expresses the view that ‘[i]f controlling discourse is a first major form of 
power, controlling people's minds is the other fundamental way to reproduce 
dominance and hegemony’ (ibid: 357). By the same token Reisigl and Wodak (2009:91-
3) identify three ways to search different types of discourse, which are the identification 
of the major themes, the investigation of the discursive strategies used, and the 
examination of the types of linguistic realisations in discourse. This stress on the various 
aspects of discourse and discursive strategies and their key role for the socio-cultural 
and political setting, sheds light on the interaction between discourse and power 
relations. 
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Having been inspired by these lines of arguments, my research looks at the ways in 
which power relations as well as the (official) ideologies involved in Turkish 
nationalism(s) and national identity are perpetuated via news stories and photos in 
relation to Armenians. However, the sole intention here is not simply to reveal negative 
or prejudiced images of national ‘others’, i.e. Armenians in this case, within the media 
representations. Instead, it is important to focus on how news discourse (both written 
and visual) concerning Armenians and the Armenian issue imitates the contemporary 
socio-political context in Turkey and the deep-rooted nationalist state tradition. As the 
national newspapers might be acknowledged as the ideal zones for ‘mind control’ from a 
socio-cognitive perspective, I aim to identify discursive patterns of news making 
strategies among different newspapers (Hürriyet, Zaman and Cumhuriyet) on the same 
incidents. What is more to the point is that I attempt to unmask ‘the manipulation of 
mental models of social events through the use of specific discourse structures, such as 
thematic structures, headlines, style, rhetorical figures, semantic strategies’ (Van Dijk, 
1996:85) in the national newspapers.  
Furthermore, the dialectical-relational approach of Fairclough (2009: 162) intends to 
analyse the power relations as shown through discourse. By borrowing Foucault’s 
concept, Fairclough (1993:138) defines order of discourse as the ‘totality of discursive 
practices of an institution and relationship between them’. He puts forward a three-
dimensional framework to comprehend and analyse discourse. The first dimension is 
discourse-as-text, which is the linguistic features and organisation of concrete instance 
in the discourse. Thus, the choices and patterns in vocabulary, grammar, consistency 
and text structure need to be systematically examined. The second dimension is 
discourse-as-discursive-practice, in which the discourse is regarded as something 
produced, circulated, distributed, and consumed in society. Finally, the third dimension 
is discourse-as-social-practice, i.e. the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in 
which the discourse is a feature (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 448-9). I adopt this 
framework as a guideline for my CDA, in which first the linguistic manoeuvres of news 
discourse are identified. The analysis, then, seeks to find out how ‘discursive practice’ is 
produced and distributed by news stories, and on the consumption side the semi-
structured interviews present significant insights regarding the perceptions of 
Armenians as the recipients of discourse. Lastly, following Gramsci’s conceptualisation 
of hegemony, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) and Van Dijk (1998) describe the 
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power of media discourse as ‘manufacturing consent’ which stands for a persuasive and 
manipulative form of power and discourse access as a means to implement power and 
dominance. Therefore, by recalling Van Dijk’s (1996: 86) complex question ‘Who may 
speak or write to whom, about what, when, and in what context or who may participate 
in such communicative events in various recipient roles’, CDA in this research draws 
attention to the multi-layered ideological and hegemonic processes that affect both the 
production and consumption sides of news discourse.  
As a research tool CDA provides an additional space for this research in terms of probing 
discursive, representational and exclusionary aspects of nationalism(s) and national 
identity. Wodak and Reisigl (2001:385) differentiate the constructive, perpetuating, 
transformational and destructive strategies of discourse, as they regard discursive 
practices as socially constitutive. According to this classification, ‘discursive practices 
play a decisive role in the genesis, production and construction of certain social 
conditions’. Thus, ‘discourses may serve to construct collective subjects like ‘races’, 
nations, ethnicities, etc.’. This shows the way for a CDA of the media representations of 
Armenians and the Armenian issue to enquire into the characterisations of  ‘Armenian’ 
and ‘Turkish’ as contradictory ethnic and national categories which have their own 
essence and customs. Second, ‘discursive acts might perpetuate, reproduce or justify a 
certain social status quo (and “racialized”, “nationalized”, and “ethnicized” identities 
related to it)’. For my CDA this raises the question how Turkish nationalisms and 
Turkish national identity are perpetuated, reproduced or justified, and in which news 
stories, with respect to the way specific events about Armenians are formed. Third, 
discursive practices ‘are instrumental in transforming the status quo’ and finally they 
‘may have an effect on the dismantling or even destruction of the status quo’.  This 
implies a CDA quest for news texts in the Turkish national newspapers in order to grasp 
whether there are any attempts to alter or challenge the status quo, particularly Turkish 
nationalism(s) and Turkish national identity as the dominant systems of belief in 
contrast to the Armenian identity.  
In more concrete terms there are also other studies that employ CDA as a research tool 
to scrutinise the representations of minority groups in the news discourse. Khosravinik 
(2010) explores the representation of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants 
(RASIM) in various British newspapers between 1996 and 2006 by employing a CDA 
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investigation on the discursive strategies. In line with one of my objectives for the 
Turkish case, he seeks to find out an answer to the question: ‘What are the most 
significant differences in representation of RASIM in different British newspapers?’ 
(ibid: 2). Hartman and Husband also underline the impact of media discourses on 
immigration to England in the early 1970s and point out the similarities between anti-
Semitic discourses in the 1920s and the discursive strategies adopted for immigration in 
the 1970s; they claim that in both historical instances fallacious xenophobic arguments 
are used in news discourse (ibid: 4). In a different study, Mahmood et.al (2011) uses 
CDA for the news headlines of different papers about the budget of Pakistan in 2011-
2012 by looking at the different representations in different newspapers of the same 
budget speech made by the finance minister. CDA illustrates how ideology performs in 
the construction of newspaper headlines. These headlines are also surrounded by 
certain hidden ideologies of the editors that lie behind apparently simple statements 
(ibid: 128). 
Given that the mass media are the major source of ‘ethnic’ knowledge and opinion in 
societies, extensive research focuses on the representation of minorities in the media, 
such as on television, in newspapers and in movies (Dates and Barlow 1990; Jager and 
Link 1993; Hartmann and Husband 1974; Van Dijk 1991 cited in Van Dijk, 2002:152). 
However, many previous academic inquiries are based on the content-analytical method 
which denotes the investigation of the observable features of text or talk through the 
lens of the quantitative approach. For instance, counting the number of portrayals of 
members of a particular ethnic group in the news, or advertising and identifying the 
ascribed roles of these groups in the news, are frequently applied ways to examine the 
representations of the minorities. Although these studies present some understanding of 
the positioning of the minorities in the newspapers, they fail to reveal precisely how the 
media depict minorities or ethnic relations. Conversely, CDA is able to offer such a study 
and ‘also is able actually to explain why media discourses have the structures they have, 
and how these affect the minds of the recipients’ (Van Dijk, 2002:152).   
It should be also noted that CDA does not only pave the way for pinpointing the 
existence of the minorities in the news discourse, but also signalling their absence. In 
order to construct and reproduce the hegemonic language and the dominant 
presentation of social events, as Erjavec (2001:703) underlines, the selective use and 
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misuse of information are utilised as journalistic strategies. In addition, ‘at the level of 
meaning news discourse is determined by what is there but also by what is absent, not 
selected and discursively repressed’ (ibid); by taking a CDA approach in this research, I 
intend to expose these discursively ‘repressed’ and/or ‘dominating’ news stories about 
the Armenians in three Turkish national newspapers that are allegedly distinct in their 
ideological affiliations. Discovering the differences and/or similarities between the 
newspapers in terms of the ways they handle and disseminate the Armenian issue 
seems to be enlightening, as the media owners, their relationship with the 
government/political elites and the self-censorship become the effective forces. The 
foremost and most eye-catching domains in which all of these factors come into effect 
are the headlines of the newspapers, as they describe the most prominent and relevant 
news information and the underlying semantic macrostructure from a subjective and 
biased point of view (Van Dijk 1987; 1988). Accordingly, particular attention is devoted 
to the newspaper headlines in this research to observe whether the Armenians appear 
in headlines in association with negative acts, as Van Dijk (1988) alleges, even if there is 
an issue pertaining to the survival of an Armenian. Although the characterisation of 
‘negative-active actors’ is attributed to the minorities in the headlines of mainstream 
media in such a way that the majority would not consider their acts as acceptable (Hall 
1982), the analysis of crisis events might introduce different patterns of news making 
and interpretations concerning the Armenians.  
Concerning the importance of headlines in CDA of newspapers, Billig (2008:785) claims 
that the works of Fowler et al. (1979) and Fowler (1991) transformed the 
understanding of common discursive phenomena such as newspaper headlines. These 
works indicated that the headlines are beyond innocent summaries of reported stories 
as they select the noun phrases over the verbs and the passive voice over the active 
voice, so they are ideologically charged. Fowler and colleagues merged the producing of 
nouns/noun phrases, or nominalization, with the producing of the passive 
constructions, or passivization; both of these concepts were defined as processes or the 
transformations. In connection with nominalization and passivization, there are mainly 
four traits which are: deleting agency, reifying, positing reified concepts as the agents 
and maintaining the unequal power relations (Billig, 2008:785). In other words, there 
occurs the risk of removing and censoring the core information, such as the agents of the 
action and according to Fairclough (1992:181) ‘nominalization turns processes and 
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activities into states and objects, and concretes into abstracts’.  I explore these linguistic 
transformations in the Turkish national newspapers, particularly in the headlines. 
Tracking Van Dijk’s CDA techniques, Sezgin and Wall (2005:789) identify some 
analytical categories for their analysis of the Kurds in the Turkish press and in 
accordance with my research I adjust these categories, such as the topics and the sub-
topics (main events, or subjects of discussion), the language (verbs, adjectives, and 
phrases used to describe the Armenians), the background information about the 
Armenians, and the sources in the coverage of the Armenians. My effort to disclose the 
(re)production of the media representations of the Armenians unquestionably embraces 
the unveiling of the (re)production of power relations in the news discourse.  
Since one of the objectives of this research is to explore the construction and 
reproduction of the ‘flagging’ of the nationhood and the discursive aspect of 
nationalism(s) and/or national identity in the Turkish national newspapers,  CDA as an 
appropriate method enables me to detect the underlying mechanisms of the texts in the 
newspapers. Among many other national products such as national holidays, museums, 
officially sanctioned curricula, the national newspapers form a significant part of 
‘consuming the nation’, which refers to ‘the constitution and expression of national 
difference through everyday consumption habits’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 538). 
Thus, discourse is the primary means through which the national newspapers’ selection 
of certain headlines, words, idioms and photos in making the news become important 
for ‘consuming the nation’. The various discursive strategies used by the national 
newspapers, particularly for the delicate topics that might have the potential to question 
the status-quo entail, a CDA approach. This analytical perspective contributes to the 
quest for the ways in which the Armenians/Armenian question in Turkey are covered 
and presented by the Turkish national newspapers by addressing specific events.   
As one of the pioneering scholars of CDA, Van Dijk (1993: 249-250) draws attention to 
‘the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance’, ‘different 
modes of discourse-power relations’ and ‘discursive strategies of elites for the 
maintenance of inequality’. The pursuit of CDA to investigate ‘opaque as well as 
transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as 
manifested in language’ (Wodak 1995 cited in Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000:448) is 
also in accordance with the analysis of the discursive formation of nationalism and 
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national identity through the media representations of the Armenians in Turkey. As it is 
through the discursive practices of the media that the dominant ideology is 
disseminated and reinforced, the mass media play a pivotal role in the establishment 
and perpetuation of power relationships (Fairclough 2001 cited in Hakam, 2009:36). 
Therefore, the ways in which discourse in the media constructs, represents and also 
challenges the prevailing understanding of the Armenian issue in Turkey come into 
question. 
4.3.1. Discursive Tools  
The CDA in this research puts forward the ‘interpretations of the meanings of texts’ and 
positions ‘what is written or said in the context in which it occurs’ (Richardson, 
2007:15). This interpretative and contextual understanding of CDA also enables this 
research to uncover the textual structures of the newspapers that construct and 
reproduce the discursive formation of Turkish nationalisms during times of crisis. In 
addition, the incidents under investigation in this research allow me to delve into 
different linguistic techniques utilised by the national newspapers to disseminate 
overriding ideologies. For instance, the assassination of Hrant Dink might be regarded as 
one of the turning points for the ideological struggle and negotiation between various 
forms of Turkish nationalisms and the media representations. Particularly in the course 
of national crises and conflicts the task of the media is to underpin the psychological 
bonds between nation and citizen through the pervasive construction and reproduction 
of founding myths, and through which a common identity and a sense of collective 
purpose becomes more powerful and visible (Chan, 2012: 362). Therefore, a close 
examination of the discursive strategies employed by the Turkish national newspapers 
sheds light on, as Titscher et.al (2000:146) argue, ‘the relationship between the text and 
its social conditions, ideologies and power relations’. Not only does a CDA of Hrant Dink 
case provide insights into the media representations of Armenians, it also offers a 
snapshot of the patterns of confrontation and denial of both the past and present events 
concerning the Armenian community in Turkey. In a similar vein, CDA of the selected 
newspapers reporting the murder of Sevag Balıkçı and the protest in Istanbul against 
the Khojaly Massacre introduces the intersection points between the issues of 
nationalism, religion and ethnic/racial identities.  
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In order to do a comprehensive CDA, the starting point is to identify the emerging 
themes for each incident in the news stories and columns. Moreover, other linguistic 
devices, such as lexical choices, direct quotations, grammatical features (active and 
passive forms) and nominalisation are taken into account. Before presenting the 
findings of CDA it might be useful to explicate what is meant by these working notions. 
In basic terms, lexical choices refer to the word choices for the sentences which are 
directly connected to the ideological agenda of the news makers. This selection 
mechanism impinging on the meaning of a text reveals which types of words are chosen 
to inform the readers. In terms of the word selection Pape and Featherstone (2005) 
highlight the perceptions of the journalists who decide on how the events will be 
conveyed by means of the words they choose. Moreover, these decisions of journalists 
might coincide with their mediator roles in the relationship between ruling class 
ideology and news content (Murdock 2000), as well as their support for the hegemony, 
by naturalising, or taking for granted, the inequalities of contemporary capitalism (Gitlin 
1979 cited in Richardson, 2007: 36). The lexical choices, accordingly, are far beyond the 
products of the straightforward judgements of the news writers. In fact, attempts to 
divulge the components of the selection process might suggest the multi-layered 
collaboration between the news makers, the news content, the newspaper ownership, 
and the journalistic ethics on the one hand, and the dominant class ideology, the 
prevailing status quo and the deep-rooted inequalities on the other hand.  
Secondly, the use of the direct quotations in the news stories and columns signifies 
another important aspect of the discursive strategies. The ‘neutral’ appearance of the 
direct quotations might be misleading as they camouflage the underlying motivations of 
the news makers. Although from a reader’s point of view the encounter with a direct 
quotation within the discursive sphere might give the impression of reading an 
unprejudiced text, once again picking out the particular passages of the spokesperson 
might suit the newspaper’s self-interest together with the wider political and social 
dominance. Moreover, pragmatically speaking, the space constraints and concerns 
regarding news consumption compel the news makers to single out eye-catching clauses 
rather than allocating a whole page to a sole declaration. Kuo’s (2007) CDA of the 
quotation patterns in two ideologically opposed newspapers in Taiwan also draws 
attention to the significant differences among newspapers in terms of their selection of 
quotation content and quoted speakers. More importantly, her study illustrates that the 
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choice of quotation patterns is by no means objective or neutral and that the 
presentations of speech in the news tends to be loaded with ideological bias (ibid: 298). 
In this research I also probe into the use of direct quotations in the news stories by 
employing CDA, as in each case the statements of states people were given space in the 
newspapers under analysis. For this reason, the positioning of these statements within 
the news coverage of these susceptible cases becomes important.  
Finally, the active and passive forms of the sentences and the nominalization technique 
employed by the newspapers are crucial to understanding the modes of representation 
ascribed to the particular communities, individuals, and ideas at a particular time and in 
a particular setting. The choice between active and passive transformation indicates two 
interrelated preferences of the newspapers; ‘the involvement of specific participants 
(whether to focus or not on the responsible agents)’ and a specific type of “action” 
(Svetanant, 2009: 233) in the news stories. Unmasking this strategy through the CDA 
approach might also bring about findings in which agents and actions are removed or 
overemphasised deliberately in the news discourse. Furthermore, making use of 
nominalization, described as ‘the syntactical transformation of predicates (verbs and 
adjectives) to nouns’, is governed by ‘ideological opportunities such as the deletion of 
important participants (details of “who did what to whom”), indication of time and 
indication of modality’ (ibid). Therefore, this transitivity analysis provides the means for 
scrutinising how readers’ attitudes towards the meanings of a text are directed in a 
particular way and how the linguistic structures of a text effectively encode a particular 
world-view (Simpson 1993 cited in Oktar, 2001: 324).  
Following this argument, this study intends to answer questions such as: Which subjects 
are attributed to the active or passive roles in the news stories? When and how are the 
active agents and specific actions eliminated or overstressed in the texts? How are the 
perception of time and space characterised in the news content? To sum up, a CDA of the 
news stories in Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet concerning the cases of the 
assassination of Hrant Dink, the murder of Sevag Balıkçı and the protest against the 
Khojaly Massacre, draws on linguistic tools such as themes, lexical choices, direct 
quotations, active and passive forms and nominalisation. In the following parts the 
findings of CDA for each case are analysed.  
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4.3.2. The Selection of the Newspapers 
In order to scrutinise news discourse in relation to the diverse forms of Turkish 
nationalism, national identity and the portrayal of Armenians, firstly I have decided to 
focus on print media despite the escalating power of social media in Turkey. Although 
the demise of print media has become a widely debated subject matter in public 
discussion, it still plays a decisive role in the opinions of the audience and the 
(re)production of the status quo. Besides this, quantitatively, newspapers in Turkey 
continue to be the leading discursive realms. According to the results of the latest print 
media survey announced by the Turkish Statistical Institute on 1st September 2014, 
7.158 newspapers were published in 2013 and 90.7% of those published in 2013 were 
local, with 3.5% being regional and 5.8% national publications. This also means that the 
total of number of national newspapers in Turkey is 180.3 By taking into account the 
importance of country wide publication, national newspapers might be considered as 
more effective tools compared to local or regional publications in terms of reaching 
more readers, and setting/affecting the agenda of the political arena, as well as moulding 
public opinion. Amongst 180 national newspapers, I decided on three national 
newspapers, namely Hürriyet (which means ‘Liberty’), Cumhuriyet (which means 
‘Republic’) and Zaman (which means ‘Time’) in order to apply CDA to the news stories 
and photos with regard to the assassination of Hrant Dink, the murder of Sevag Balıkçı 
and the protest against the Khojaly Massacre in Istanbul. For the years 2007, 2011 and 
2012, the time of the above incidents, the circulation of these selected newspapers is 
shown in the table below.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Retrieved from: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=16122 
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 15th -21st January 
20074 
25th April-1st May 
20115 
27th February-4th 
March 20126 
Zaman 625.916  
(Ranking:2) 
1.009.150 
 (Ranking:1) 
945.162  
(Ranking:1) 
Hürriyet 597.259  
(Ranking:3) 
453.193 
 (Ranking:3) 
418.581  
(Ranking:3) 
Cumhuriyet 63.045  
(Ranking:19) 
53.135  
(Ranking:23) 
51.003  
(Ranking:22) 
 
As is clearly evident from the chart, Zaman is the most widely circulated newspaper and 
Hürriyet is in third position in all the years listed. However, the superiority in number is 
not the only reason for choosing these national papers. My initial assumption is related 
to their prospective differences from each other in terms of the coverage of news about 
Armenians and the emphasis on the distinct aspects of the incidents such as the ethnic-
religious identity of the victims, the current status of their minority rights, the denial of 
the Armenian Genocide or the issues of national unity and security. This is mainly 
because they stand for divergent ideological affiliations and appeal to various 
addressees with dissimilar political and social backgrounds. Additionally, the news 
discourse of these newspapers is governed by their publishing policies, journalistic 
ethics, their owners and also their relationship with the government. All these factors 
might be expected to affect the way they make and produce news about identical 
incidents and the newsworthiness of an incident might change, depending on the news 
criteria of these newspapers.  
In very simple terms, Zaman, as the biggest daily of Turkey, has a pro-religious 
standpoint and as a part of a large media empire of the Gülen community, which is ‘one 
of the most powerful and best-connected of the networks that are competing to 
                                                          
4 Retrieved from: http://www.aktifhaber.com/sabahin-tiraji-saha-kalkti-98925h.htm 
5 Retrieved from: http://www.dorduncukuvvetmedya.com/tiraj-raporu/3396-zamanin-satis-rakami-1-
milyonu-gecti-vatan-100-bine-geriledi-.html 
6 Retrieved from: http://www.haber365.com/Haber/27_Subat_4_Mart_2012_Tarihli_Tirajlar/ 
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influence Muslims around the globe’7, it is predictably a supporter of moderate Islam 
(Tunç, 2010:646). This moderate Islamist position also suggests its right-wing tendency 
in the political spectrum. According to Yavuz (2013:141), among Turkish newspapers 
Zaman is exceptional because it is printed in 13 different countries that have large 
Muslim Turkic populations and, more importantly, this is a ‘conscious effort to promote 
an imperial Ottoman Muslim vision’. Analysing the news stories/photos regarding 
Armenians as a non-Turkish and non-Muslim community in a newspaper committed to 
the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and the Ottoman heritage might identify peculiar 
discursive strategies.   
Being in the third rank of the circulation figures, Hürriyet is usually associated with 
mainstream news production in Turkey and its news discourse can be seen as an 
illustrative form of the state ideology. Its pro-secular and nationalist outlook also reveals 
itself in its logo, Atatürk’s silhouette on a Turkish flag, as well as its motto, ‘Turkey 
belongs to Turks’. Even this dictum gives an idea about the editorial line of the 
newspaper with regard to the Turkish nationalism(s) in conjunction with the ethnic 
religious minority groups. Moreover, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2014:76-77) claim that 
Hürriyet, as the representative of the different attitudes of the pro-secular public, was 
evidently critical of the AKP government, but that the recent negotiations between the 
holding company (Doğan Media Group - the owner of Hürriyet) and the government 
have resulted in  the ‘tempering of Hürriyet’s critical stance toward the government’.  
Finally, Cumhuriyet presents itself as the defender of Kemalist and secular ideology, 
which is the basis of the official nationalism in Turkey. Tunç (2010:646) describes its 
editorial line as leftist secular, strongly nationalist, and pro-army, groups who are 
critical of the policies of the AKP government and the Gülen movement, and claims that 
Cumhuriyet acts as a partisan paper of the Republican People’s Party, which is the main 
opposition party in Turkey. Its statist and secular stance might also become evident in 
the news stories concerning the Turkish Armed Forces, such as those on the murder of 
Sevag Balıkçı during his military service.  
 
 
                                                          
7 Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/node/10808408 
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4.3.3. The News Stories: the Time Frame and the Access  
As stated above, in this research CDA addresses the news coverage of the assassination 
of Hrant Dink, the murder of Sevag Balıkçı and the protest against the Khojaly Massacre 
in three national newspapers, i.e. Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman. With the purpose of 
undertaking a more focused and detailed analysis, the period is limited to one week for a 
CDA of the news coverage of these particular incidents. That is to say, this research 
examines the news stories and photos regarding the assassination of Hrant Dink which 
took place on 19th January 2007 between the dates 20th-26th January 2007 in these 
designated national newspapers. As the murder of Sevag Balıkçı occurred on 24th April 
2011, the analysis covers the days between 25th April-1st May 2011, and the protest 
against Khojaly Massacre was held on 26th February 2012 so the CDA of the news 
coverage consists of the days 27th February-4th March 2012. My decision concerning this 
time restriction also depends on the issue of managing the volume of news stories, as 
well as the data analysis.  
In order to access these old news stories, first I benefited from the newspaper archive 
section of Beyazıt State Library in Istanbul. However, the newspapers published after 
2010 have not been documented yet. Thus I was only able to collect news stories 
including the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007. As an alternative, I visited the 
archives of Zaman and Hürriyet in person through special permission. Among these, only 
three papers from Cumhuriyet were presented in its archive of previous issues in an 
actual printed form through online access. Thus I used its online archive to get access to 
the news stories.   
In terms of the quantity of news stories/photos, there is a considerable difference 
between the incidents.  Since the death of Hrant Dink, a prominent figure at both 
national and international levels, led to many political and public debates, the news 
stories about this event occupied a great deal of space in comparison with the other two 
events. CDA of all the news stories in the three national newspapers regarding the 
murder of Sevag Balıkçı and the protest against Khojaly Massacre are included. 
However, for the case of Hrant Dink I decided to classify the news stories depending on 
the publication date, the headlines, the content, and the page (i.e. national news, 
economy, or international news). This also allows the allocation of some space for the 
analysis of those columns which might introduce distinct aspects of the issue.  
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4.4. Semi-Structured Interviews 
4.4.1. Interview Techniques in a Qualitative Research   
Given the importance of interviews as the most common cross disciplinary research 
instrument, researchers from various disciplines such as education, sociology, 
anthropology, social psychology, and social history, utilise interviews as a vital research 
method alone or in combination with other techniques (De Fina and Perrino, 2011:1). 
The ubiquity and importance of interviews have also inspired Atkinson and Silverman 
(1997) to claim that “perhaps we all live in what might be called an ‘interview society’ in 
which interviews seem central to making sense of our lives” (cited in Gubrium and 
Holstein, 2002:10). According to Kvale (2007:7), the interview society is one in which 
the production of the self becomes the focal point and the interview ‘serves as a social 
technique by construction of the self’.  
However, the interview process itself is more multifaceted than regarding it as only as a 
means of gathering data from the respondents in line with the intentions of the research.  
Alvesson (2003:17) draws attention to the academic literature on interviewing, which 
copes with issues such as the effective use of interviews as much as possible and making 
interviewees talk a lot - openly, trustfully, honestly, clearly, and freely - according to the 
researcher’s interests. At the same time, there is an increasing tendency among 
researchers in terms of involving comments, such as the interviewees ‘reported such 
feelings’ (Martin et.al., 1998:449) or ‘gave me this account’ (Barker 1993 cited in 
Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011:100). More notably, Alvesson (2003:17) maintains that 
Still, such qualifiers only marginally soften the impression of the data and results 
presented as being robust and authoritative, and the reader is not encouraged to 
reflect upon what the accounts really are about. The interview then appears, on the 
whole, as a valid source of knowledge production, although it is indicated that the 
social process and local conditions need to be appreciated and actively managed by 
the interviewer in order to accomplish valid results.  
For my research, likewise, rather than simply considering the interview data and results 
as the ultimate means for obtaining knowledge about the ‘Armenian question’ and 
Armenians, I endeavour to develop reflexive interpretations of the interviews by paying 
attention to multiple factors. These factors, for instance the contentious sides of the 
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Armenian issue, the interaction between my presumed ethnic-religious identity as an 
interviewer and the narratives of the interviewees and existing power relations, play a 
central role throughout the analysis of my interviews with the Armenians.   
The construction and reproduction of the interaction, meaning systems and unique 
conditions that exist between the different social agents during the interview process 
has also led researchers to adopt distinct methodological stances. Gephart (1999:3) 
points out a classification for the idea of the interview as a research method by using the 
terms positivism, interpretivism, and critical post-modernism. In a similar vein, 
Alvesson’s (2003; 2011) reconceptualization of neo-positivist, romanticist and localist 
perspectives is particularly inspiring for a critical assessment of the interviews used in 
this research. 
Both the neo-positivist and romanticist perspectives are inclined to consider the 
interviewees as epistemologically passive and as mere vessels of their answers, whereas 
the localist perspective challenges ‘the assumptions, claims and purposes of those 
wanting to use interviews instrumentally’ (Silverman 1993 cited in Alvesson, 2003:17). 
As the localist standpoint criticises the idea of employing the interview as an instrument, 
it perceives the interview process as ‘an opportunity to explore the meaning of the 
research topic for the respondent and a site to be examined for the construction of a 
situated account’ (Qu and Dumay, 2011:241). While critically reflecting on different 
interview methods, Qu and Dumay (ibid: 239-240) point out a typology in which the 
neo-positivist view (studying facts) corresponds more to structured interviews, the 
romanticist view (focusing on meanings) to unstructured interviews, and the localist 
perspective (social construction of situated accounts) to semi-structured interviews.   
Although these types of categorisations seem to run the risk of constraining the 
interviews within a modernist understanding and drawing on the boundaries between 
various methods, this taxonomy at the same time enables me to clarify my 
methodological approach and concerns with regard to the interviews. Put briefly, the 
‘interview conversation is a pipeline for transporting knowledge’ (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2004:141) according to the neo positivist approach based on the claims of the 
objective perception of the interviewer and the discovery of a ‘reality’ out there. 
Therefore, structured interviews based on a rigid format provide an ideal setting for a 
neo-positivist to grasp the ‘objective’ responses of interviewees. In a different way, the 
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romanticist view tends to consider research interviews as a human encounter which 
encourages interviewees to disclose their unique experiences by forming a relationship, 
trust and commitment between the interviewer and interviewee (Qu and Dumay, 
2011:242). This approach tends to employ unstructured interviews with open-ended 
questions which are contingent on the characteristics, experiences and responses of an 
interviewee and also the communication between the interviewer and interviewee. As 
this interactive bond constructed between the two sides of the interview process 
depends on the interviewees’ narration, Fontana and Frey (1994:371) recommends that 
the researcher engages in a ‘real’ conversation with an empathetic understanding 
instead of performing ‘outdated’ techniques that seek to preserve the distance from the 
interviewee. Throughout the fieldwork of this research the building of trust has been 
one of the top priority issues as it was usually hard to convince the subjects of the 
interviews. This was mainly due to their deep rooted fear about being recognised easily 
within the society and being identified by the state and its institutions if those 
interviews were publicised. Thus, this research shares with the romantics the conviction 
that the trusted and committed relationship between the interviewer and interviewee 
needs to be built with an emphasis on empathy. 
However, disentangling itself from the neo-positivist and romanticist standpoints, the 
localist position takes the interview statements into account as a local, situation-specific 
context and empirical situation. I also follow this localist perspective, both in the course 
of collecting and analysing interview the data in this research. More importantly, this 
point of view claims that interviewees do not only report external events, but also 
produce situated accounts by relying on cultural resources so as to generate morally 
adequate accounts (Alvesson, 2011:19). In other words, from a localist perspective the 
interview process is recognised as a situated event in which the interviewer creates the 
reality of the interview situation, instead of a neutral tool for exposing reasonable 
responses. The semi-structured interviews have the potential to yield distinct responses 
depending on the characteristics of the interviewer, and different interviewers arouse 
different responses from the same interviewee given the way the questions are asked 
and explored (Qu and Dumay, 2011:247).  Therefore, my decision to employ semi-
structured interviews with Armenians is based on three premises: (1) not only the 
interview data, but also the interview situation itself contributes to the whole research 
process; (2) each of the interviews has its own circumstances defined by the socio-
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cultural and political atmosphere and the ‘need’ for generating morally and socially 
accepted responses; (3) the particular interaction between the interviewer and 
interviewee has an immediate effect on the interview process.  
4.4.2. Semi-Structured Interviews with Armenians  
I conducted semi-structured interviews with forty-five Armenian citizens who identify 
themselves as Armenians and have Armenian parents as well. These face-to-face 
interviews contained the pre-determined questions and themes relevant to the research 
focus. During the five-month period, I interviewed twenty five male and twenty female 
Armenians in different neighbourhoods of Istanbul. This research was limited to 
Istanbul because the present estimated population of Armenians is between 60,000 and 
70,000 and the great majority of them live in Istanbul today, even though the eastern 
part of Turkey is the original homeland of the Armenians. According to Hofmann 
(2002:6), this region was emptied of Armenians in the course of the genocide in 1915 
and ‘follow-up cleansing operations’ in the subsequent decades and the ‘persistent 
discrimination towards Armenians and also other Christian groups’. Therefore, the main 
interview site of this research was Istanbul where the Armenian population is 
immensely concentrated.  
These semi-structured interviews mainly took place in public areas such as coffee shops 
and cafes and in private spheres such as the offices and homes of the interviewees, 
depending on the interviewees’ choice of interview location. The table below presents 
brief descriptions of the respondents. 
 
Interview 
Number 
Gender Year of 
Birth 
Birth Place Occupation Duration of the 
Interview  
1 Female 1972 Istanbul Housewife 49' 
2 Female 1980 Istanbul Journalist 24' 
3 Male 1981 Istanbul Journalist 25' 
4 Female 1985 Istanbul Journalist  30' 
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5 Male 1991 Istanbul Undergraduate 
Student 
37' 
6 Male 1979 Istanbul Reporter 15' 
7 Male 1960 Istanbul Accountant 21' 
8 Male 1974 Istanbul Columnist 21' 
9 Male 1977 Istanbul Executive Editor 34' 
10 Male 1975 Istanbul Web Designer 19' 
11 Male 1980 Istanbul Journalist 40' 
12 Female 1985 Istanbul Employee (NGO) 43' 
13 Male 1960 Malatya Retired 44' 
14 Male 1989 Istanbul Master’s Student 50' 
15 Male 1980 Istanbul Tradesman 41' 
16 Female 1990 Istanbul Undergraduate 
Student 
39' 
17 Male 1984 Istanbul Employee (NGO) 96' 
18 Male 1964 Istanbul Business Owner 21' 
19 Male 1963 Hatay Craftsman  38' 
20 Male 1984 Istanbul Postgraduate 
Student 
58' 
21 Male 1954 Istanbul Editor in Chief   29' 
22 Male 1976 Istanbul Columnist 45' 
23 Male 1967 Adana Writer/Activist 64' 
24 Female 1974 Malatya Housewife  28' 
25 Male 1968 Istanbul Craftsman 53' 
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26 Female 1958 Istanbul Retired 51' 
27 Male 1949 Istanbul Business Owner 109' 
28 Male 1972 Istanbul Business Owner 52' 
29 Male 1988 Istanbul Craftsman 39' 
30 Female 1951 Sivas Housewife 35' 
31 Female 1988 Istanbul Postgraduate 
Student 
40' 
32 Male 1960 Dersim Chairperson (NGO) 54' 
33 Female 1986 Istanbul Postgraduate 
Student 
48' 
34 Male 1980 Istanbul Producer 92' 
35 Female 1959 Istanbul Housewife 45' 
36 Male 1969 Istanbul Columnist 53' 
37 Female 1975 Istanbul Housewife 82' 
38 Female 1979 Istanbul Employee 
(Company) 
70' 
39 Female 1987 Istanbul Graduate Student 53' 
40 Female 1987 Istanbul Employee 
(Company) 
33' 
41 Female 1948 Istanbul Retired  70' 
42 Female 1965 Istanbul Housewife  33' 
43 Female 1958 Istanbul Housewife 41' 
44 Female 1963 Istanbul Housewife 19' 
45 Female 1950 Istanbul Retired 21' 
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The oldest interviewee was sixty-five years old, while the youngest was twenty-two 
years old, and the average age of the interviewees was forty. Few of them were 
grandchildren of the survivors of Armenian genocide, but most of them had second hand 
information retrieved from their older parents and relatives about their previous 
experiences. As the medium age indicates, most of the interviewees were witnesses of 
the last forty years of the Turkish Republic which was founded in 1923, only eight years 
after the genocide. Since the main goal of these interviews was to explore the ideas, 
perceptions, and experiences of Armenians about their current understanding of the 
‘Armenian issue’ in Turkey, the recent events concerning the Armenian community and 
their positioning within the nationalism debates and media representations, the 
emphasis on the attitudes and interpretations of the interviewees concerning the 
genocide was narrow, and this was set out in the interview guide.  
All the interviews were carried out and transcribed in Turkish and tape recorded.  After 
pinpointing the salient responses, I translated some parts of the quotations into English 
in order to save time. The average length of time of the interviews was forty-five 
minutes, but it took five months to complete all the interviews. Four underlying causes 
seemed to bring about the extension of time for the finalisation of the interviews. Firstly, 
I did all of the interviews by myself, which was very time-consuming, but given the 
thorny issue of Armenians in Turkey the confidentiality of the interviewees’ personal 
details and responses were of great importance. In order to address the basic ethical 
issues (i.e. providing necessary information about the research, the voluntary 
participation of the interviewees, the competency of the interviewees in terms of age, 
mental health, etc.) I gained informed consent from the participants through verbal 
means rather than written forms. Secondly, many of the interviewees were working 
professionals who were not very willing to meet after work or at the weekends. It 
sometimes became difficult to arrange a convenient time for the interviews and prevent 
a timetable clash, so there were a few weeks that were only taken up with organising 
interview times and sites. Thirdly, some of the interviewees asked for appointments 
before the interviews to meet and find out more about me and my research. This was 
mainly due to my limited acquaintance with the Armenian community until this 
fieldwork, so the persuasion process for some interviews took more time on a few 
occasions. However, my female identity and the fact that I was carrying out PhD 
research abroad facilitated this process. Finally, only less than half of Armenians with 
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whom I made contact agreed to be interviewees in this research, even though I got in 
touch with approximately one hundred potential interviewees via email, telephone or 
gatekeepers.  
4.4.3. Interview Topic Guide  
During semi-structured interviews with Armenians I used an interview guide containing 
the list of questions which were related specifically to the research questions. Thanks to 
the flexibility and spontaneity of the semi-structured interviews, the order of questions 
was changed, and when it was necessary new questions were added, whereas the 
existing ones were deleted, explained or probed so as to receive adequate answers from 
each interviewee (Cargan, 2007:108). The interview guide starts with some general 
‘warm up’ questions such as:  
• Can you tell me a bit about your life?  
• When and where were you born?  
• How many generations of your family have lived in Istanbul?  
• Have you been told anything about the Armenian Genocide in your family?  
• As an Armenian, what aspects do you like and/or dislike about living in Istanbul?  
• Do you think you belong to Turkey as an Armenian citizen?’  
 
After building a ‘trusted’ rapport with the interviewee courtesy of these introductory 
questions, the follow up question aimed to open a general discussion by asking: ‘What 
do you understand by the idea of the Armenian issue in Turkey and how do you define 
it?’ Then I moved on to ‘direct questions which directly introduce topics and dimensions’ 
(Kvale, 2007:61) and focused on more specific topics with regard to the three recent 
events that composed the focal points of this research. These more focused questions 
were as follows: 
• What do you think about the assassination of Hrant Dink and how do you feel 
about it? 
•  Did you hear the about killing of Sevag Balıkçı on Genocide Remembrance Day 
during his compulsory military service two years ago and how do you feel about 
this? 
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• What did you think when you saw or heard the protests about the Khojaly 
Massacres in Taksim Square and the slogans/posters targeted at Armenians? 
 
In order to explore the Armenians’ experiences and perceptions concerning the official 
ideology and developments during the current government I asked questions such as:  
 
• As a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, do you think there is a prevalent discourse 
of nationalism and national identity in Turkey? If yes, how would you 
describe/experience it? Do you think it excludes Armenians?  
• As you might know, the official narratives in Turkey still deny the Armenian 
genocide and regard it as an “ethnic conflict” - what do you think about this claim 
as a citizen of Turkish Republic?  
• How would you evaluate the eleven year period under the government of the 
Justice and Development Party regarding the position of Armenians in Turkey? 
 
 Another set of questions address the Armenians’ reading habits of Turkish national 
newspapers with different ideological backgrounds, and their views on their own media 
representation; in this way the interviewees responded to these questions below: 
 
• Which newspaper do you read daily or weekly?  
• What is your opinion about the media images of Armenians in Turkey?  
 
On the basis of these central questions, various responses were collected and over two- 
hundred pages of transcriptions were produced from these interviews.  
4.4.4. Sampling Design and Gaining Access for Interviews 
I employed the snowball sampling technique to reach interviewees where one subject 
provided the researcher with the name of another, who in turn gave the name of a third 
and so on. I reached my initial snowball contacts through the assistance of my 
acquaintances and their friends in Istanbul. It was particularly useful for this research as 
I made an effort to contact people with ‘unusual experiences or characteristics who are 
likely to know one another’ (Vogt and Johnson, 2011:368). Cohen and Arieli (2011: 428) 
point out this method plays a key role in three critical stages of data collection, that is, 
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locating, accessing and involving a hidden and hard to reach populations. In addition to 
the sampling as a significant phase in research design, Flick (2007: 34) argues that 
‘finding access determines how far the plan of research formulated in this design is 
going to work in the concrete research practice’ and it ‘takes a form of negotiation with 
and in the field’.  
First of all, I was introduced to different segments of the Armenian community by means 
of the social networks of the gatekeepers, without this it would have been very hard to 
convince the members of the society to take part in the interviews. Secondly, even after 
the initial location of potential research subjects, accessing, involving and gaining the 
subjects’ cooperation in the data collection processes continued to be a vital challenge 
(Flick, 2007:34). Through the snowball technique I asked for help from previous 
interviewees in order to gain access to the potential new interviewees in such a closed 
community. This sampling technique is primarily used in the studies in which ‘the 
population under investigation is ‘hidden’, either due to the low numbers of potential 
participants or the sensitivity of the topic’ (Browne, 2005:47).  Under the circumstances 
of this research, the amount of potential interviews was not very low given the total 
population of the Armenian community, but the numbers of Armenians who were eager 
to respond to questions about such a delicate topic and who were ‘fearless’ about the 
‘prospective harm’ of this research on their lives was very limited. 
There are also other studies which employed the snowball sampling technique to 
penetrate into social networks in marginalised populations and conflicted societies. In 
their research on refugees, Jacobsen and Landau (2003) were able to interview 750 
research subjects thanks to the snowball technique in an otherwise impenetrable 
research environment. In a similar vein, this technique helped Romano (2006) in his 
study in Iraq to enlarge the network of his contacts and interviews and gain access to 
high-level meetings and conferences, and Tessler and Jamal (2006) reached many civic 
associations in their field research (cited in Cohen and Arieli, 2011:430). Browne 
(2005:47) also points out that due to the use of social networks and interpersonal 
relations, the snowball sampling informs how individuals act and interact in focus 
groups, group interviews and interviews. More notably, she describes how her 
membership in these networks assisted this type of sampling and how the potential 
subjects in the study were more likely to trust her than to trust heterosexual researchers 
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(Babbie, 2012:201) as her sexuality became the facilitator for the recruitment of the 
interviewees. 
However, this chain-referral sampling has questionable representativeness as research 
subjects are not selected randomly and/or depending on their unique features. Instead, 
the selection process relies on ‘the referrals of the respondents first accessed and on the 
willingness of the research subjects to participate’; that is why most snowball samples 
are biased and cannot be generalised from (Kaplan et.al. 1987; Griffiths et.al 1993 cited 
in Cohen and Arieli, 2011: 428). In addition, Heckathorn (1997:175) indicates the points 
introduced by Erickson (1979) about the shortfalls of snowball technique, such as 
‘masking’ the potential interviewees due to the gatekeeper’s choice to protect their 
friends, particularly in societies with privacy concerns and when ‘oversampling’ subjects 
with larger social networks. Needless to say, the interviews conducted for this research 
do not represent the whole Armenian community in Istanbul or in other areas of Turkey 
and is not intended to generalise the ideas and experiences of the respondents. 
Correspondingly, this research does not perceive Armenians as a homogenous group nor 
does it seek to interpret their responses within a stereotyped understanding. In order to 
guarantee the diversity of responses and increase the representativeness of the sample, 
I attempted to reach interviewees with different ages, occupations, education levels and 
classes, and with the assistance of multiple gatekeepers rather than relying on a single 
one. Furthermore, in order to overcome the problem of bringing relatively isolated and 
reluctant members of the community into the interviews, I stated that the Armenian 
point of view might have the chance to be recognised through these interviews, which 
encouraged these members to participate in the interviews. 
4.4.5. The Reflections on My Researcher Position and Contextual Factors 
As an interviewer, my ethnic and religious identity, which is assumed as Turkish and 
Muslim, had an effect on the interview situation and entailed its own ‘reality’, which is 
consistent with the localist premises. This evokes the question of whether the manners 
and/or responses of the interviewees would have been different in some ways if the 
interviewer had been an Armenian researcher. Being an ‘outsider’, meaning Turkish in 
this case, was the most constitutive element in the course of the interviews. Most of the 
interviewees asked my intentions in undertaking research on this issue despite my 
Turkishness and the potential risks of this research for my prospective academic career 
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in Turkey. Moreover, by assuming that I do have restricted knowledge of Armenian-
Christian culture and identity due to my ethnic background, some of the interviewees 
felt obliged to describe even the basic features and practices of their lives. At the same 
time, in order not to offend me, some of the interviewees paid attention to their speech, 
especially in their criticisms of the Turks, even if I did clarify my position as a researcher 
at the very beginning of the interview.  
Furthermore, it has become obvious that for the interviewees with a lower educational 
level and for male interviewees, my educational background (doing a PhD) and my 
female identity, respectively, have formed new relations between me and the 
interviewees. Before starting the interviews, with few exceptions the interviewees, who 
are primary or secondary school graduates, insisted on the idea that they were not able 
to offer any ‘valuable’ responses as they did not have enough knowledge to answer my 
‘scientific’ questions. During the interviews, even if they realised that the interview 
questions did not require any expertise, they seemed to feel the need to re-assert their 
‘inadequate’ level of educational qualification in order to lower my expectations about 
their answers. Therefore, I was obliged to persuade these interviewees to voice their 
own views and experiences without hesitation and repeatedly explained to them the 
importance of these interviews, as well as the analysis of the media representation. 
However, in such attempts to explain the objectives of the research there was a thin line 
between making these interviewees feel at ease and leading the interviewees to tell me 
what they thought I as a researcher preferred to hear. Depending on the circumstances 
of the interviews, it was hard to maintain this balance. In addition to the effect of 
educational background, gender roles also affected the nature of the interviews. The 
interviews with some of the male interviewees were different compared to the ‘woman-
to-woman interviews’, in which a sense of shared understanding was influential.  
During my interviews with the Armenians I also had the chance to observe their ideas 
and feelings about being examined by a ‘Turkish’ researcher and being the focal point of 
a piece of sociological research. It might be suggested that the meaning of this research 
for the Armenian interviewees was two-fold. On the one hand, some of them expressed 
the view that they felt pleased to find out that such sociological research was being 
carried out, and that they were able to be a part of it, and were aware of its importance 
for the visibility of the Armenian community and the potential amendment of their 
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conditions in Turkey. On the other hand, some of them seemed uncomfortable about 
voicing their views on such a delicate topic and were also suspicious about my identity 
as a researcher, stating that such studies only ‘(re)open the old wounds’.  
The former standpoint also draws attention to the shortage of academic studies on the 
Armenian Genocide from a non-official perspective, as well as the experiences, 
representations and reactions of Armenians in Turkey which have been neglected in 
academia until recently. In one of his latest pieces, the columnist and human rights 
lawyer Cengiz (2013) comments on how the censorship mechanism operates in Turkish 
academia with respect to the Armenian issue. He asserts that according to a database 
search of the Higher Education Board (YÖK); only four theses have been written on the 
issue and more strikingly all of these mirrors the official ideology of the Turkish 
Republic concerning the massacres. Moreover, the bilingual Turkish-Armenian weekly 
Agos disclosed an official document in which the Turkish Historical Society (TTK) has 
asked the Higher Education Board (YÖK) for the names of the scholars studying the 
Armenian issue, the titles of their research and their contact information, and in return 
the universities were asked to provide all the information about these academics. 
However, it should be noted that the problematic situation of academic freedom and the 
restraints of the state on researchers working on subjects such as minority issues, LGBTI 
rights, or state violence in Turkey, have been always prevalent. Therefore, the 
interviewees with a more constructive attitude tended to perceive this research as one 
of the steps to overcome the taboo of the Armenian Genocide and raise awareness of the 
presence and problems of the Armenian community among Turkish citizens.  
In contrast, some of the interviewees were sceptical about the goals of this research so 
they questioned my position as a Turkish researcher regarding the recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide and my views about the official ideology and the current situation of 
the Armenian community. In other words, they attempted to find out if this research 
would make any difference to their lives and enable them to speak out about both their 
previous and current experiences and the representations in the Turkish media. Even if 
these interviewees agreed to answer my questions and disclose their opinions, they also 
declared their doubts about the potential benefits of this research for the community. 
For instance, at the very beginning of the interview a 53-year-old male interviewee 
explicitly stated that, ‘[t]here is no point in probing the old events. The more you 
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investigate these issues, the more likely long-standing pains will persist and this wound 
will never be healed and will always bleed.’ However, rather than uttering such 
criticisms and suspicions about this research at some stage in the interviews, 
intriguingly most of these opposing ideas and/or reactions were put into words during 
the off-the-record chats and/or telephone calls to arrange an interview time. In other 
words, not only the responses of the interviewees, but also the interview process itself 
has paved the way for exploring the new meanings attached by the interviewees and the 
different sociological dimensions of the research. For instance, such an attempt to 
explore the Armenian issue and the ideas and experiences of the Armenians might not 
be welcomed even by some segments of the Armenian community. More notably, from 
an Althusserian viewpoint the influence of ‘ideological state apparatuses’ and their 
historical role in terms of assimilating various minority groups in Turkey have been 
revealed through the concerns of the Armenian interviewees. Furthermore, the special 
request of some interviewees, particularly female Armenians, to meet in their own 
residences and the reluctance of many interviewees to speak out in public spaces gives 
an idea about how ingrained insecurity is a dominant feeling among the Armenians and 
how self-preservation against potential threats turns into a defence mechanism, 
particularly in the encounters with the ‘stranger’. This also calls to mind the debate in 
Turkey on ‘neighbourhood pressure’, which is a term coined by a leading Turkish 
sociologist, Şerif Mardin (2007), to portray ‘the unofficial, local and communal pressure 
on individuals to conform to religious-conservative norms in their everyday lives’ 
(Altınordu 2009). It was illuminating to witness how this neighbourhood pressure 
affected the interview sites and the non-verbal actions of the interviewees, such as 
following the people around with their eyes to check if our conversation was heard or 
not.   
Departing from the view of the interview data as ‘a mirror of reality’, in methodological 
terms this research follows the localist argument that ‘the interview data only 
represents the interviewee’s world view at a particular point in time in a particular 
context’ (Qu and Dumay, 2011: 246). In other words, the opinions and reactions of the 
interviewees are dependent on the timing of the interviews. For instance, the possible 
effects of the Gezi Park Protest in Istanbul on the interviewees’ responses epitomise the 
importance of contextual factors for the interview process. Since the prevalent patterns 
of social relations were transformed and people from distinct segments of the society 
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actively participated in the protest and resisted against the ‘authoritarian’ structure of 
the AKP government and PM Erdoğan in particular, the political and social atmosphere 
at the time of data collection inevitably acquired a new dimension. In a parallel vein, the 
AKP government’s recent announcement of the ‘democratisation package’, which is 
claimed to offer several developments with reference to the rights of non-Muslim 
minorities and Kurds, and also significant steps towards democratisation in Turkey, 
might have altered the opinions of interviewees about the developments for the period 
of the AKP government. That is to say, the vibrant political, economic and socio-cultural 
conditions in Turkey as a developing country necessitated a flexible attitude with 
respect to the analysis and interpretation of the semi-structured interviews. 
The changing conditions of the interview process and the impact of contextual factors on 
the ideas, reactions and/or feelings of the interviewees also necessitated reflecting on 
the quality of the interviews. Schensul and LeCompte (2013:163) put forward three 
main principles, namely: maintaining the flow of the interviewee’s story, having a 
positive researcher and respondent relationship, and avoiding interviewer bias, all of 
which are asserted to ameliorate the ‘standard’ of the interviews. The self-management 
of the interviewer during the interview is underlined through particular strategies, such 
as avoiding leading questions, redirecting/interrupting the story, asking questions that 
suggest the desired responses, using non-verbal cues, and failing to follow up on or 
omitting topics the interviewee introduces (ibid: 166). However, the interviewee bias 
might be also introduced to the list of factors that might affect the quality of the 
interviews. In some of the interviews with Armenians, the interviewee bias came to light 
through the constant stress on ‘you, Turks’ and the use of binary oppositions, such as 
‘we’ and ‘you’, and ‘ours’ and ‘yours’ in the sentences. More notably, it is possible to 
claim that the ethnic/religious difference between me as an interviewer and some of the 
interviewees was particularly crystallised in the question referring to the issue of 
genocide and/or the mention other historical events, such as 6-7 September riots or the 
expropriation of Armenian wealth by Turkish citizens. As I was perceived as a so-called 
representative of the Turkish society and the Turkish state by some Armenian 
interviewees, my interviewer role failed to remain important. However, this was an 
underlying interpretation which was not put into words within the interview settings 
very often, but some of the expressions and non-verbal manners of the interviewees 
were straightforward. I might argue that the nature of past encounters with Turks, 
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particularly in public spaces, and the unpleasant memories transferred from the 
preceding generation affected the susceptibility of the interviewees. For example, one 
very explicit account belonged to a 28-year-old female interviewee who generalised the 
characteristics of Turks by means of offensive language, since her history teacher in high 
school compelled her to admit that the 1915 events took place in wartime and that 
people from both sides were killed so it could not be called genocide. This unforgettable 
confrontation with the Turkish teacher led the interviewee to speak of how she portrays 
Turks:  
I do not think he was trying to cover his guilty feelings because he really believed 
that this is not genocide. This is mainly because committing genocide is something 
that damage Turkish pride. However the main conviction is ‘Turks are humane, 
Turks hurt nobody’. In the European history books Turks are labelled as barbarian 
but Turks absolutely refuse to accept this characterisation. However Turks are 
barbarian and they burn the libraries. These accounts may seem to be racist 
discourse but they exist in the history. You, Turks did try to eradicate the problem 
instead of attempting to solve the problem. 
 
According to my reflexive interpretation, this situation does not stand for the illusory 
responses of the interviewee, but instead her ‘sincere’ opinions and feelings. Therefore, 
it is crucial to read between the lines of the interviewees’ answers and focus on the 
hidden messages or ambivalence (Qu and Dumay, 2011:251) in order to disclose the 
underlying dominant themes.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The CASE of the ASSASINATION of HRANT DINK  
(19th January 2007) 
 
Although the problematic status of the Armenians under the rule of both the Ottoman 
Empire and the Turkish Republic has a long history marked by discriminatory 
acts/policies as mentioned in the preceding chapters, their ‘visibility’ in the public space 
and their citizenship rights have entered a new phase since 2002. With the election of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in November 2002 it might be argued that the 
emphasis on Islamic identity, the pluralistic and democratic demands of various social 
groups, and meeting EU membership criteria, has become prominent. However, the 
discussions over violations of freedom of expression, interventions into the freedom of 
the press, and the exclusionary treatment of historically marginalised groups such as 
Kurds, Armenians, and Alevis, have not ceased. According to Öktem (2011) the 
European years of the AKP government have witnessed a more critical analysis of 
Turkish history because taboo topics such as the Armenian Genocide, the September 6-7 
Events, the National Struggle and the Kurdish Question have begun to be discussed. 
However, at the same time a new type of nationalism has developed, which was 
demonstrated by bestseller books such as These Mad Turks or television series such as 
Valley of the Wolves. The murder of Hrant Dink is one of the traumatic events through 
which this nationalist hysteria displayed itself. Öktem (2011) identifies the rise of 
nationalist hysteria as the return of the guardians aiming to overthrow the AKP 
government (cited in Ertan, 2011: 264). 
 
Within this context on the 19th January 2007, Hrant Dink, a well-known Armenian 
journalist and founder of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian weekly newspaper Agos, was 
killed by an ultranationalist assassin. In this chapter I intend to explore media 
representations of this incident in selected national newspapers and find out both 
common and distinct discursive strategies to construct and reproduce Turkish 
nationalisms. To begin with, this assassination challenged the established order in 
Turkey and triggered large-scale public demonstrations with the signs, ‘We are all 
Armenians, We are all Hrant Dink’. Not only Armenians, but different ethnic and 
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religious groups in Turkey voiced their disapproval of this murder and showed their 
support for Armenians. This momentous resistance was also linked to Dink’s peculiar 
standpoint about the Armenian issue and his attempts to remove the obstacles against 
the rights of minority groups in Turkey. Dink was opposed to both anti-Armenian and 
anti-minority sentiments in Turkey and also the Armenian diaspora’s international 
campaign for the official recognition of the genocide. It is claimed that the first incident 
that caused this assassination was Dink’s article, published in Agos on 6 February 2004. 
The article was titled ‘Lady Sabiha’s Secret’ and suggested that Atatürk’s (the founder of 
the Turkish Republic) adopted daughter, Sabiha Gökçen, who was the first Turkish 
female pilot, could have been an Armenian girl taken from an orphanage. This claim 
became a topic of public debate when it appeared on the front page of Hürriyet on 21 
February 2004. More notably, the Head of the General Staff - the commander of the 
Turkish Armed Forces - responded to Dink’s statement by saying that, ‘[t]o open such a 
symbol to public debate, for whatever reason, is villainy against national unity and social 
peace.’(Christensen, 2010:185).  
 
In a society where the terms ‘Armenian’ and ‘Armenian seed’ are used as swear words to 
insult a person or to point out his/her degraded position, to question the ‘Turkishness’ 
of a national sacred figure unsurprisingly led to many public and political discussions. As 
Christensen (ibid: 186) stresses, Dink’s ironic writing style and a number of expressions 
he employed were taken out of context by some in the media and were framed as 
‘degrading Turkishness’. Thus, he was prosecuted under Article 301 in the Turkish Penal 
Code and sentenced to six months in jail, which was suspended. The court decision (in 
part) read: ‘This is disrespectful to the Turkish ancestors, martyrs, and values that form 
a nation’ (ibid). In other words, referring to one’s Armenian identity, particularly a 
national symbol, is regarded as evidence for ‘insulting Turkishness’. In addition, calling 
the 1915 events genocide and/or pronouncing the number of deceased Armenians has 
been considered a betrayal of Turkish national unity and national identity in other 
cases.8   
                                                          
8   In 2005 Orhan Pamuk- well-known novelist and Nobel laureate- was accused under Article 301, since in 
an interview with a Swiss magazine, he said, ‘Thirty thousand Kurds have been killed here, and a million 
Armenians. And almost nobody dares to mention that. So I do.” One year later, Elif Şafak -one of the most 
famous female writers- was also accused of insulting Turkishness through her novel ‘The Bastard of 
Istanbul’ in which one of the heroes defines the Armenian issue as genocide (Leonidas 2009). 
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Although the reactions of the far-right and nationalist camps and Dink’s exposure to 
death threats were somehow anticipated, the attitudes of the government and security 
forces towards his vulnerable position was notable. Freely (2007:3) alleges that Dink 
was summoned by Istanbul governor’s office twice and told that ‘if he did not watch his 
step, “anything” could happen to him’. Although the assassin, a 17-year-old 
ultranationalist boy, was caught 20 hours later, it was mainly claimed that this was an 
organised crime in which different segments of the state took part and did not take any 
measures to protect Dink. In spite of being a Turkish citizen, Dink’s Armenian identity by 
itself is considered as a precondition for his disloyalty to Turkish Republic and its 
‘glorious’ history. Moreover, Dink’s ‘critical’ ideas on both the official denial of Armenian 
Genocide in Turkey and the efforts of the Armenian Diaspora, particularly in the US and 
France, to impose their own demands, e.g. compensation, paved the way for his 
assassination. In their report for the 3rd anniversary of Dink’s murder, Çetin and Tuna 
(2010:1), Dink’s lawyers, declared that the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), the 
Gendarmerie and the Police Department were all guilty of neglecting their 
responsibilities and of not cooperating and not coordinating among themselves as far as 
the murder of Hrant Dink was concerned. More importantly, it is maintained that these 
three institutions, which generally quarrel among themselves, have united and acted in 
unison in two matters, their determination not to take any steps to protect Hrant Dink, 
even though they knew he would be killed, and treating the suspect/suspects of the 
murder of Hrant Dink as heroes (ibid)9. The police officer’s treatment of Samast -the 
assassin- as a ‘national’ hero came to light when photos and video recording appeared in 
the media. The policemen in the Anti-Terror Branch of the Samsun Police Directorate 
had souvenir photographs taken together with the assassin holding the Turkish flag, and 
one of these police officers received a promotion later.10 In the ensuing years, almost all 
the officials involved with the Dink trial received promotions11,  which was interpreted 
by some sections of the society and  intelligentsia as an ‘award’ given by the government 
to those who ‘silenced’ the counter voice.  
                                                          
9 For the whole report, please see http://www.hrantdink.org/img/Hrant_Dink_Murder_Case-
Three_Years_After.pdf 
10 Retrieved from: http://bianet.org/english/english/137070-police-officers-posed-with-murderer-
samast-after-offence, Bianet, 20 March 2012 
11 Retrieved from: http://www.panorama.am/en/law/2013/05/01/ermenihaber/, Panorama.am, 1 May 
2013 
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The public demonstration in Istanbul following the assassination of Hrant Dink, which 
was the strongest protest thus far against the killing and intimidation of the non-Muslim 
minorities in Turkey, also overlapped with the debate on the civic definition of Turkish 
national identity. From this new point of view, Turkish national identity should not be 
based on ethnic Turkish decent (Turk), but should be based upon one’s own origin 
within the territory that constitutes the Republic of Turkey (Türkiyeli). Although the 
primary goal was to bridge the gap between the Turkish state and its biggest minority, 
the Kurds, this new definition of citizenship remained highly significant for all non-
Muslim minorities at the symbolic level (Grigoriadis, 2012:288). Despite the nationalist 
reactions which caused the governments to dissociate itself from the discussion, this 
new understanding enriched the public debate about the integration of the non-Muslim 
minorities into the Turkish people (Grigoriadis 2007); it also revitalised the debate on 
the reconciliation of the minority rights and full citizenship in Turkey (Kurban 2006 
cited in Grigoriadis, 2012: 288). However, these attempts to compromise on the new 
understanding of citizenship and redefine the rights of minorities brought about 
nationalist reactions. In particular, the banners saying ‘We are all Armenians’ and ‘We 
are all Hrant Dink’ and the participation of the non-Armenian citizens in the protests 
after the assassination of Hrant Dink challenged the very basic component of Turkish 
nationalism based on Turkish and Muslim identity.  
 
Correspondingly, this slogan became the focal point of the nationalist and religious 
reactions in Turkey; as Sünbüloğlu (2009:111) mentions, the far right and Islamist 
political parties, including The Nationalist Movement Party, The Felicity Party, and The 
Great Union Party, put forward the counter slogan, ‘We are all Mehmet12 , We are all 
Muslims’. In addition, the head of the Great Union Party objected to the phrase, ‘We are 
all Armenians’ as it charged the Turkish state and the Turkish nation with the 
assassination of Hrant Dink. In a similar vein, PM Erdogan stated that his sole objection 
to the funeral was the expression ‘We are all Armenians’ (ibid). Çetinkaya (2007:103-4) 
underlines that by means of the billboards, posters and headlines of some newspapers, 
the slogan ‘We are all Turks’ was publicised, but the important aspect is that this counter 
slogan apparently implies the ethnic-based description of Turkishness. More 
                                                          
12
 ‘Mehmet’ is a typical Turkish name and is also used to refer to Turkish soldiers, so this name has a symbolic 
meaning for Turkishness and the Turkish Armed Forces as the fundamental guardian of Turkishness. 
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remarkably, as the terms ‘Mehmet’ and ‘Hrant’ are constructed as mutually exclusive 
categories, the non-Turkishness of ‘Hrant’ is emphasised through the subtext of ‘he is 
not one of ‘us’, so the status of Armenians as the ‘others’ is underlined once more.  
 
The tragic character of this assassination is not restricted to the killing of another 
Armenian on ‘Turkish’ soil, but also indicates the limits of freedom of expression in 
Turkey, particularly for a non-Turkish citizen. Besides this, the murder reminds us how 
counter opinions are suppressed by the involvement and cooperation of different 
segments of the Turkish state, in the same way as discussions revolving around the ‘so-
called’13 Armenian genocide, by connecting to external powers instead of addressing the 
current status of the Armenian community and the oppressive setting in Turkey. In 
addition to these points, to examine the news stories about this case, it is also significant 
to uncover the neglected aspects of the news about minority groups and the silence of 
newspapers about the government’s moving away from responsibility. 
 
5.1. Critical Discourse Analysis of the Hrant Dink Case  
Since Dink was indeed the target of a media lynching campaign (Göktaş 2007 and 
Pakkan 2011 cited in Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013: 680) before the assassination, the role 
of printed press in the assassination was extensively debated. Four years after the 
assassination, the perpetrator sent a letter to Istanbul’s 2nd Juvenile High Criminal Court 
and said ‘I am not guilty. Guilty are the headlines that showed Dink as a traitor. I learned 
about Dink from the newspaper headlines.’14 From this perspective, editorial approaches 
of papers towards this attack gained importance. Therefore this part seeks to answer the 
question: “How is the case of the assassination of Hrant Dink portrayed in the news 
stories of Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet as the leading Turkish national newspapers?” 
By utilising CDA as an analytical tool I point out both the overlapping and diverse 
discursive strategies adopted by these designated newspapers while framing the news 
about this murder. Due to the high amount of news stories and columns focusing on this 
incident published between the dates 20th-26th January 2007, the news stories are 
examined in terms of the emerging themes for the one week time span after the incident. 
                                                          
13 The phrases ‘so-called’ or ‘alleged’ are commonly used in Turkey to point out the invalidity of the 
Armenian Genocide. 
14 Retrieved from: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hrant-dink-shooter-blames-turkish-media-for-his-
actions.aspx?pageID=438&n=hrant-dink-shooter-blamed-the-turkish-media-for-his-action-2011-04-04 
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Rather than focusing on the newspapers individually, the major themes and sub-themes 
are identified and investigated within a comparative framework.   
 
5.1.1. The Figure of Enemy as a National Threat  
To begin with the day after the assassination of Hrant Dink (20th January 2007), the 
incident was carried on the front pages of the three newspapers under analysis and the 
news stories, along with the photos of Hrant Dink, were spread across the front pages. 
This can be interpreted not only as an indicator of the political and social impact of this 
tragic event, but also a mutual concern shared by national newspapers with distinct 
ideological affiliations. However, the headlines of Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet on 
20th January 2007 were written as follows: ‘This Bullet was fired against Turkey’; ‘Hrant 
Dink was Killed - The Assassin is Traitor’; ‘The Bullets Hit Turkey’. This showed that the 
main reason for apprehension was the national security of Turkey. It implied that the 
Turkish state, rather than Dink himself, was the real target of this attack and thus the 
bullets fired by an unknown perpetrator were aimed at Turkey. In particular, the lexical 
choice of Hürriyet indicates how the offender was proclaimed a ‘traitor’ by the reporters, 
even though the guilty party had not been arrested and/or the motives behind the crime 
had not been discovered yet.  
 
The prioritisation of the idea of national security and the figure of an anonymous enemy 
comes to light by means of the word selections of the newspapers, such as ‘Turkey’, 
‘bullet’, and ‘traitor’. It is also interesting to observe how the actual victim of a deadly 
shooting was relocated with the image of the Turkish state as an aggrieved party in the 
headlines. The distinction between active and passive positioning of the subjects 
becomes evident through this discursive manoeuvre. In contrast, these headlines can be 
read as a verification of the inclusive attitude of the national newspapers towards a 
citizen of the Turkish state despite his ethnic-religious identity. In other words, the news 
coverage of the murder in this manner might stand as a reflection of the Turkish state’s 
commitment to its citizens, as the bullet fired against this respected journalist is 
depicted as if it also hit Turkey in a metaphorical sense.   
 
However the subheadings, and the lead and body paragraphs of the newspapers suggest 
that the purpose of this assassination was to impair national security and unity as 
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Turkey would be put on the spot, particularly in the international arena. For instance, in 
Hürriyet, underneath the photo of Dink it was written, ‘The traitors targeted Turkey and 
democracy once again’, in parallel with the headline. The news story in Zaman 
correspondingly read as follows: ‘The murder targeted at internal peace [in Turkey] and 
leaving Turkey in a difficult position was reacted to strongly. The powers intending to 
disturb [national] peace and serenity in Turkey attempted a new provocation yesterday.’ 
Besides this, Cumhuriyet drew attention to the timing of the assassination and reported 
the news as if ‘Hrant Dink lost his life in an armed attack during the time when the 
declarations of Ankara regarding the issue of Kirkuk become rigorous and the Armenian 
claims are taken to the agenda of the United States Congress’. In addition to the 
victimised portrayal of the Turkish state and the threat perception associated with 
national security and internal peace, the choice of the terms ‘the traitors’ and ‘the 
powers’ particularly implies fabricated enemies of the nation.   
 
This emphasis on the notion of enemy in the news discourse is also regarded as one of 
the reflections of the ethno-nationalist discourse in the Turkish self-image, especially in 
the 2000s (Çırakman, 2011). From this point of view, the transformation of the Turkish 
self-image from a modernist and secular nationalist discourse to an ethno-nationalist 
discourse can be witnessed in the forms of identification with both the enemy-within 
and the enemy-without in the Turkish media. The discursive constructions of ethnic-
religious groups -the Armenians, the Kurds or the Jews- as the enemies-within, and the 
European Union, United States or the globalising West in general, as the enemies-
without, have close connections. Therefore, the ethno-nationalist discourse redefines 
the concept of enemy in terms of an ethnic and religious identity and labels the West as a 
dividing and contemptuous force, whereas the modernist and secular nationalist 
discourse in Turkey used to regard the West as a model for progress and a civilizing 
force (Çırakman, 2011: 1907). Bearing in mind these points, it’s worth mentioning the 
news framing of Cumhuriyet, with its specific focus on the controversial relationship 
between Turkey and Kirkuk and the likelihood of the Armenian Genocide recognition in 
the US while reporting on the assassination of an Armenian citizen. Despite the murder 
of a member of ‘enemies-within’ groups it is implied that both internal and external 
enemies acted together to plot against Turkey.  
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In order to legitimate particular representations, drawing on the voices of symbolic 
elites is also a common strategy, as their authority is vested in them due to their 
particular position (Van Leeuwen 2008 cited in Don and Lee, 2014:4). Therefore, the use 
of the direct quotations from the President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General 
Staff and the party leaders, both in the front and inside pages of the newspapers, might 
be taken as central signifiers for the legitimisation of a particular ideological structure in 
discourse. For example, the Prime Minister was quoted as saying, ‘Once again, dark 
hands15 have chosen our country and spilled blood in Istanbul to achieve their dark 
goals’ and the President expressed the view that: ‘The apprehension of the perpetrators 
of this attack which has deeply wounded our nation is our immediate expectation.’ 
Besides this, the official statement of the Motherland Party (ANAP) declared: ‘This is a 
provocation aiming to strengthen the idea that the Turks committed genocide’, and the 
leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) said: ‘The ones who committed or 
involved in this crime caused the biggest damage in Turkey’. The ways the political 
powers issued messages condemning Dink’s murder might be regarded as an accurate 
example of the primordialist perspective that underscores how the survival of the nation 
is more significant than the survival of its members (Özkırımlı, 2010:52). In this case, 
the importance of the survival of the Turkish nation is underlined many times in the 
discursive domain. This discloses how the newspapers under analysis refer to the 
authority figures to reinforce the idea of Turkey and the Turkish nation as equivalent 
notions.  
 
Consequently, the terms in the news stories such as ‘our country’ and ‘our nation’ are 
represented as if they have identical meanings, regardless of the diverse ethnic and 
religious groups residing in Turkey. The declarations of other political agents were also 
given space in all three newspapers by using direct quotations. Accordingly, in a similar 
way the subheadings that highlighted the words ‘our reputation’, ‘our national interest’, 
’provocation’, ‘negative impact on freedom of expression’ were selected to capture the 
reader’s attention. The narratives in all three papers draw a picture in which the 
assassination was brought about by anticipated, but anonymous, adversaries of Turkey 
as a part of an extensive plan to bring about national chaos. Taking this incident out of 
                                                          
15 The expression ‘dark hands’ is a commonly used metaphor by Turkish statesmen and officials to 
describe those who attempt to trigger provocative events such as assassinations, bombings or similar 
incidents in order to harm national interests and the international image of Turkey.  
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the context of the descriptions of the news stories removes the decisive roles of time and 
space in creating the conditions that paved the way for this murder.    
 
5.1.2. In Between the National Identity and the International Image 
In the days after the event, the subheadings of the newspapers under investigation 
focused on the assassin and his personal life, as well as the potential link between the 
murder of Dink and the murder of priest Andrea Santoro in 2006. In Hürriyet, 
underneath the subheading ‘The Second Case from Trabzon’, it was expressed that the 
murder of the Italian priest Andrea Santoro was called to mind, as it was revealed that 
the perpetrator of Dink’s murder was also from Trabzon. The verb selection ‘call to 
mind’, instead of other verbs, to point out the resemblances of the two cases and the 
tone of the writing, disregarding the usage of ‘might/could’, are self-explanatory in 
terms of the newspaper’s undoubted judgments. The news story also implies a 
relationship between a clandestine criminal organisation in Trabzon, the hometown of 
the offenders, and the anti-Armenian and anti-Christian killings. In a similar vein, 
Cumhuriyet referred to the suspicion concerning the existence of an illegal organisation 
in Trabzon, claiming that both of the offenders were from the underclass and nationalist 
juveniles. Zaman also called attention to the identical traits of both perpetrators, such as 
age, homeland and the fact they were both children of divorced parents. These parallel 
ways of reporting in the newspapers thus signals how the focal points of an issue can be 
repositioned and the readers’ attention can be directed to a particular agenda. 
Furthermore, the executors are labelled as ‘nationalist’ in the news discourse and, 
concerning the public discussion over the rise of nationalism, particularly in Trabzon, it 
is indicated that the murders are the direct consequence of a nationalist wave in a 
particular territory.  
 
On 21st January 2007 the headings of Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet revolved around 
the arrest of the assassin and were written, respectively, in the following manner: ‘His 
Father Reported, He was Arrested in Samsun’, ‘His Father Made the Traitor Get Caught’, 
and ‘The Suspect is Arrested’. The use of the passive forms that reorients the focus away 
from the agent of an action and toward the object (Fowles 1991 cited in Saft and Ohara, 
2006:89) is noticeable in the titles of the front pages. The police departments are 
constructed as the key social agents for the arrest operation and their success is praised 
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in the news stories. Hürriyet alludes to the public statement of the Prime Minister and 
highlights his gratitude to the police forces for their help for maintaining democracy in 
Turkey. An extended version of this statement, which also includes the PM’s 
thankfulness on behalf of ‘his country, his nation, and the struggle for democracy and 
freedom’, and the pace of the police operation, is given space in Zaman. According to my 
reflexive interpretation, the importance of these news stories concerning the arrest of 
the offender lies in their subtexts in two interrelated aspects. The first point is that in 
discursive terms the overemphasis on the achievement of the police forces rests on their 
presentation as a national asset. As the police are central ‘to the production and 
reproduction of order and security’ within national ‘structures of feeling’ (Loader, 
1997:3), the representation of the ‘success’ of police departments in national papers 
epitomises a mechanism of bolstering nationhood. In their work, Gorringe and Rosie 
(2010) examine the processes through which national identities are articulated, 
contested and acted out in the context of the policing. Their research focus is policing in 
Scotland, and they seek to discover the interplay between national identity and policing, 
analysing the ‘banal’ ways in which national identity is naturalised through the police. 
They come to the conclusion that Scottish policing is a ‘convenient fiction’ as it manifests 
implicit and taken for granted assumptions. More importantly, they argue that the 
discursive construction of Scottishness has ramifications for how policing is conceived 
and conducted (Gorringe and Rosie, 2010: 80). In my analysis the function of policing for 
the construction of Turkish national identity is transferred to the discursive domain by 
the national newspapers. That is to say, the figure of the ‘Turkish’ police as a 
determining factor for the sense of nationhood plays a role in solving a national crisis 
which incriminated the Turkish state and Turkish nation. By following the assumption 
that ‘[t]he police are as influenced by the boundaries of the imagined community as they 
are influential in their imagining’ (Gorringe and Rosie, 2010: 72) it can be claimed that 
the news discourse has a negotiating role in this relationship. In terms of the Dink case, 
the portrayal of Turkish policing in the papers also contributes to the understanding of 
national unity.  
 
The second point concerning the arrest of the offender is the newspapers’ preoccupation 
with the international image of Turkey. The capture of the perpetrator in a very short 
period of time is incorporated in the news stories as if the image of Turkey has been 
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acquitted on charges of the violation of freedom of expression, the protection of 
minority rights and the failure to act against nationalist attacks in the eyes of the 
international community. The elapsed time -expressed numerically as 32 hours - for the 
arrest operation is repeatedly accentuated in the news texts to confirm the 
determination of the national security forces. In addition to the selection of the 
headlines, the way the assassination was reported by the leading newspapers in Europe 
and United States is integrated into the news stories to emphasise how this large-scale 
incident is described by the foreign press. Hürriyet attaches importance to the reactions 
expressed by the ‘world’ press, such as Independent, the Guardian, Financial Times, 
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, El Pais, and La Razon. However, it should be 
underlined that the ‘world’ press only consists of the papers from UK, USA and Spain, 
according to the reporters, and the absence of the French press is interesting due to the 
ongoing tension between France and Turkey on the subject of the recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide. The selected title for the news story including the quotations from 
these cited newspapers is ‘A Big Impact on the Hope for EU Membership’. It is apparent 
that the notion of agency is deleted in the headline through the technique of 
nominalisation. The murder of Dink is cited as a reason for the potential rise in the 
arguments against Turkey’s EU accession process, depending on the commentaries of 
the foreign newspapers. Through this representation, which ‘implies the active work of 
selecting and presenting, and of structuring and shaping’ (Hall 1982 cited in Don and 
Lee, 2014: 688), the above mentioned title situates the murder itself as the major 
obstacle for national interest and pictures ‘the hope for EU membership’ as a national 
will shared by all Turkish citizens. More notably, a causal relationship between the 
assassination and the international image of Turkey is produced.  
  
Zaman congruently frames the international responses to the death of Dink by pointing 
out the headlines of the leading newspapers in Europe and America, which are limited to 
the UK, US and Spanish press, just as in the case of Hürriyet. It is predictable that both of 
these newspapers draw on the same news agency to obtain information for their news 
texts regardless of their alleged ideological affiliations, audience profiles and editorial 
lines. However, Zaman especially spotlights the reactions of Armenia, the Armenian 
diaspora and Armenian lobbying groups. The two excerpts below are only parts of two 
different news stories published on 21th January 2007 in Zaman.  
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The subheading: It became a trump card for the Armenian lobby 
The Armenian lobby in America started to make use of the murder. In his message 
issued to condemn the murder Aram Hamparian, the executive director of Armenian 
National Committee of America (ANCA), defended the idea that the murder took 
place in a period in which official investigations and nationalist pressures are on the 
rise to silence Dink’s writings on the Armenian genocide. Robert Fisk, the well-
known columnist of the British newspaper the Independent, also wrote that: 
“Yesterday Hrant Dink became the one million, five hundred thousand and first 
victim of the Armenian genocide.” 
 
The heading: A Calm Approach from Yerevan to the Assassination 
Armenia is struck by the news of the murder of Hrant Dink. While the politicians and 
journalists consider the incident evenly some political scientists blamed Turkey. All 
the channels on TV interrupted their programs and broadcasted the assassination 
by citing Turkish television and news sources. 
 
These two excerpts signify the influence of the newspaper’s standpoint on the syntax 
preferences for the titles. As ‘headlines are the subjective definition of the situation, 
which influences the interpretation made by the reader’ (Van Dijk 1991 cited in Dağtaş, 
2013:22), the selection of the words also reveals the negotiator or contestant roles taken 
by the newspapers. In the first excerpt, the word ‘trump card’ in particular has strong 
connotations, implying that there are at least two opposite camps seeking to prevail 
over an enemy. Although what is meant by the Armenian lobby is not clear as it seems to 
include both the Armenian diaspora in the US and the Armenian groups actively striving 
for genocide recognition in the political arena, it is implied that the Armenian lobby is 
now in an advantageous position for the control of the issue. The title implies that in 
terms of the ongoing confrontation between Turkey and ‘the Armenian lobby’ over the 
issue of genocide recognition, the murder of Dink changed the conditions in favour of 
the Armenian lobby. This argument is also substantiated by the choice of the verb ‘make 
use of’ in the first sentence and the verb ‘defend’ before the account of the subject. In 
featuring a quotation from a British journalist, though, a neutral verb ‘write’ is picked 
out by the newspaper. However, the overall tone of the extract is made to sound 
defensive and the expressions of disapproval are embedded in the text. It might be 
further claimed that by the means of incorporating the direct quotations, Zaman intends 
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to prove its point that the Armenian community abroad will immediately embark on an 
effort to impose the genocide claim in the international arena and, figuratively speaking, 
the assassination of Dink will be the instrument used to achieve their goal. 
 
In the title of the second excerpt, Yerevan, the capital of the Republic of Armenia 
symbolises the Armenian state authorities whose attitude towards the murder is 
assessed by the reporters of Zaman. As a result of this journalistic evaluation, the stance 
of the Armenian powers is delineated by the adjective ‘calm’. The title also tacitly 
contains a probability calculus of the opposite reaction of the Armenian state. It conveys 
the message that the Armenian state decided to maintain its level-headed approach to 
the murder instead of showing an offensive or inflammatory attitude. Before illustrating 
the responses, the standpoints of the ‘politicians’ and ‘journalists’ are portrayed in a 
positive manner in which there is a clear generalisation realised in the use of the words 
‘politicians’ and ‘journalists’. The expression ‘some political scientists’ then unfolds the 
discursive uncertainty and it is  also vague on which topics and in what respect ‘some 
political scientists’ ‘blame’ Turkey. The news story, hence, begins with speculative 
descriptions and carries quotations from the state authorities such as the Armenian 
president, the Armenian foreign minister, the speaker of the National Assembly of 
Armenia, the statements of two political parties (Dashnaktsutyun Party and Orinats 
Yerkir Party) in Armenia, the news of two Armenian newspapers (Haykakan Zhamanak 
and Aravot), and the views of the political scientist Stepan Grigoryan. It becomes 
apparent ‘who speaks in the news text?’, ‘whose speech is valued?’ and ‘which politicians 
and journalists are recognised as the representatives for their colleagues?’ Furthermore, 
it is thought-provoking to grasp that the phrase ‘some political scientists’ corresponds to 
a single specialist. The passage below demonstrates the entire declaration of the 
political scientist.  
 
For me, the ethnic background of the murderer, of which nation he is a member of, is 
out of consideration. The thing that matters is what has this murder done. Beyond 
any doubt, an authority or a state arranged this murder against Turkey’s EU 
membership and the reconciliation of Turkish-Armenian relations.  
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Contrary to the accusation claim of the news text in Zaman, it seems hard to find 
evidence of incriminating idioms in this statement. Rather, the national interests of 
Turkey and the support for a rapprochement between two states are emphasised.  
 
Moreover, the rhetorical techniques employed by Cumhuriyet with regard to the issues 
of genocide recognition, the Armenian community and national signifiers seem more 
distinctive. For instance on 22th January 2007, three days after the assassination, 
Cumhuriyet ran an editorial under the title ‘The Suspect and The Incident?’ on the front 
page. 
 
As everyone knows Hrant Dink was adopting the views which were not shared by 
the majority with respect to the so-called Armenian genocide as well as other 
related subjects. This difference has been reduced to zero abruptly and the 
murdered journalist has been fully defended. The Armenian attribute of Dink led to 
the rise in sympathy and tolerance shown to him. The sad incident demonstrated 
the cooperation between a society respectful of freedom of opinion and opposed to 
ethnic discrimination in our country. Turkey adopts a more liberal and modern 
profile than many European states which have approved the Armenian genocide 
claim by law, and it has prohibited opposition to this view and formally linked the 
historical event to anti-democratic status within the state 
 
The passage is just a minor section of this editorial which might give an idea concerning 
the dominant features of news discourse in this particular paper. In line with Hall’s 
(1996 cited in Van Dijk, 1998:9) definition of ideology as mental frameworks - the 
languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought and systems of representation, 
this excerpt exposes how these mental frameworks are constructed within the news 
discourse. Ambiguous concepts such as ‘everyone’, ‘the majority’ and ‘other related 
subjects’ used in the first sentence oversimplify the multi-dimensional aspects such as 
the involved social agents or groups and the competing claims or ideas. The newspaper’s 
disapproval of removing the differences, to put it simply, between the supporters and 
the opponents of genocide recognition and Dink’s viewpoint, is detectable in the second 
sentence. That is to say, Cumhuriyet has no hesitation in terms of publicly taking sides. 
However, the passive form of the sentences also gives the impression that no subject is 
held responsible for advocating the ideas of Dink. More notably, in the next sentence the 
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ethnic identity of Dink is spelled out as the main reason behind the ‘sympathy and 
tolerance’ shown to him. Yet again the answers to the questions ‘who shows this 
‘sympathy and tolerance’? and ‘how has Dink’s Armenian identity led to these 
sentiments?’ are equivocal. The political stance of the paper alludes to the fact that being 
an Armenian is a condition that requires tolerance from ‘the majority’ in a national 
context. This is tantamount to an argument that the hierarchy between the ethnic-
religious identities grants the right to decide whom to tolerate and under what 
conditions as Turkish-Muslim citizens. Cumhuriyet then draws a picture of ‘our’ ideal 
country by pointing out the ‘deixis of homeland’ which ‘invokes the national ‘we’ and 
places ‘us’ within ‘our’ homeland’ (Billig, 1995: 94-107). The following sentence also 
reinforces the sentiment of national belonging by means of a comparison of ‘our’ nation-
state to the European nation-states. The important point at this juncture is to notice how 
the recognition of the Armenian genocide in the sphere of jurisdiction by ‘many’ 
European states is marked as ‘anti-democratic’, whilst Turkey as ‘our’ homeland is 
portrayed as liberal and modern. This discursive gesture also addresses the patterns of 
the (re-) positioning of a nation-state with respect to minority groups as well as the 
echoes of the official denial. Therefore, the ideas expressed in this editorial remind 
Armenian readers of how the state associates their status with the issue of genocide 
recognition in the international arena.  
 
5.1.3. ‘We are all Hrant, We are all Armenians’ 
The funeral ceremony of Hrant Dink took place on 23nd January 2007 and in particular 
the mass protest during the funeral made a mark in news stories published in Zaman, 
Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet. As over a hundred thousand people from different ethnic-
religious or social backgrounds, gathered for the funeral and carried placards that read: 
‘We are all Hrant, we are all Armenians’, this momentous resistance naturally featured in 
all the newspapers under analysis. In particular, the slogan which connotes a developing 
empathy with Dink as well as Armenians attracted the public’s attention and became a 
contentious question in Turkey. To explore the reflections on this funeral in the national 
newspapers thus unveils how news discourse becomes a field for the construction, 
reproduction of the forms of nationalism and national identity.  
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The headline in Zaman, ‘The entire Turkey Bids Farewell to [Hrant Dink]’ on 24th 
January 2007 appears to give a message of solidarity among Turkish citizens. The news 
text, however, contains conflicting discourses, as follows: 
 
The funeral of Hrant Dink revealed the picture of Turkey. Thousands of people from 
every segment of the society came together as one heart in the funeral. Turkey, who 
shows her determination to live together by respecting the differences to the world, 
also gave the best answer to those attempting to abuse the topic of the assassination 
in the genocide discussions.  
 
On the one hand, the language employed in the news text promotes the idea of national 
togetherness, which might be interpreted as a challenge to the understanding of an 
‘internal enemy’. The language of respect for differences is also notable, as the 
assumption that an inclusive approach, which is able to engage with difference in 
Turkey, is underlined. On the other hand, by means of a definitive judgement indicated 
as the ‘best answer’ in the news content there is no room left for different observations. 
The advocates of genocide recognition, more importantly, are accused of taking 
advantage of the murder to justify their claims concerning the confrontation of genocide. 
This clear-cut deduction might have the potential to lead readers to overlook the 
possibility that the participants of the funeral might not necessarily share the views of 
the adherents of genocide recognition. The praising tone at the outset, expressed as ‘one 
heart’, is then converted into a narrative of isolation created between interrelated 
stances and agents.  
 
Despite their distinct ideological points of reference, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet also 
follow a common discursive path. The encounter with such a massive protest after the 
killing of an Armenian has, interestingly, brought about identical reactions in the news 
discourse. The extracts below exemplify not only the similar writing styles of the papers, 
but also the mind-set towards both the territorial and mental boundaries of the nation-
state.  
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Hürriyet: The bullet backfired. Turkey became a single heart.  
Cumhuriyet: The thousands who gathered together in Dink’s funeral responded to 
those who attempt to divide the people of this land, an attack on thought, and the 
dark hands and opponents of Turkey in the world. 
 
These excerpts reinvent the category of Turkey, referring to both a national territory 
and the Turkish nation. The theme of national cohesion is also explicitly underlined that 
the challenges instigated by internal and external enemies/threats are claimed as being 
overcome through the congregation of the people. Furthermore, the day after the 
funeral, the headline of Hürriyet ‘‘[Hrant Dink’s wife]: You did not leave your country, my 
dear’, and the subheading in Zaman, ‘you did leave from everyone, you did not leave 
from your country’, cite Rakel Dink’s speech. The phrase ‘your country’ seems to be an 
especially important factor for the selection of this particular sentence for the titles. 
While Cumhuriyet’s headline, ‘An Enormous Farewell’ draws attention to the magnitude 
of the funeral, the same sentence, ‘You did not leave your country’ as a subheading 
highlights the most allegedly important aspect of Dink’s murder. The recurrence of this 
phrase evokes the question of national belonging in relation to the identity construction 
of minority groups. It might be interpreted as a discursive form of confirming the 
‘loyalty’ of Armenians to the Turkish state even after their death.  
 
Despite the positive atmosphere in the front pages of the dailies with regard to the 
coordinated acts of the different segments of the ‘Turkish’ nation against the murder, the 
slogan “We are all Hrant, we are all Armenians” challenged the very basic component of 
Turkish nationalism based on Turkishness and Muslim identity. The assassination also 
undermined the belief in ‘the benevolence of Turks’ as one of the chief components of 
Turkish national identity and the funeral is claimed to have ‘help[ed] those who feel 
guilty repair that rift, purge themselves of collective guilt and refresh their trust in their 
nation’ (Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013: 684). The slogan, however, is perceived as a threat 
to Turkishness and the reactions from the political powers were given space in the 
national newspapers. Cumhuriyet recited the criticism of the leader of the Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP) on 25th January 2007 with the title ‘Bahçeli: [The slogan] is a freak 
that begs elucidation’. The passage below illustrates the direct quotations that appeared 
in the news story. 
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The leader of Nationalist Action Party Devlet Bahceli made a declaration concerning 
the slogans ‘We are all Armenians’ in the funeral of Dink: “It is a freak that begs 
elucidation that as a member of the Turkish nation the social circles whom never be 
seen at the [Turkish]martyr funerals and visits of condolence now develops slogans 
over the ethnic belonging of the victim.” 
Nationalist Action Party Antalya Provincial Chairman: “I do not believe that the 
citizen who does not say ‘I am a Turk’ in this geography has the right to life.” Stating 
that they feel sorry for Dink’s death Sagır asserted that the Turkish nation is 
regularly insulted in the newspapers and TV channels.  
 
These statements might be regarded as blatant forms of nationalism that become visible 
and also consumable within the news discourse. The selected title, though, deceives the 
reader as it gives the impression that the slogan itself is described as ‘freak’ by the 
quoted speaker. However, the news content clarifies that the creators of the slogan are 
labelled as ‘freak’, which means that the focal point of the quotation is a particular social 
group instead of the slogan. This discursive strategy attempts to pass on the idea of 
conceiving the slogan as abnormal and unacceptable. In order to bring forward the same 
quotation, Hürriyet also provides a title, ‘We are all Armenians is a freak that begs 
elucidation’, and the text is also written in almost the same way as Cumhuriyet. In 
addition, the decision of the editorial office in Cumhuriyet to publish the ‘offensive’ views 
of the provincial chairman might typify possible biases in news discourse which ‘not 
only reside in the selection and prominence of news actors, but also in the ways they are 
presented as speakers who give their interpretation of, and opinion about news events’ 
(Van Dijk 1991 cited in Kuo, 2007: 297). Both of the newspapers thus ‘allow the 
insertion of subjective interpretations, explanations, or opinions about current news 
events’ through employing these particular quotations ‘without breaking the ideological 
rule that requires the separation of facts from opinions (ibid).   
 
5.2. The ‘Unexpected’ Consequences of an ‘Expected’ End: Hrant Dink 
The dynamics of the ‘Armenian issue’, the status of Armenians in Turkey as well as the 
relations between Turkey and Armenia, have entered a new epoch in the wake of the 
assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007. As the founder and editor-in-chief of the bilingual 
newspaper Agos Dink attempted to call attention to the visibility and rights of the 
Armenian community in Turkey. Particularly, his critical writings about ‘the 
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exclusionary nature of Turkish nationalism, the official discriminatory Turkish state 
policy against non-Muslim minorities and the continued lack of accountability for past 
collective violence committed against the Armenians’ (Göçek, 2015: 419) led him to 
become a prominent figure. However, these challenging claims also brought about death 
threats along with lawsuits under the pretext of denigrating Turkishness based on 
Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. For instance, the first prosecution against him 
was the result of his conference speech in which he said, ‘I am not a Turk, but an 
Armenian of Turkey’; the second derived from a decontextualized sentence in ‘an article 
in which he urged the Armenians of the diaspora to abandon their blanket hatred of the 
Turk’ (Freely, 2007: 16). As these charges against Dink started to appear in both visual 
and printed media he became the target of a hate campaign in the public realm. This 
murder, therefore, includes a multifaceted process that consists of different actors, such 
as the state, the media, and the judicial system.  
 
Since the press plays a pivotal role in the pre and post period of this assassination, as 
demonstrated in the previous section, I intend to explore the news discourse of Turkish 
national newspapers, namely, Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet, with regard to this 
incident. In addition to the production side of the discursive sphere, in this section I 
point out the ideas and reactions of Armenians in Turkey concerning the assassination. 
On the one hand, this scrutiny discloses the meaning of Dink’s controversial efforts for 
the interviewees, the implications of this murder for the Armenian community and the 
reverberations of the funeral. On the other hand, this examination correspondingly 
opens up the discussion over the involvement of the state and also the ‘deep-state’ in the 
assassination, and the positioning of the press and the problematical aspects of the 
judicial process. In response to my question, ‘What do you think about the assassination 
of Hrant Dink and how do you feel about it?’ many respondents had begun to express 
their thoughts about Dink as a ‘spokesman’ and a ‘pioneer’ for the Armenian community 
before they commented on the murder. In parallel with their line of reasoning, I also 
start by briefly indicating the interviewees’ descriptions vis-à-vis the public image of 
Dink and his contentious standpoint.  
 
To begin with, a 41-year-old female interviewee compares the condition of the 
Armenian issue twenty years ago with the present situation. She claims that even to 
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pronounce the word ‘Armenian’ would have been ‘the end of the world’, but that Dink 
broke this taboo and took the lead in the discussions on the Armenian issue on TV as 
well as in the newspapers. In spite of the optimistic portrayal of Dink, the interviewee 
questions the potential connection between the prevailing political climate and his 
ability to speak up on polemic matters. She implies that Dink was able to raise his voice 
concerning the status of Armenians owing to the consent of the AKP government. From 
my point of view, the interviewee’s argument is illuminating as it uncovers an aspect of 
distrust among the Armenian community towards the government. The scepticism 
about the perfunctory acts/policies of the government merges with the likelihood of 
bringing Dink to the fore so as to pretend to be concerned with the problems of the 
Armenian community. Although the interviewee questions the self-determination of 
Dink, along with the pressure of the government on him, she underlines the significance 
of voicing these topics by an Armenian. Dink, as described by a 33-year-old female 
Armenian, was able to ‘break the shell’ around this minority group, which in return 
enabled Armenians to act freely and look inside and outside the community. His ideas, as 
the interviewee maintains, opened a new door for this closed and reserved society. 
Along the same lines a-53-year-old male interviewee depicts Dink as ‘a pioneer for 
themselves’ and continues as follows:  
 
He could be beneficial to the society and capable of being a bridge between the two 
countries [Turkey and Armenia]. Some nationalist people chose Hrant Dink as a 
target to remove this peace bridge. Now a setting is created in which the murderers 
wander around as if they are national heroes. This is our pain and sorrow. He 
actually have devoted himself to our cause and paid with his life. He could have kept 
silent so he might have survived but some things might have remained enclosed. At 
least now they are unlocked. We will feel the absence of him in this country and no 
one like him will come along again.   
 
Although the excerpt fails to elucidate in what ways Dink might have been able to 
change the conditions for Armenians, it captures the Armenian identity, revolving 
around the struggle of Dink, with the ‘nationalist’ mind-set. The figure of a leader who is 
cast as a liberator is also portrayed as a way to break the silence of Armenians in the 
search for an anticipated recognition by the Turkish state and society. Furthermore, the 
vanguard role of Dink is explained through his ability to instil confidence in Armenians. 
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A 29-year-old male interviewee, as an example of Dink’s influence, puts forward the 
enlightenment of Islamised Armenians with regard to their identities and the efforts of 
some families in other Anatolian cities to send their children to Istanbul and enable 
them to be educated in Armenian schools. It is suggested that the reawakening of 
identity and collective memory among these converted members of the Armenian 
community came to light as Dink started to demystify the overlooked aspects of the lives 
of Armenians. According to a senior interviewee (a 59-year-old male) Dink confidently 
declared his stance and made Armenians believe that they can also defend their rights 
and say what they think in this country; as the interviewee put it: ‘he made us  
accustomed to this idea’. This is read by another interviewee (a 39-year-old female) as 
an opportunity for Armenians to explain that ‘we live in this land too, we love the 
country too and we also enrich this land differently’. At the same time, this demonstrates 
the deep-rooted idea of serving the country and the constant need for proof of loyalty to 
the Turkish state.  
 
In contrast to this picture of a prominent figure, along with his impact on the Armenian 
people, the self-criticisms about how ‘we’, the majority of the Armenian community, left 
Dink to his fate came out in a few interviews. The paragraphs below exemplify the 
feelings of guilt experienced by the few interviewees who obviously agreed to share 
their sentiments.  
 
Interviewee 3 (32-year-old-male): I and my family are often surrounded by a 
feeling:  ‘how did we leave Hrant Dink alone?’ I mean why did this come to an end 
like this? So it is a feeling of distress. What might have been done? I don’t know but 
it is an issue of why we left him alone.  
Interviewee 25 (45-year-old-male): Hrant did receive threats until his death and 
did not we, as the people around him, hear these threats? We did hear them and we 
did nothing. But now we blame the state and say that the state closed its ears to the 
truth. We also did the same thing. If only ten percent of the crowd in the funeral had 
sided with Hrant when he was alive would it be possible to go through such an 
event? 
Interviewee 34 (33-year-old-male): Due to his Armenian identity neither liberals, 
nationalists, politicians nor his own close friends looked after Dink. While Hrant was 
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on a trial due to Article 301 many of his friends were not there to support him. Thus, 
they are guilty as well.  
 
Although the regrets seem to share a mutual theme, it is possible to pinpoint two 
distinct reactions. On the one hand, the first account still seeks to find out alternative 
explanations for the past lack of interest in Dink’s ‘fight’ and the feeling of 
embarrassment on behalf of the Armenian community is easily recognised. On the other 
hand, in other narratives the interviewees appear to blame the Armenian community 
and equate its responsibility with other actors such as the state and people from 
different ideological backgrounds. The resentment toward all Armenians thus becomes 
visible. However, the interpretations unite in admitting the responsibility of the 
Armenian community for the process that paved the way for the assassination.  
 
In addition to the importance of Dink as a public and political figure for the Armenian 
community, the meaning-making processes and reactions of the interviewees with 
regard to the assassination of Hrant Dink are one of the focal points of this research. 
First of all, there are crucial differences between the younger and older generations of 
the Armenian community in terms of their assessments of the assassination. While the 
younger interviewees aged between 22 and 40 mostly characterise this murder as a 
‘trauma’, the interpretations of the older counterparts aged between 40 and 65 
generally focus on the ‘banality’ of this attack, which bears a relation to state violence. 
Although my intention is not to generalise the views of the interviewees depending on 
their ages, it is possible to detect definite discrepancies amongst the generations of the 
Armenian community. From my perspective this generational divide comes into the 
picture because of the asymmetric experiences of violence and the shifting patterns of 
remembrance and forgetting of the past. For some senior interviewees the assassination 
was not an ‘unexpected’ or an ‘unusual’ incident; as stated by a 46-year-old male 
respondent, it is just ‘a part of a larger picture’ in Turkey where deep-seated prejudice is 
still held by the media and the state. He also put forward the assaults against non-
Muslim and non-Turkish individuals, such as the killing of the priest Andrea Santoro in 
February 2006, the murder of Dink in January 2007 and the massacre of three Christian 
missionaries at a publishing house in April 2007, to illustrate the recent social 
atmosphere. However, his sentence ‘we got used to these types of events, we experience 
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the same things from time immemorial’ reveals the connection between the 
understanding of routine hostility and the effects of distant memories of the past. 
Moreover, a 53-year-old male interviewee explains the assassination as the continuation 
of the process of political structuring in Turkey. He elaborates his argument as follows 
 
In my opinion Turkey is always founded on blood, tears and massacres. From past to 
present none of the incidents has been resolved. For example the Alevi massacres in 
Çorum, Maras and Sivas were not resolved. Turkey killed its own journalists and 
intellectuals such as Abdi İpekçi, Turhan Dursun and Bahriye Üçok. Turkey 
established its system on status quo and fear and slaughtered some people to take 
advantage of its system. It has continued its dominance through threats and military 
coups. Armenians were also made terrified by the assassination of Hrant Dink.  
 
While this thought-provoking account criticises the Turkish state concerning its 
repressive and destructive actions, simultaneously it reminds us of the ‘equal’ treatment 
of groups or persons by the state due to their different identities or critical ideas. Thus, 
the positioning of the murder of Dink within the broader power relations of the state by 
the interviewee is illuminating in terms of interrelating the Armenian identity and its 
sufferings to other ethnic religious identities. Furthermore, the interviewee’s 
interpretations of recent events, in a similar way to the ideas of other interviewee, take 
as reference point the preceding experiences that are unforgettable for the collective 
identity. Regarding the predictable aspect of the murder, a 49-year-old male Armenian 
also affirms that many Armenians had expected that Dink would get in trouble soon. 
However, he offers a different explanation and dissociates this situation from the 
peculiar case of Dink, asserting that a number of Armenians also received death threats 
at that period of time; thus, he underlined the mundaneness of the death risk for 
Armenians. Although I asked for further details, such as information about the 
dispatchers or the motivations behind these letters, the interviewee stated only that the 
senders were the predicted but unnamed persons and that no action was taken to solve 
this problem. His reluctance to speak out about his idea or the experience of his 
acquaintances might be considered as an indicator of an ingrained fear of violence and 
the acceptance of this violence as a form of ordinary conduct.  
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In a similar vein, from the standpoint of a 44-year-old male interviewee, one of the 
probable consequences of the increasing public visibility of Dink might have been 
assault instead of a murder. More notably, he condemns his generation, as they aimed 
for a ‘desk-based struggle’ for the normalisation of relations in Turkey. From this point 
of view, the assassination confirmed the fears of this cohort, as the costs for the visibility 
of Armenian identity and unconventional claims become evident. For the interviewee, 
losing Dink is a sign of the collapse of an attempt to resolve the issue through dialogue, 
and of the unchanging nature of social relations. Nonetheless, the unexpected aspect of 
this murder, as pronounced by the interviewee, came out in the reactions of the 
Armenian community, particularly the younger generation, who refused to withdraw 
themselves from the public sphere. This is rationalised by the idea that ‘we also lost 
Hrant. What else could happen?’ and strikingly the interviewee describes the influential 
state of mind among Armenians in this way: ‘If the only thing that they can do is killing, 
they can kill us at most; what else they could do?’  
 
While the tendency of some senior interviewees to consider the loss of Dink as a 
justification for their reservations appears in their accounts, the narratives of younger 
interviewees emphasise both the traumatic and incentive effects of this tragic event. On 
behalf of his peers, a 29-year-old male interviewee outlines why this loss has a different 
meaning for the same age group, as follows: 
 
Due to our age we did not witness the military coups, the 6-7 September riots or the 
Wealth Tax. The killing of Hrant Dink was the biggest trauma that we had ever 
experienced in person. It showed us that an Armenian might be shot in the back of 
his neck in broad daylight on the streets of Istanbul. There is still no obstacle for 
them to do it again. 
 
Similarly, a 27-year-old female interviewee depicted the assassination and the protest in 
the wake of this tragic event as the breaking point in her life, as she started to find out 
more about the genocide and the subsequent sufferings of Armenians. In her own words 
she elucidated that:  
 
To understand what my identity is made me realise that my own identity is actually 
a problem. My family elders lived through the Wealth Tax, the 6-7 September riots 
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and the military coup in 1980, but this was the first happening for my generation 
who understood how we become targets in this society owing to this loss. 
 
Although younger interviewees have some knowledge regarding the genocide and other 
state-sponsored sanctions, the role of witnessing the death of Dink resulted in an 
awareness of their identity. More importantly, some interviewees claim that the 
aftermath of this murder also corresponds to the beginning of their politicisation 
process. It is equally interesting to observe that three young female respondents in the 
26-28 age range articulate the same ideas, as follows: 
 
Interviewee 12 (28-year-old female): I’m too young so I didn’t go through the 
history of this country in the same way as my parents. Of course I know that being 
an Armenian is such a thing that needs to be concealed. I was taught to say ‘I am a 
Turkish of an Armenian descent’. When my parents saw the protests and the slogan 
‘We are all Armenians’, for the very first time my parents felt guilty since they raised 
me in such an assimilated way. I think this murder affected the youth more. For 
instance, I used to be apolitical but now I am more interested in politics. I had never 
gone out and shouted slogans in the protests, but now I feel myself more involved in 
the events.  
Interviewee 33 (27-year-old female): I was 21 when this event took place and 
was not a very political person at the time. The protest organised on the day of the 
murder was the first protest that I had ever attended; and after that I didn’t re-enter 
the home. It was a breaking point for me. I was at the university and came to realise 
more things. I started to find out everything, including the genocide, after the 
murder.  
Interviewee 39 (26-year-old female): I could understand his uneasiness from his 
writings during the process that resulted in the murder. I was proud of him as he 
was able to speak up about the issues and he paved the way for us. This murder also 
coincided with the time that I recently started to become politicised. Since then I 
became more politicised and sorrow was replaced by anger.  
 
In spite of the self-enlightenment of these respondents with regard to their Armenian 
identity and engaging in political matters after the murder, a female interviewee within 
the same age group approaches the subject from another perspective. She explains the 
predictability of this assassination through the lack of democracy in Turkey and ‘the 
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command of the sovereign’. Her criticism toward the AKP government, and Erdoğan in 
particular, is apparent; nonetheless, she asserts that this political situation is not limited 
to the AKP government but ever present within the roughly 100-year-old history of the 
Turkish Republic. This point of view also resembles the points raised by the senior 
interviewees, in the sense that they consider the assassination of Dink as an extension of 
previous forms of state-led violence and a discriminatory mentality embedded in the 
state apparatuses.  
 
Consequently, the funeral of Dink challenged the state-imposed ethnic and religious 
segregation, as a heterogeneous crowd gathered together to raise their voice against the 
hostility towards Armenians. The slogans ‘we are all Armenians’ and ‘we are all Hrant 
Dink’ even contradict the official historiography that dictates the Turkish and Muslim 
identity for a desirable citizen. It is also argued that the funeral march indicated how 
solidarity surpassed ethnicity by a ‘contentious collective action’ (Tarrow 1994) in 
which individuals without any access to political power through institutions, congregate 
to ‘voice a claim that challenges authority through sustained interface’ (cited in Gellman, 
2013: 786). The attitudes of Armenians pertaining to this social cohesion, when 
considered from this point of view, come into prominence. As I did pose a non-directive 
question about the assassination to delve into the perceptions and feelings of the 
interviewees, the decision about commenting on the funeral was completely left up to 
the interviewees. Based on the accounts of the interviewees who integrated the impact 
of the funeral ceremony into their analysis, the forms of observations and recollections 
might be classified into two standpoints. On the one hand, the gathering of thousands of 
people from different backgrounds to protest against the murder and speak up for the 
Armenian community led some interviewees to depict the funeral as an extraordinary 
moment. To witness the support of non-Armenian individuals, as expressed by a 29-
year-old male interviewee, overturned the disappointment and dispiritedness felt after 
the murder. Particularly, the slogan ‘we are all Hrant; we are all Armenians’ was, 
according to a 39-year-old female respondent, an atypical manifestation of solidarity. 
More notably, another interviewee (a 53-year-old male) claims this solidarity was able 
to arise since different actors and dynamics of the society assembled in order to 
contribute to the democratisation process in Turkey. The funeral ceremony, along with 
its components, thus comes to provide counter-hegemonic spatial and discursive 
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articulations. Through the lens of official ideology, the selection of the protest site, in 
front of the Agos newspaper’s office building, and the challenging slogans that associated 
the image of the national ‘we’ with the Armenian identity and the placards in Armenian 
and Kurdish, as well as Turkish, might be read as forms of resistance to Turkish 
nationalism and its official narratives. Regarding the implications for the participants of 
the funeral, one exceptional interpretation belongs to a 55-year-old female interviewee 
who depicts the slogans as a ‘salve on the wound’, since they caused Armenians to 
perceive that they are not isolated and to relate this sense of unity to collective 
resistance in the Gezi Park protest.  
 
On the other hand, the persistence of the support for the Armenian community and the 
sincerity of non-Armenian attendees of the funeral are questioned by another group of 
respondents. The focal point of this sceptical thinking is voiced by a 33-year-old-female 
interviewee along these lines: ‘There was a crowd of people in the funeral and on every 
19th January to support us. It is really good to see this support but I am not sure if we can 
experience the same support at any moment of our lives.’ The subtext of this explanation 
points out the marginalisation of Armenians in their quotidian interaction with other 
members of the society, as well as their continuing experiences of everyday nationalism 
in the Turkish state. Although the protest march consolidated the sense of protection 
among Armenians, a 29-year-old male interviewee poses challenging questions, such as:  
‘where are all these people who attended the funeral and gathered together even after 
the funeral? Did these people come to the funeral just to confess and ease their 
consciences and was that all?’ Even if he admits that the solidarity created among 
different ethnic and religious groups assisted them to overcome ‘their’ trauma and made 
Armenians think that ‘we are defended this time’, he complains about the impermanence 
of this help. In a similar vein, another respondent (a 33-year-old male) probes questions 
such as: ‘was this event supposed to happen to make thousands of people march? How 
can I trust your sincerity?’ He calls to account both those Armenians and non-Armenians 
who had not taken action before the murder for their indifferent attitude in the earlier 
period. By taking into consideration these critical comments, it becomes discernible that 
the interviewees seek out a consistent approach from non-Armenians towards their 
problems and, more importantly, that they oppose the ostensible support for the 
minority rights.  
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Finally, the interviewees’ opinions with respect to the assassination bring up the themes 
of the involvement of the state and deep-state, the positioning of the media and the 
problematic aspects of the judicial process. The tone of the criticisms toward different 
agencies for the most part might be regarded as accusatory. For instance, a 33-year-old 
male respondent asserts that the state is ‘the biggest mafia’ which also instigated the 
perpetrator to commit this crime. By referring to the books ‘Hrant’ (2010) by Tuba 
Çandar, and ‘The Murder of Hrant Dink: Media, Jurisdiction, State’ (2009) by Kemal 
Göktaş, another interviewee (a 38-year-old male) highlights the fact that this 
assassination is an organised crime and that its origins should be investigated within the 
inner mechanisms of the state. In a more explicit manner a 37-year-old respondent 
expresses his views as follows: 
 
It is an official murder; it is a murder of a national consensus. In the murder of Hrant 
Dink the state is in a white cap16 . Not only Ogün Samast, but the state as a whole is 
in a white cap. Ideologically, the state is the murderer. ‘I killed an Armenian’ as the 
exclamation of the perpetrator is also the motto of the state.  
 
The governing idea in this account also coincides with the remarkable phrase, ‘the 
state’s tradition of being murderer’ employed by another interviewee (a 34-year-old 
male) to explain how the different channels of the Turkish state were involved in the 
assassination of Hrant Dink. This phrase also accentuates the historical continuity in 
terms of the elimination of Armenians through the hands of the state and a pervasive 
distrust of the state and its institutions even in terms of the protection of the basic right 
to life. As stated by a 26-year-old female interviewee, the stance of the Turkish media 
might be also considered as equivalent to the strategy of the state in terms of distorting 
the truth. The differences in the media representations before and after the murder are 
provided as an example by a 39-year-old male respondent to point out the biased 
attitude of the Turkish media towards Armenians. Although the mainstream media, such 
as Hürriyet and Milliyet, had caused Dink to become a target for nationalist attacks, after 
the murder news discourse in the same newspapers changed and the titles, such as 
‘Hrant Dink is Turkey’ and ‘Freedom has been shot’, appeared in these papers. In simple 
terms, the interviewee also highlights the selection of the term, ‘an Armenian from 
                                                          
16 The white cap was worn by the perpetrator on the day of the murder and later it has become an 
infamous symbol of the incident and a mark of pride among nationalist voices in Turkey.  
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Turkey’, instead of ‘an Armenian’ by the newspapers in the case where a person 
represents Turkey in the Olympic Games. In contrast, three respondents call attention to 
the positive attitude of the press that keeps the audience informed of the latest 
developments with regard to the case of Hrant Dink. Thanks to the efforts of the Turkish 
media, a 36-year-old male interviewee argues, the assassination remains on the political 
agenda. Although ‘extreme rightist and nationalist’ print media adopted a negative 
attitude towards the murder, according to the interviewee newspapers generally took a 
positive stand on this case. Another interviewee (a 44-year-old male) also points out the 
attempts of some journalists to extend the investigation. Regarding the judicial process 
of the Hrant Dink case, the most repetitive theme is the suspicion of the interviewees 
about the independence of judiciary. Based on the assumption of the involvement of the 
state in this assassination, the spoliation of evidence comes to the agenda. However, two 
interviewees interestingly stated that such a judicial question is not peculiar to the case 
of Hrant Dink, as other court cases are also cursorily conducted in Turkey. A 44-year-old 
male respondent describes this legal process as another scandalous moment for the 
judicial system in Turkey. More notably, he underscores the fact that all the state organs 
in Turkey remain unresponsive to the killing of an Armenian, which also reflects the 
inner structuring of the state. In the same way, a younger interviewee (a 24-year-old 
male) enunciates that this case once again reinforces the assertion of impunity after 
1915 for the killing of an Armenian. Nevertheless, other unsolved murders of 
intellectuals and public figures are recalled by some interviewees to contend that 
different voices are always silenced by the cooperation among the state bodies.    
 
5.3. Conclusion  
This chapter presented the findings of both CDA of a sample of news stories in selected 
national newspapers and semi-structured interviews with Armenians with regard to the 
assassination of Hrant Dink. In the first section I identified three dominant themes in 
news discourse of three different newspapers. The first theme is connected to the idea of 
insecurity of Turkish national identity along with the formation of an implicit enemy 
figure. News representations depicted the Turkish state as an actual aggrieved party and 
attempted to prevent any argument that the attack was the consequence of prevailing 
existence of Turkish nationalisms and the connivance of the state. The second theme 
focuses on the emphasis of the international image of Turkey and Turkish national 
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identity. All the newspapers under analysis drew attention to the risk of 
instrumentalising this particular act of violence against an Armenian by ‘non-Turkish’ 
actors to strengthen Armenian genocide claims. The third theme is related to ambivalent 
standpoints of designated newspapers concerning the slogan ‘We are all Hrant, we are 
all Armenians’, which challenged the fundamental components of Turkish national 
identity. In spite of common discursive stress on national unity and reaction to this 
incident it is possible to observe a shared tendency among dailies to picture the protest 
as evidence for a homogenous Turkishness. In contrast to my presumptions, the overall 
outcome of CDA regarding this case is that newspapers under review employed quite 
similar discursive strategies in their news reporting of the assassination of Hrant Dink. 
 
The second section of this chapter unveiled the perceptions and reactions of Armenian 
interviewees about this happening and its repercussions for their lives and identities. 
From my point of view the most significant argument that came out of these narratives 
was that this assault led the respondents to establish a connection between the 
Armenian genocide and continuing atrocities against the Armenian community. 
Although many of the interviewees pointed out other discriminatory state policies and 
violent incidents targeting themselves in the wake of the genocide, the assassination of 
Hrant Dink seemed to add a new dimension to their own Armenian identities as well as 
interpretations of state-sponsored violence. Moreover generational differences among 
younger and older respondents became evident as their depictions of the Hrant Dink 
case were dichotomised into ‘traumatic’ and ‘usual/expected’ experiences. In this regard 
I claim that the uniqueness and mundaneness of this case at the same time denote both 
an interruption and continuity in the treatment of the Turkish state against its citizens. 
While this assassination was read by some interviewees as another ‘sacrifice’ for the 
visibility of the Armenian identity and the official denial to confront the past, a group of 
interviewees perceived it as a similar case to previous attacks against intellectual figures 
in Turkey. In opposition to news coverage of the Hrant Dink case in three national 
newspapers, many of the interviewees situated this particular act of violence within a 
socio-historical context; and despite ‘national’ concerns implied by three newspapers 
concerning the genocide recognition, many of the accounts associated this assault with 
wider institutional problems of the state and intolerant aspects of forms of nationalism 
in Turkey.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
The CASE of the MURDER of SEVAG BALIKÇI   
(24th April 2011) 
 
This chapter addresses the murder of an Armenian private, Sevag Balıkçı, by a Turkish 
private in the same unit under his compulsory military service.17 As this distressing 
event took place on 24th April 2011 which was also the 96th anniversary of Armenian 
Genocide, the timing became the most noteworthy aspect of this incident. This incident 
thus raised new questions about the status and experiences of the minority groups in 
the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the implications of compulsory military service for 
non-Muslim and non-Turkish male citizens. Regarding the maltreatment and 
discriminatory practices against members of ‘different’ ethnic and religious groups 
during the military service, Bali’s (2011) book includes interviews with eighty non-
Muslim citizens served in the Turkish army. According to his analysis Armenians 
encounter the most serious problems during their military service; it is mainly because 
the 1915 incidents continuously become a matter of discussion and Armenians are 
compelled to concede the official ideology of the state as well as the nationalist 
sentiments of other soldiers.  
 
In the present case, hence, the issue is not limited to find an answer to the question ‘how 
a soldier could be killed by another soldier under the protection of TSK?’ Instead the 
question ‘how this incident was dealt with by different institutional and societal actors 
such as TSK, judiciary system as well as national newspapers?’ needs to be asked. 
Although this murder was initially believed to be an accident and reported as an 
unexpected outcome of the joking around of two friends, the testimonies of other 
soldiers suggested Sevag’s Armenian identity was the main cause of his murder.18 The 
Turkish-Armenian weekly Agos reported that Sevag had told his fiancée about his 
problems in his unit; a couple of weeks before the event a soldier lost some money and 
one of his commanders had held Sevag responsible and beat him mercilessly. Although 
                                                          
17 Here I use the terms ‘Armenian’ and ‘Turkish’ to refer to different ethnic/religious identities. However, 
all the male citizens doing their compulsory military service are accepted officially as ‘Turkish’ but the 
emphasis is on the descent, in this case Sevag was a Turkish private of Armenian descent. 
18 Retrieved from: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-269806-armenian-private-killed-intentionally-
new-testimony-shows.html, Today’s Zaman, 27 January 2012 
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he filed an official complaint against the commander for the incident, he had to 
withdraw his complaint under pressure. His fiancée also said  
 
 I don’t believe that this happened while they were kidding with one another. I 
believe that he was murdered. Some fascists in his unit were pressuring him. I think 
that they were talking about April 24 the Armenian Genocide commemoration day, 
and one of them shot him.19   
 
Moreover this killing ‘coincided’ with the Easter and as the testimonies revealed Sevag 
was threatened by his murderer who told him ‘‘I will kill you, fatty!’ ‘This will be the last 
Easter cake you ate’ ‘If the war begins between Armenia and Turkey, I will shoot you!’ 
On the basis of the comments and photos the murderer shared on the social media, it 
was later recognised that he was a follower of Great Union Party which is a far-right 
Islamist party and defends the synthesis of Turkish nationalism and Islam for the 
governance.20   
 
Similar to the Hrant Dink case the official authorities failed to interrogate the incident by 
wide ranging methods and publicise all the details about this ‘suspicious’ death of an 
Armenian citizen. Although TSK first announced the killing of Sevag as an unfortunate 
result of the kidding of two soldiers, later on it was declared that he was the victim of a 
stray bullet. As Karaca (2013) writes, on the contrary, the advocates of victims called 
attention to the contradictions in witnesses’ testimonies and indicated the report of 
Turkey’s main forensic institution. This report also proved that the murderer’s rifle was 
shot in parallel to the victim, which was the evidence which might refute the claims for 
the accident. However the court decided that it was an accident and sentenced the 
perpetrator to serve only for 4 years and 5 months in prison. Depending on this verdict 
Kalaycı21 (2013), an activist from Justice for Sevag Initiative, claimed that for the 
Armenian community and other communities in Turkey the court reproduced the idea 
that ‘if you claim your identity and presence you might be killed ‘accidentally’ and 
appeared in the news as ‘a soldier committed suicide’ and underlined that Armenians 
are not able to find solutions for their problems unless they resist the dominant system 
                                                          
19 Retrieved from:http://www.armenianweekly.com/2011/05/01/istanbul-armenian-soldier-shot-dead-
on-the-96th-anniversary-of-armenian-genocide/, Armenian Weekly, 1 May 2013 
20 Retrieved from: http://rojpress.com/?p=11194 
21 Retrieved from: http://rojpress.com/?p=11194 
138 
 
in Turkey. More remarkably, Kalaycı emphasises that Armenians played a part in the 
court’s decision-accidental killing-as they did not make an effort to demand justice. 
These self-explanatory statements are also enlightening for this research. On the one 
hand, the constitutional definition of Turkishness comprises Armenians who are 
expected to serve for the Turkish Republic and also ‘Turkish’ nation and continually 
prove their loyalty to the state through the compulsory military service.  Yet at the same 
time Armenians are not able to become the military officers or hold high ranking 
positions in the TSK due to their descent. On the other hand, the existence and visibility 
of Armenian identity still challenge the ‘identity, temporal and spatial claims of 
nationalist discourse’ (Özkırımlı, 2010:208-209) in Turkey and the very basic definition 
of Turkish citizenship. Their unequal position as Turkish citizens also reveals itself in 
the unfair trials such as the cases of Sevag Balıkçı and Hrant Dink that fail to meet the 
standards of unbiased and in-depth judgement process. Kalaycı’s stress on the 
responsibility of Armenians in terms of claiming their substantive rights from judicial 
system and countering the prevailing structures within the state and TSK is also worth 
mentioning. Although the Turkish Armenian civic group Nor Zartonk and the Justice for 
Sevag Initiative attended all hearings and struggled to publicise this case, it is difficult to 
say that the Armenian community in general showed enough interest and commitment 
for the lawsuit of this murder.   
 
My endeavour to explore how the murder of an Armenian private by another private 
under the protection of Turkish Armed Forces is reported and represented in different 
national newspapers also aims at discovering discursive formations of Turkish 
nationalisms with respect to the ‘Armenian question’. As the democratisation process in 
Turkey has been interrupted by several military coups (directly in 1960 and 1980, 
indirectly in 1971, ‘post-modern’ coup in 1997 and ‘e-coup’ in 2007) and Turkish Army 
is encircled by nationalist and religious motifs, civil-military relations particularly 
between non-Muslim/Turkish citizens and military becomes a new testing ground for 
Turkish nationalism. It might be argued that recent years under the rule of AKP 
government witnessed the weakening of the strength attributed to TSK as the guardian 
of secular Turkish national identity. Particularly as Ünver (2009:2-3) elaborates 
Ergenekon process, the investigation of retired army generals, politicians, media 
representatives and civil society leaders who are accused of making an attempt to 
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initiate a military coup to overthrow the AKP government brought the deep-state 
networks in Turkey to the agenda.  However, the politicisation of Ergenekon case has 
been harshly criticised as it has been claimed that AKP government uses this case for its 
own interest in order to silence opponent groups and individuals (ibid: 12). While the 
attempts of AKP government oppress the power of TSK and consolidates its supremacy, 
in 2012 PM Erdogan paved the way for a new law to propose the concept of civil 
martyrdom which includes distributing various government benefits to the families of 
martyrs, security personnel wounded in an attack and civilians lost their lives in attack. 
However the leader of Nationalist Movement Party objected to this new law by saying 
that ‘Martyrdom is not a legal term or concept; it is a religious or national value. Nobody 
has the right to determine who can be called a martyr by legal interventions’22 and 
‘Someone is required to be Muslim in order to be accepted as martyr’23. Afterwards 
Sevag’s family reacted to this emphasis on the link between Turkish-Muslim identity and 
martyrdom. Sevag’s mother underlined that this statement made themselves feel as the 
‘others’ and said ‘if anyone who decease during the military service is taken into account 
as ‘martyr’, my son also needs to be accepted as martyr’24.   
 
It might be alleged that the discussion about the civil martyrdom law over the murder of 
an Armenian private also bears the stamp of the debate on the civic definition of Turkish 
national identity after the protests against the assassination of Hrant Dink. Sevag’s 
Armenian identity as the main cause of his death, the controversial judgment process 
and the ways this murder is appeared and/or overlooked in national newspapers once 
again necessitate focusing on the equal citizenship rights of non-Muslim citizens. From 
my point of view, this murder stands at the intersection point between distinct but at the 
same time inter-related dimensions of the power relations, discrimination and demands 
for rights in the Turkish nation-state with its own hegemonic structures.  
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Retrieved from: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-275577-mhp-leader-bahceli-protests-new-
regulation-of-civil-martyrdom.html, Today’s Zaman, 27 March 2012 
23  Retrieved from: http://www.hristiyangazete.com/2012/03/gayrimuslim-sehitler-otekilestiriliyor-
mu/, Hristiyan Gazete, 30 March 2012 
24 Retrieved from: http://www.internethaber.com/er-sevag-sahin-balikci-ani-ermeni-vatandaslar-
gayrimuslim-sehit-tartismalari-vat-411075h.htm, Internet Haber, 28 March 2012 
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6.1. Critical Discourse Analysis of the Murder of Sevag Balıkçı  
This section delves into media portrayals of the murder of Sevag Balıkçı in newspapers 
under analysis. As Balıkçı had not been a public figure and had come to be known after 
his death accordingly the quantity of the news stories featuring this event are limited 
compared to the Hrant Dink case. The other point that needs to be mentioned is that the 
murder became a newsworthy subject in Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet after the three 
days had passed. Thus from 27th April 2011 onwards the incident were given space in 
these mentioned papers. By employing CDA I investigate a series of themes in news 
coverage of three papers concerning the murder of an Armenian soldier by a Turkish 
soldier.  
 
6.1.1. The Reference to Ethnic Background   
To begin with Zaman reported the killing of Sevag Balıkçı on 27th April 2011 by using the 
title ‘from the gendarmerie to the family of Armenian descent: Your son died in an 
accident’. The title selection itself seems to unmask the ideological standpoint of the 
daily. The word choice ‘Armenian descent’ expounds not only the importance attached 
to the ethnic-religious identity of the victim’s family but also the reminder of the inferior 
status of his identity. In other words even if the victim as a citizen of the Turkish 
Republic is killed when serving for the Turkish army his Armenian identity remains as a 
unique indicator. Moreover the tone and writing style of the title are so harsh which 
gives the impression of lack of empathy for both the victim’s household as well as for the 
entire Armenian community in Turkey. Although the newspaper might disagree with the 
gendarmerie’s verdict that the cause of death is accident by incorporating this statement 
into the title, the paper looks as if promoting this estimation.  
 
The opening sentence of the news text also describes Balıkçı as the ‘Turkish citizen of 
Armenian descent’ and underlines that his death caused by a bullet fired from the rifle of 
‘his friend’ led to discussions. While narrating the interrogation request of Balıkçı’s 
family from the authorities it is emphasised that the Balıkçı family regards their son 
whom they lost in the Easter holiday not as a ‘martyr’. There are basically two 
controversial points in this news content. First the Balıkçı family refuses the claim of the 
accidental nature of Sevag’s death but not the status of the martyrdom given by the 
Turkish army as it comes light by the subsequent statements of the family. But the news 
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story depicts the situation as if from the very beginning the family renounces the 
martyrdom status of Sevag. The basic reason for this discursive strategy might be the 
Islamic connotations of the martyrdom in which deceased soldiers are granted highest 
religious status by the Turkish army. The decease of a Christian soldier in this case 
however might lead the newspaper to develop such a prejudiced language. Second the 
stress on ‘the Easter holiday’ draws attention to the non-Muslim character of the victim 
and also the family. More remarkably the timing of the murder is associated with the 
Easter holiday instead of the Armenian genocide remembrance day. That is to say the 
newspaper puts aside the symbolic meaning of this murder committed by nationalist 
motives.   
 
The murder of Sevag Balıkçı hit the headline of Hürriyet ‘Martyr’s House’ on 27th April 
2011 and a part of his story appeared on the front page of the daily. After informing the 
readers that the victim was shot by a ‘stray’ bullet during his ‘national’ service in the 
army the news story quotes the last conversation between the mother of the victim and 
Sevag Balıkçı. It is conveyed in a narrative form and includes a dialogue that recounts 
how they celebrate Easter with each other and Sevag did receive one of the sweet yeast 
breads that his mother had sent him. It is also written that Sevag had said ‘Kiser Pari 
Mama’ which means ‘Good night Mom’ while he hung up the phone. Interestingly the 
reporters employ this Armenian phrase ‘Kiser Pari Mama’ in the subheading.  That is to 
say the text tacitly leads the news audience to perceive both the religious and linguistic 
attributes of the deceased by abstaining from using the word ‘Armenian’. Beside the 
news story there is also a photo of a waving Turkish flag in front of a house which might 
be assumed as a possession of the Balıkçı’s family. By means of this visual image the 
paper authenticates the Turkish nationality of an Armenian family along with the lexical 
choices of ‘national’ service and ‘martyr’ in the eyes of the readers.  
 
The news article is continued on the fifth page and the journalist maintains the story-
telling tone that the personal details about Balıkçı (i.e. the university and the 
department he had graduated from, his favourite football team, his career plans) and his 
experiences at the army and relations with his parents are narrated. In contrary to the 
writing style and editorial preferences of Zaman Hürriyet seems to arouse the reader’s 
interest by focusing on the tragic aspects of the incident and pictures the murder of 
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Sevag as a totally unexpected accident. Furthermore the following paragraph intends to 
legitimise a particular mentality through the direct quotations of Sevag’s father and 
uncle as such  
The father Garabet Balıkçı said that “Long live the homeland but I opt he would have 
been dead during a battle. Due to the cause of his death I cannot accept that he is a 
martyr.” The uncle Murat Sant Ozler explains that they have no doubts regarding the 
day coincided with 24th April and states that ‘On that day the only thing that 
occurred to Sevag was to share the cake with his friends.’  
 
These statements also underpin the prevailing attitude that there is no organic link 
between the murder and the genocidal aims of the perpetrator. The expression ‘Long 
live the homeland’ correspondingly infers that ‘the survival of our homeland and our 
state is enough of a remedy to the tragedy of the individuals we lose’ (Akyol 2008). This 
media portrayal also reveals how the conception of sacrifice for the nation is naturalised 
even in the absence of wartime. As ‘blood sacrifice connects the citizen to the nation’ and 
‘the flag is the sign and agent of the nation formed in blood sacrifice’ (Marvin and Ingle, 
1998:63), the news stories concerning the murder and funeral of Sevag Balıkçı operate 
as legitimizing tools for this national imaginary.  
 
The news reporting of the murder of Sevag Balıkçı is initially raised in Cumhuriyet on 
27th April 2011 in the same way as Hürriyet and Zaman. Cumhuriyet however allocated 
comparatively less space to the coverage of this murder which contains only two 
sentences on the ninth page. As the selected title ‘They will host Sevak’s family’ utilises 
null subject it is uncertain who will host Sevag’s family. More importantly as the title 
assumes that this murder had been already a familiar topic for the readers it fails to give 
any answer to the questions ‘who is Sevag’ and ‘why his family is hosted by an unknown 
subject’. In addition to the vague language in the news discourse the word choice ‘host’ 
to describe the incident seems unsuitable as it purports a positive and voluntary action. 
It gives the impression that thanks to the hospitality of the General Commandership of 
Gendarmerie the Balıkçı family decides to visit gendarme station where the event took 
place. However it becomes clarified in the news content that the General 
Commandership of Gendarmerie plans to ‘host’ the Balıkçı family in order to enable 
them to talk privately with the commanders and friends of Sevag. It should be also noted 
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that just as in the news coverage of Zaman the phrase ‘Turkish citizen of Armenian 
descent’ appears in the news item of Cumhuriyet as well as the emphasis on the ‘martyr’ 
status of the deceased.  
 
It is also interesting to see that the Armenian name of Sevag turns out to be ‘Sevak’ in the 
title as well as in the text. As the words in the Turkish language do not end with the 
letters ‘b, c, d, g’, this letter change in the news signifies the linguistic effort to adjust an 
Armenian word according to the grammar rules of Turkish. Although this might sound a 
minor attempt language has been always one of the apparatuses for the self-
identification of Turkish nationalism. From a historical perspective also during the 
construction of the Turkish state language was employed as a significant device ‘to 
create Turkishness as a collective identity’ which was essential for the formation of 
national consciousness (Smith 1991 cited in Aydıngün and Aydıngün, 2004:416). In this 
case also the sense of collective identity and the perception of a shared language are 
invented via linguistic assimilation of another language. The discursive strategy adopted 
by Cumhuriyet as a secular and defender of Turkish national ‘values’ paper operates 
through the patterns of denial and transformation. In the first step the newspaper 
neglects the existence and legitimacy of the Armenian language and in the subsequent 
step the composition of the Armenian language is altered in consistent with the Turkish 
language.  
 
6.1.2. The Issue of Martyrdom 
News discourse employed by Zaman in the following day also signals similar language 
and the ideological standpoint in relation to the murder. The headline on 28th April 2011 
after the funeral is ‘The Turkish private of Armenian descent killed by a stray bullet was 
buried with a Turkish flag’. In addition to the avoidance of using active voice in the 
sentence the headline states the prejudgement of the newspaper concerning the cause of 
death even though the court had not been finalised its decision at that time. The 
integration of the expression ‘Turkish flag’ into the headline also operates as a banal 
reminder of nationhood (Billig, 1995: 41) but brings no added value to the news content. 
Besides as the victim had been serving in the Turkish Armed Forces, the arrangement of 
a military funeral for the martyr is an ordinary procedure which includes covering the 
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coffin with the Turkish flag. Yet this ceremony routine for Sevag Balikci is taken out of its 
natural context and presented as an exceptional case.  
 
Moreover CDA of the news story uncovers overlexicalization which is an excessive use of 
descriptive expression (Svetanant, 2009:231). As a result of overlexical preference of 
Zaman the phrase of ‘the Armenian descent’ is repetitively mentioned to define the 
victim that news audience might memorise only this information after reading this 
piece. According to Fowler et.al (1979 cited in Teo, 2000:20) it is typical that powerless 
people are over-lexicalized; for example since nurses are supposed to be female there is 
a certain stigma or markedness is attached to ‘male nurse’. Thus ‘overlexicalization often 
has a pejorative effect as it signals a kind of deviation from social convention and reflects 
perceptions and judgements from the essentially biased standpoint of such cultural 
norms or social expectations’ (ibid: 20-21). Seen in this light the martyr funeral arranged 
in an Armenian Church contradicts with the conventional Islamic rituals so the 
discursive reflection of this funeral in the media representation draws on 
overlexicalization. The recurrent overlexical choices such as ‘Armenian descent’, 
‘Turkish flag’ and ‘Armenian Church’ shape the meaning construction of the text.  
 
The news coverage of the funeral also encompasses the declarations of Egemen Bağış- 
the Minister for EU Affairs (State Minister) and Chief Negotiator and Mustafa Sarıgül-the 
mayor of Şişli (one of the districts in Istanbul). Interestingly Zaman quotes only one 
sentence of Bağış from among his press statements at the end of the ceremony. This 
direct quotation is as follows: ‘our brother Sevag died as a martyr during when he is on 
duty serving for our country’s unity and integrity’. The expressions of ‘our’ brother and 
‘our’ country are worth of mentioning as the national gesture is activated through both 
the inclusion of an Armenian into an understanding of the Turkish ‘brotherhood’ and 
fostering a shared national territory which needs protection from the enemies of the 
Turkish state. The reporting of the mayor’s account is equally momentous. At the same 
time as Sarıgül expresses his condolences to the Balıkçı family and ‘the community 
members’ he emphasizes that the ‘coincidence’ of this ‘unfortunate’ event with the 
Easter holiday makes him more upset. By neglecting the importance of the day 24th April 
for both the motive behind the offense and further investigation of the case, the murder 
and its timing are rationalised through their predestined characters.  
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Furthermore the text involves the utterance of Balıkçı’s father by employing reported 
speech that he said he would keep the flag forever while delivering the ‘Turkish’ flag on 
the coffin from the Gendarmerie Regional Commander. Although it is a matter of 
common knowledge that the coffin of a deceased soldier is wrapped in the national flag, 
the reporter additionally underlines the word ‘Turkish flag’. Under the subheading of 
‘The news in the press have provocative aims’ the reactions of the victim’s family and 
friends to the news appeared in the press are highlighted. The main issue then becomes 
apparent that the interview done by a reporter from the newspaper Aydınlık with the 
‘alleged’ partner of the victim is claimed to have ‘provocative aims’. The adjective 
‘alleged’ characterising the partner attempts to impose the conviction that this person is 
an unreliable source of information. This discursive effort gains meaning by the 
succeeding sentence shown as follows 
 
It was already announced that Sevag Sahin Balikci lost his life by a bullet mistakenly 
fired from his friend’s rifle during a practice of loading-unloading while 23 days left 
for his demobilization on the date of 24th April which is accepted as a remembrance 
day of the so-called Armenian genocide.  
 
It is implied that the death of the victim is an isolated incident and more interestingly 
the reporter seeks to refute the comments of the victim’s partner without even citing or 
mentioning them. However it is detectable that the partner claimed that this offense had 
been committed deliberately and the perpetrator had also picked out the date 
specifically. As a result it might be argued that the news story makes an implicit 
differentiation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Armenians through these discursive strategies. 
The representation of the victim’s father and family as committed to the Turkish state by 
internalising the components of both official ideology and national symbols also 
overlaps with the national goal of creating ‘congruent’ Turkish citizens despite their 
different descents.  
 
The funeral of Sevag Balıkçı has relatively wider news coverage in Cumhuriyet on 28th 
April 2011 and the title ‘The Funeral of a Martyr in the Church’ appeared on the front 
page. Before redirecting the reader to the fourth page where the article is continued, 
three key pieces of information are provided by the news story which reflects the 
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standpoint of the editorial policy of the newspaper. Although the reporter refrains from 
stating the ethnic identity of the fallen soldier both the heading and the text draw 
attention to the religious affiliation of Sevag Balıkçı. The usage of the word ‘church’ 
seems to be considered as explanatory enough to make news audience understand that 
the mentioned person is not Muslim. Despite his non-Muslim identity the text underlines 
that he is accepted as a martyr and finally informs the readers regarding the 
participation of the military authorities in the funeral. These discursive preferences 
might be read as the methods of stigmatisation that embrace the classification of a 
minority group member by a peculiar trait, the so-called recognition of his contradictory 
status and the ability to ‘tolerate’ the different national subject. The main news coverage 
on the fourth page is also predicated on these schemes. Once again the religious 
ceremony in the church, the condition of martyrdom ascribed to the deceased soldier 
and the attendance of both the state and military authorities picture the skeleton of the 
news discourse. This time yet the paper calls of naming Sevag as Sevak without adding 
any revision note. Besides Cumhuriyet takes part in the same discursive sphere 
constructed by Hürriyet and Zaman and draws on the expression of ‘the coffin covered 
by the Turkish flag’ and the identical photo published by Hurriyet as a visual 
representation.  
 
Although one of the chief goals of journalism is to seek an answer for the question of 
‘When did it take place?’ Cumhuriyet fails to offer any information regarding the time of 
the incident in the news stories. It reports the murder of Sevag Balıkçı as happened at 
any time recently with no specified date. As meaning in news discourse is also 
determined by what is absent, not selected, discursively repressed (Hartley, 1982:117) 
the journalistic strategy of Cumhuriyet to disregard the date of the murder proves how it 
also looks through the lens of the official ideology. By decontextualizing the incident 
news reporting in Cumhuriyet presents the murder as an ‘ordinary’ criminal case. In 
other words the significance of the timing, the concerned parties, and the criminal intent 
of the perpetrator are removed in the news discourse. This deliberate tactic naturally 
prevents the readers to grasp the determining factors of the murder. More remarkably 
biased news coverage constrains the perceptual field with respect to the current status 
of Armenians in Turkey and the tangible evidence for the ongoing effects of the 
genocidal mentality. From this point of view the media representations of Armenians 
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are not limited to the ‘ideological square’ which consists of positive self-representation 
and negative other representation (Van Dijk 1998 cited in Shojaei et.al, 2013: 859). They 
also divulge the ways in which news discourse contributes to the repression and 
silencing of the attitudes, experiences and reactions of Armenians as an ethnic-religious 
minority group. In other words the othering of Armenians sometimes becomes visible in 
the national newspapers as in the case of Cumhuriyet via their invisibility. 
 
6.1.3. Sacrifice for the Nation 
The symbolic meaning attached to the flag and the portrayal of sacrifice for the nation as 
an honorary act are also integrated into the news coverage of Hürriyet on 28th April 
2011. The title ‘Kissed the flag as he took it’ on the front page is deprived of an active 
subject and the accent is on the flag as a respected national value. In order to intensify 
the effect of the news and convince the readers regarding the action, a photo of the 
victim’s father kissing the flag facing Istanbul Gendarmerie Regional Commander is 
printed. This photo on the one hand displays the deep-seated structure of the power 
relations between the state governmental authorities and the citizens. On the other hand 
this visual image leads the consumers of a national newspaper to comprehend sacrifice 
for the nation as an inseparable part of patriotism. The frequent phrase ‘Turkish flag on 
the coffin’ in the text along with the photo also glorifies the idea of suffering for the 
permanence of the state.  
 
Moreover the ethos of the patriotic sacrifice is claimed to be closely connected to 
modern nationalism and ‘individuals’ readiness to die for their nation is a social and 
moral act that defies their instinct for personal survival in the name of the future of the 
collectivity’ (Zerubavel, 2006:73). It might be claimed that in a time of crisis such as the 
murder of a soldier by another soldier under the protection of a national army, the 
discursive construction of ‘the ethos of the patriotic sacrifice’ overlooks the ‘will’ of a 
national subject. The media representations of Balıkçı in Hürriyet seem to suppress the 
distinction between the will and willingness to sacrifice for one’s nation in which 
‘willingness is passive; one expects to respond if and when asked to sacrifice whereas 
the will to sacrifice is the already established desire to do so’ (Axinn, 2010:63). This 
moment of crisis even might be regarded as an occasion for news discourse to 
(re)produce and negotiate with Turkish nationalisms under the name of patriotism. For 
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instance Hürriyet publishes the title ‘Sevag was bid farewell as red and white’ via the 
device of metonymy to give the message that the Turkish flag was the major constitutive 
element of the funeral. Since red and white as the colours of the Turkish flag are 
featured the heading merges this national emblem with a ‘sacrificed’ citizen for the 
nation. Due to the positions of the sacrificer and the sacrificed the indebted nation 
expresses its gratitude through this military funeral in which the fallen soldier becomes 
a national symbol. Patriotic sacrifice also results in sophisticated routines of obligations 
between the bereaved family and the state that the state supports the family to cope 
with the death whereas ‘the bereaved family reaffirms the importance of the nation by 
its participation in official commemorations’. Consequently it is presumed by the 
patriotic ethos that the families of the deceased soldiers and the state come to an 
understanding concerning the importance of sacrifice (Zerubavel, 2006:73-4).  
 
The case of Sevag Balıkçı additionally presents how discursive framing still nurtures the 
idea of the sacrifice for the Turkish nation as expressed by the degree of martyrdom 
even when the soldier belongs to a different nation and is ‘sacrificed’ by his soldier 
friend. Yet at the same time the incompatibility between Sevag’s religious identity and 
the notion of martyrdom defined as one of the highest titles in Islamic belief challenges 
the national themes in the news discourse. Thus the national newspapers appear to be 
compelled to underline the participation of the Turkish military officers and the State 
Minister in the ceremony and the arrangement of the funeral at the Armenian Church as 
novel practices. Unexpectedly only one of the columnists of Hürriyet, Mehmet Yılmaz 
mentioned the national newspapers’ ways of reporting the funeral of Sevag Balıkçı in his 
column on 29th April 2011.25 In order to indicate the similarities among the dailies 
concerning the funeral of Balıkçı, Yılmaz listed the names and the headlines of some 
national newspapers which are shown below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25  Retrieved from: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/17663750.asp 
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Sabah 
The Priest Officiated the Ritual: ‘Today is 
the day to get to understand each other’ 
Milliyet 
He was Bid Farewell by the Turkish Flag. A 
Great Number of TAF (Turkish Armed 
Forces) Personnel Attended the Ceremony 
in the  Church 
Akşam 
A Martyr Private Sevag was Bid Farewell 
by Church Bells. Many Soldiers Attended 
the Ceremony. 
Vatan The Funeral of a Martyr in the Church 
Radikal The Soldiers Bid Farewell 
Habertürk 
The Minister and the General in the Funeral 
at the Church 
Posta The Military Ceremony in the Church 
Star 
The Funeral of a Martyr Soldier in the 
Church 
Yeni Şafak He was Bid Farewell in the Church 
Taraf 
The Funeral in the Church for an Armenian 
Martyr 
 
After asking the news worthiness of the participation of the soldiers in the funeral and 
doing a funeral ceremony for a Christian at the church, Yılmaz then poses the questions 
‘When the deceased is a Muslim soldier do the newspapers put emphasis on holding a 
funeral at a mosque? Is the involvement of great number of soldiers in a martyr funeral 
not a normal situation?’ He claims that news reporting through such an attitude 
manifests how discrimination and racism penetrate to ‘our’ marrows and concludes his 
column by saying that this has not been a good test for ‘our’ newspapers as they stress 
their difference and report the news on the basis of difference.  
 
The issue of difference also becomes evident when Hürriyet recounts the statements of 
the partner of Sevag Balıkçı. The subheading ‘The Fiancée Upsets the Family’ declares 
not only an opinion but also stereotypes both of the parties without providing any 
supporting information. Following the quotation of a single sentence ‘I do not believe 
that his cause of death is accident’ uttered by the fiancée the news story highlights that 
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the people from the Armenian community who are close to the family said that the 
Balıkçı family had not approved their son’s marriage with his fiancée. It is also claimed 
that as the declarations of the fiancée after the death of Sevag upset the family, they do 
not even want to see her. Since the views of anonymous informants are taken into 
account as news source this news story is unable to go beyond speculative claims. It 
however sets an example of one of the discursive mechanisms of the newspapers to deal 
with the counter arguments such as the potential link between the murder and the 
victim’s ethnic-religious identity. It might be alleged that the opposite contentions with 
respect to the motive of the murder and its capacity to revitalise the genocide 
discussions challenge the claims of nationalism which in return affects the discursive 
strategies. The binary opposition between the family and the fiancée is entrenched in 
the news stories that echoes the differentiation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims in the 
US context (Mamdani 2004) and ‘Muslims in Europe’ and ‘Muslims of Europe’ in the 
European setting (Marranci, 2004:112). News story in Hürriyet also employs this 
intragroup distinction in order to consolidate the bonds of nationhood.  
 
6.2. More than an Accident: the Death of Sevag Balıkçı 
This part focuses on the readings of the interviewees with regard to the murder of Sevag 
Balıkçı in 2011 during his compulsory military service. I aim to address emergent 
themes which capture overlapping or divergent standpoints of Armenian interviewees. 
To begin with the gender of the interviewees plays a decisive role in influencing the 
responses unlike the Hrant Dink case. Particularly the male interviewees underline that 
the experiences of discrimination at some point in the military service are not unusual 
for an Armenian soldier. Notably the young male Armenians who had not done military 
service yet seem more worried about their future and striving to find a way to postpone 
or avoid the compulsory military service. The youngest male interviewee (22-year-old) 
determinedly refuses to do military service and asks ‘Why do I sacrifice myself for the 
country?’ In addition to the concerns related to his Armenian identity which might affect 
his experiences under the control of Turkish Armed Forces the opposition against the 
centrality of the military in the Turkish state appears as a driving factor. The reactions of 
the Armenian families to the death of Sevag Balıkçı also affect the opinions of young 
males. A 32-year-old male interviewee quotes his family’s response as follows: ‘you 
definitely cannot join the army; we will not send you off to the army’. This resistance in 
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return leads him to seek a solution and his own words below elucidate the reason 
behind his quest.  
The murder of Sevag made us realise once again we are not normal people. They will 
never consider us as normal. That is why we are faced with a threat at every turn. 
  
This statement indicates the image of the Turkish army as another public sphere in 
which the feeling under threat comes into prominence for male Armenians. On the other 
side the members of the Armenian community as a perceived threat by the Turkish state 
along with other non-Muslim citizens are not hired into the military. Thus the encounter 
between the thought of an internal enemy by the state and threat perception by 
Armenians gains a new meaning in the course of compulsory military service. The army 
is perceived by some respondents as just another site to confront Turkish nationalism 
and to conflict with the intolerant nationalist sentiments. A 33-year-old male 
interviewee who had finished his military service points out how some Turkish soldiers 
adopting a nationalist and racist attitude pose a threat for male Armenians during the 
military service. As both of the parties are allowed to bear arms, he claims, the ethnic 
and religious differences become more visible under the pressure of official duty. Given 
that the increasing significance of different identities in Turkey, another male 
interviewee (34-year-old) who benefitted from paid military service touches on the 
impact of generation gap. The survival strategy of the preceding generation according to 
him is to keep silent and be assimilated and yet new generation is claimed to be 
different. He elaborates this difference as follows: ‘We proudly want to say our names; I 
do not want to hide the cross in my neck and I want to give an answer to someone who 
does/ says something wrong’. What he intends to say is that if he did his military service 
in the same way as Sevag Balıkçı did and made his Armenian identity visible he might 
have been dead or experienced humiliating treatment. It is argued however by some 
respondents that Sevag’s being an Armenian is a sufficient reason for the murder and 
the timing of the murder is put forward as evidence to substantiate their argument. 
Unlike the official declarations of the Turkish Army they claim that this was an 
intentional assault as it took place on the Genocide Remembrance Day and in the Easter 
time. The excerpts below demonstrate the ways in which the interviewees consider the 
death of Sevag as a wilful murder. 
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Interviewee 2 (33-year-old female): Since the day I heard Sevag’s case I am sure 
that this must not be an accident. But it is almost impossible for the authorities to 
admit that this was a pre-planned murder. Because this will directly mean that 
Armenians are still being killed in this country.  
Interviewee 21 (59-year-old male): It is very difficult to believe that this was an 
accident as the event took place on 24th April and during Easter and the victim is an 
Armenian whereas the killer is a nationalist Turk.  
Interviewee 22 (37-year-old male): He shot Sevag because he was Armenian. 
Some protests began to be organised on 24th April in Turkey and according to the 
perpetrator’s logic the choice of this time to shoot Sevag has a meaning. It is very 
evident that this is a racist murder.  
Interviewee 24 (39-year-old female): It was definitely no coincidence as the 
perpetrators of such murders are represented as heroes in this country.  
Interviewee 30 (62-year-old female): To make it look like an accident is easier 
than anything else. Of course this is not accepted as a deliberate action. Such events 
are not new; they dated back to prior to 1915.  
 
These narratives also reflect the scepticism of the interviewees towards the official claim 
of the murder as an isolated event; instead they seem to believe in the historical 
continuity of the attacks, the negligent attitude of the authorities, the effects of newly 
started commemoration events in Istanbul and the temporality of the event as a signifier 
for a biased motivated crime. Furthermore two female (28 and 48 years old) 
respondents allege that the victim’s ideas concerning the genocide must have been 
incited the perpetrator. His Armenian identity as well as his approval of 1915 events as 
genocide is regarded as the driving forces behind the murder.  
 
Nevertheless another group of interviewees disagrees with the thoughts of purposeful 
homicide and the army as an exceptional public sphere to experience different forms of 
discrimination and violence. Based on his military anecdotes a 33-year-old male 
interviewee insists on the personal matter between two soldiers as the main reason for 
the murder. According to another male respondent (43-year-old) the problematical 
system embedded in the military service mistreats both Muslim and Armenian 
individuals so Sevag’s Armenian identity comes to be perceived as a neutral element. By 
providing the categories ‘Muslim’ and ‘Armenian’ instead of ‘Turkish’ and ‘Armenian’, 
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this view gives prominence to a structural explanation in which the army as an 
important power of the Turkish state commits violence towards its own subjects 
regardless of their ethnicity and religion. Although the murder of Sevag is considered 
from a different angle due to his ethnic identity and the date of 24th April, 33-year-old 
male respondent states, Sevag’s death is an unexceptional case among many other cases 
of deceased soldiers in which the authorities pretended as if they were accidents or 
suicides. Yet again the ethnic and religious differences among male citizens throughout 
their military services are claimed to be eliminated as the difficulties they face in the 
Turkish army are identical.  
 
The discussion over the possible effects of the Armenian identity on the military 
experiences of racially motivated assaults in both physical and psychological terms takes 
on another dimension by the ideas of other respondents. The public visibility of the 
Armenian identity along with the relationship with the state and the influence of 
national education on the understanding of different groups come to light through the 
narratives of the interviewees. First with the transition to the public sphere the 
othering/exclusion of Armenians becomes crystallised. Since the national media and the 
political power holders impose a particular mindscape about non-Turkish and non-
Muslim actors in the society as implied by an interviewee (32-year-old male) Armenians 
are subjected to discrimination in the Turkish army and the judicial system. The 
projection of a 26-year-old female respondent concerning the potential risks for an 
Armenian male in the Turkish Armed Forces indicates the detectable feature of 
Armenian names. Although this might sound a minor concern she underlines that at first 
step an Armenian is ‘identified’ by his name which might later trigger new problems 
between Armenian and Turkish soldiers. From a more critical perspective a 44-year-old 
male respondent expresses his views as follows  
If an Armenian is killed anywhere in Turkey the state seeks to close the case. We 
also heard that just after the killing of Sevag the commander made a meeting in 
order to ensure that the witness soldiers will testify in the same way. The incidents 
may change but the reflex of the state remains the same. There might be the young 
raised by hostile feelings and the state utilises these young ones to kill Armenians 
and then tries to cover the incident. 
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This severe criticism of the attitude of the Turkish state towards Armenians is also 
found in other narratives of the interviewees together with the dominant unreliability 
on the lawsuits against the perpetrators. Particularly the similarities between the cases 
of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı in terms of the intentions of the attacks and the 
inefficiencies in the criminal justice process in Turkey are stressed. The need for an 
independent and transparent judiciary system is thus recited many times. On the basis 
of the statements of a 24-year-old male interviewee the underlying reasons behind the 
murders of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı are alike since both the dominant official 
ideology still fails to confront its history. Thus he comments on this mind-set along these 
lines  
The issue is not only to solve this crime but we need to scrutinise ‘why this crime 
was committed’. This racist and fascist mentality is the reflection of the policies of 
Turkey aiming at homogenisation and standardisation of the citizens since the 
foundation of the Republic.  
 
Moreover other interviewees who might be defined as ‘politically active’ maintain that 
both murders exemplify their constant suffering and experiences of discrimination. A 
34-year-old female respondent identifies both of these acts of violence as the 
perpetuation of the 1915 events and the political mentality of the Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP). The concept of ‘mentality’ is repeatedly used by the interviewees to 
explicate prejudiced frame of mind in Turkey with regard to the issue of difference and 
continuing effect of the right-wing political parties. Great Union Party (BBP) as a far-
right Islamist political party in particular is criticised by some interviewees as the 
perpetrators of Hrant Dink, Sevag Balıkçı and the priest Andrea Santoro have strong 
partisan attachments to this party. The correlation between CUP and BBP is suggested 
by a 55-year-old female respondent due to their emphasis on Turkish-Islamic synthesis. 
This understanding is regarded as one of the core elements of the official ideology and 
according to a 53-year-old male interviewee the murder of Sevag also indicates how the 
state instils nationalist thoughts in the minds of its soldiers. More remarkably the killing 
of an Armenian is viewed as a taken for granted right from a nationalist perspective, he 
argues, and this murder aims to give a message that ‘an Armenian can be killed even in 
the army if needed’. Another interviewee (33-year-old male) carries the argument a step 
155 
 
forward as he asserts that apart from the setting ‘people with this mentality possess rifle 
in the army and a knife in the civilian life’.  
 
Four respondents predicate this mentality argument on the effects of national education 
in Turkey. As the citizens receive education at a very young age under the supervision of 
the Ministry of National Education and national curriculum in the schools follows the 
doctrines of the official ideology, the socialisation process of citizens begins with a 
biased training. The interviewees correspondingly draw attention to the significance of 
national schooling as a state policy to impose one-sided knowledge concerning the 
historical and recent developments. According to two female respondents it is not so 
difficult to perceive an Armenian as an enemy in the case where national education 
nurtures nationalist and hostile sentiments and even the word Armenian is employed as 
a swear in the daily life. As the image of an Armenian identity is formed within 
predetermined stereotypes in the minds of non-Armenian citizens by the state, a 25-
year-old female tells that one of her Turkish friends said ‘you are not as I thought’. This 
is a simple but also an enlightening instance of the imaginary cognitive distance between 
two communities despite the spatial proximity.  
 
Almost one third of male respondents told me about their military memoirs when they 
heard the question about the murder of Sevag Balıkçı. A personal experience told by a 
young male Armenian exemplifies the continuation of national training in the army as 
follows 
One evening we were watching a special video which looks like a national security 
course in the schools. As the video said that ‘Greeks are our enemies, Armenians 
betrayed us’, all the soldiers in the military unit started to stare at me. Because they 
knew who I was and I said before that I am an Armenian, I did not hide it from 
anyone. The commander warned them but not because he liked me.  
 
Although this account might appear ‘normal’ for a person familiar with the Turkish 
context, it is still striking to find out constant encoding of Turkish nationalism based on 
racist assumptions through the agency of military and state authorities. In a similar vein 
the short conversation between a 25-year-old male interviewee and his commander 
during his military service epitomises the verbal expression of ethnic prejudice along 
with a form of ignorance. The interviewee told me that the commander asked ‘Why are 
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you doing your military service here?’ and he replied ‘I am a citizen of the Turkish 
Republic but I am an Armenian’. However he was dissatisfied by the answer and said 
‘Why do they enrol you into military service in the first place?’ Once again this anecdote 
sheds light on the problematical relationship constructed between the state institutions 
and the Armenian inhabitants. In order to make me comprehend ‘why Sevag is not the 
last one’ a 33-year-old male interviewee narrated the story of his Armenian friend who 
lived in America and decided to go back to Turkey. But the last month of his military 
service coincided with the death of Hrant Dink. His friend told the interviewee that ‘on 
the day of the assassination the Turkish soldiers in the same military unity were dancing 
in front of him as they were happy with the death of an Armenian’. The interviewee 
claims that the effects of a trauma as such cannot be overcame and the experiences of 
Sevag might resemble the experiences of his friend.  
 
The experiences disclosed by senior male respondents also show consistency in terms of 
the exposure of discrimination, humiliation and intimidation during their military 
service. The extracts below illustrate the conditions of their treatment in the army in 
their own words. 
 
Interviewee 19 (50 years old): Although I had to do my military service under 
equal circumstances, there were some issues that I was troubled with. For example 
while I was in the army I frequently heard the word ‘infidel’ used against me even 
though I had a religion.  
Interviewee 21 (59 years old): I also went through unpleasant events. I think 
there is no Armenian that had no problem during the military service.  
Interviewee 25 (45 years old): I did my military service as a blacklisted soldier 
like every Armenian. As I was Armenian and was good at shooting I was accused by 
being an ASALA militant but luckily a Muslim lieutenant protected me.  
Interviewee 27 (64 years old): I suffered oppression in the army. I argued with 
another soldier over the cleaning works as he tried to goldbrick. We started to fight 
as he told me that ‘you are not guilty but the one who let you in here is guilty’. He 
distorted the subject and said many things about my Armenian identity.  
Interviewee 32 (53 years old): When I was doing my military service my 
commander told me ‘I know you are an Armenian, watch your step! I can give you a 
headache in any minor mistake you make.’ In short I was threatened.  
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The picture drawn by male interviewees provide important insights to understand the 
historical background of the martial atmosphere in which Sevag was murdered. 
However some parts of the narratives appear ambiguous such as the expression of 
‘unpleasant events’ or the form of assistance provided by the superior. In contrast to my 
findings with respect to the ideas of Armenians about army as well as their experiences 
in this institution Örs’ (2010) study provides more optimistic results. The survey based 
on 228 interviews with Armenians in Istanbul between November 2004 and May 2005 
in Örs’ (2010) study points out the Turkish Army as the most credible and trustworthy 
institution in Turkey. More remarkably around 70 % of interviewees consider the duty 
of the army as to save the country from internal enemies; this is read by Örs as evidence 
to the success of the Turkish Army to lead the majority of Armenians to internalise its 
own discourse (ibid: 611-613). It is also maintained that Armenians in Turkey view the 
army as a guarantor of protection for their community against Islamic or ultranationalist 
groups (ibid: 617). As Örs conducted her study before the assassination of Hrant Dink 
and the murder of Sevag Balıkçı the interviewees expectedly fail to integrate these 
turning points for their communal ties and their relationships with the state institutions 
into their interpretations. Besides the snowball technique to gain access to the 
interviewees might result in similar circles of Armenians with comparable views of the 
army.  
 
Finally I would like to finish this section by briefly highlighting the point raised by a 29-
year-old male interviewee. He criticises the limited involvement of the Armenian 
community in the cases of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı. As he is personally interested in 
these cases and keenly engages in the protests, he draws attention to fear as the 
dominant mental state among Armenians in Turkey which leaves Sevag’s family alone in 
their psychological and legal struggles. By admitting the difficulty of ‘being a politically 
active Armenian’ in Turkey he believes that ‘many things could be changed if the 
Armenian families refused to send their sons to the military service after this incident.’ 
As different from other accounts this perspective recommends an alternative approach 
in which Armenians are not positioned only as ultimate victims but also as agents who 
can make a difference.  
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6.3. Conclusion  
In this chapter I discussed discursive strategies in which three national newspapers 
developed to cover the murder of Sevag Balıkçı. First of all news stories put specific 
emphasis on the ‘Armenian descent’ of the victim; yet simultaneously they preferred to 
overlook the point that this murder was committed on the genocide remembrance day. 
While ethnic-religious differences of the injured party were presented as newsworthy 
items, this assault was though decontextualized from its profound socio-political 
circumstances. In contradiction to this discursively repressed aspect the martyrdom 
status of a non-Muslim soldier and the Turkish military funeral customs, in the second 
place, were prominent issues in media representations. My CDA disclosed the ways in 
which the incompatible Armenian identity of Sevag Balıkçı with the understanding of 
national martyrdom and official martyr funeral ceremonies was insinuated in news 
stories. In addition it shed light on discursive manoeuvres that described the incident 
within acceptable nationalist terms. In parallel with this argument news frames 
particularly in Hürriyet highlight the significance of the idea of sacrifice for the Turkish 
state and nation. More notably my analysis showed that strong nationalist themes in 
news discourse were represented as if they were essentials of patriotism. Unlike the 
Hrant Dink case this examination also demonstrated the emphasis on the 
personalisation and particularity of the killing in news stories which gave details about 
the victim’s personal life and previous experiences but refrained from mentioning the 
perpetrator. The underlying cause for news discourses to particularise this incident 
might be considered as a journalistic attempt to report this assault as an ordinary 
criminal case.  
 
In the following part of the chapter I scrutinised observations of Armenian interviewees 
concerning the Sevag Balıkçı case and found out that gender differences were 
determining factors for respondents’ commentaries on this instance. Particularly young 
male Armenians challenged the idea of sacrifice for the nation which was proliferated in 
media representations. Furthermore this investigation crystallised two distinct 
standpoints among the interviewees. On the one hand a cluster of respondents claimed 
that being a soldier has significance in terms of one’s relation to the Turkish state 
regardless of one’s ethnicity and religion. On the other hand according other group of 
interviewees the distinguishability of the Armenian identity was recognised as a 
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satisfactory reason for any act of violence against Armenians. Particular responses of the 
interviewees also allowed me to conclude that this case considered as an example for 
historical continuity of the attacks towards non-Turkish and non-Muslim citizens in the 
military might be identified with the indulgence of the state. Despite the official 
declarations that strive to downplay the severity of the situation, analysis of the 
interviews elucidated that the murder of Sevag Balıkçı was not perceived as an isolated 
incident; but instead was assessed through the socio-political setting that paved the way 
for nationalist sentiments. Therefore the findings of CDA of news stories and responses 
of the interviewees enabled me to point out divergent production and consumption 
processes of this particular incident.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
The PROTEST AGAINST the KHOJALY MASSACRE 
(26th February 2012) 
 
In addition to the analyses of the assassination of Hrant Dink and the murder of Sevag 
Balıkçı, my research also focuses on the protest organised in Istanbul vis-à-vis the 
Khojaly Massacre in 2012. During the Nagorno-Karabakh War, which took place 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the years between 1988 and 1994, hundreds of 
Azerbaijanis in the village of Khojaly were massacred by Armenian forces on 26th 
February 1992. According to Human Rights Watch, this massacre resulted in the killing 
of approximately two hundred Azeri villagers, women and children, and was the largest 
massacre in this war up until that point (Companjen, 2010:236). The Azerbaijan 
authorities officially recognised the Khojaly Massacre as genocide in 1998 and 
subsequently considerable efforts have been devoted to the international recognition of 
this tragedy as genocide. In order to institutionalise the genocide, the Azerbaijan 
authorities declared the 31st March as the official commemoration day on which special 
ceremonies are organised in both Azerbaijan and in states with Azerbaijan’s diplomatic 
representations. For instance, in 2008 special events for the commemoration of the 
Khojaly Genocide were arranged in 60 cities around the world. In addition to the official 
efforts of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Turkish state and Turkish Diaspora groups 
have played important roles in promoting the vision of the Khojaly Massacre as 
genocide. This is not simply related to enhancing fraternal relations between the Azeri 
and the Turkish nations, but also due to Turkey’s attempt to minimise the salience of the 
political battles and pressures over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide (Finkel, 
2010:58-9).  
 
It should be noted that in some political and public debates in Turkey, the Khojaly 
Genocide is put forward as evidence to indicate the ‘inhumane’ nature of Armenians, 
their ‘capability’ of causing physical and psychological damage, and the ‘invalidity’ of 
their claims about the Armenian Genocide. In other words, two human tragedies in the 
20th century are opened up for discussion by comparing their magnitude and 
consequences. In addition, the subject goes beyond the international recognition of the 
Khojaly Massacre as genocide and turns into an encouragement of anti-Armenian 
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sentiments in Turkey. For the purposes of this research, one of the most appropriate 
examples through which to observe this problematic situation is the protest against the 
Khojaly Massacre in Istanbul. On 26th February 2012, thousands of people gathered in 
Taksim Square for the 20th anniversary remembrance of the victims of the Khojaly 
Massacre. During the protest people shouted the slogans: ‘We are all Khojalians, we are 
all Karabakhians!’, ‘You are all Armenians, you are all bastards’, which were disparaging 
manipulation of the phrase ‘We are all Hrant, We are all Armenians’ used in the protest 
after the assassination of Hrant Dink to express solidarity with the Armenian community 
in Turkey. The nationalist tone in the protest also manifested itself through banners 
with slogans such as: ‘We are all Turks’, ‘Call for an end to Armenian lies’, ‘Today, 
Taksim, Tomorrow, Yerevan: We will descend upon you suddenly in the night’ and ‘We 
are all Ogün Samast’ (the convicted murderer of Hrant Dink). More notably, Guillaume 
Perrier, a correspondent for the French daily Le Monde, argued that ‘this protest has 
been supported, promoted and financed by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’26. In 
addition to this claim, the approval of the AKP government of this protest became 
obvious as Turkish Interior Minister - İdris Naim Şahin- was one of the speakers at the 
demonstration. In his speech, İdris Naim Şahin said 
 
Twenty years ago on this day, blood-thirsty murderers, merciless, heartless and 
covert aggressors claimed the blood of 603 people in Khojaly. That day, blood was 
spilled, but the case is not over. As long as the Turkish nation stays alive that blood 
will be answered for. 
 
Concerning this speech and the protest as a whole, the Human Rights Association (IHD) 
Istanbul branch called for the initiation of an investigation of the organizing committee 
for the slogans, the placards and the speeches, as well as an investigation of the Interior 
Minister for the content of his speech under Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code27. This 
commemoration in Istanbul was also harshly criticised by the Armenian National 
Committee of America (ANCA) and its executive director declared that: 
 
                                                          
26   Retrieved from: http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/21966/protests-in-istanbul-you-are-all-armenian-
you-are, LBC International, 26 February 2012 
27   Retrieved from: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists-272789-khojaly-massacre-and-
racism.html, Today’s Zaman, 28 February 2012 
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Today’s anti-Armenian demonstrations in the streets of Istanbul—with the interior 
minister and prominent political parties at the helm—were clearly aimed at inciting 
increased racism and renewed violence against Turkey’s own Armenian citizens and 
neighbouring Armenia. These are not simply the violent echoes of a post-genocidal 
state, but the determined actions of a pre-genocidal Turkish society that is angrily 
lashing out at its imagined enemies and seeking out its next target.28  
 
As this statement makes apparent, on-going feelings of hatred in society and potential 
attacks towards Armenians are emphasised along with the involvement of the 
government in a commemoration that was marked by nationalist and racist themes. 
Although the announced goal of the commemoration was to remember the victims of the 
Khojaly Massacre and share the sorrow of the survivors, the members of the Armenian 
community became the target of hate speech and threats and were held responsible for 
the Khojaly Massacre.  
 
My main rationale behind the selection of this protest for this research is its capability to 
indicate how the image and representation of Armenians as an ‘internal enemy’ 
intersect with their counterpart, that of an ‘external enemy’ within the discourse of 
Turkish nationalisms. The inquiry into the news stories concerning the protest of the 
Khojaly Massacre is important for two reasons; first, designated national newspapers 
might point out the ways in which the Khojaly Massacre becomes a tool in the discursive 
sphere to put pressure on the Armenian community in Turkey; second, the participation 
and support of the government in this protest might raise issues of the self-censorship 
and autonomy in newspapers and lead to different and/or similar coverage depending 
on the relationship between the owners of newspapers and the government. 
 
7.1. Critical Discourse Analysis of the Protest against the Khojaly Massacre 
The CDA in this research lastly concentrates on the news stories concerning the protest 
against the Khojaly Massacre in Istanbul. In this section, I investigate news coverage of 
this problematic case and identify both overlapping and divergent themes that appeared 
in the dailies, namely Zaman, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet. Starting from the period before, 
                                                          
28   Retrieved from: http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/02/26/anca-condemns-anti-armenian-
protests-in-turkey/, Armenian Weekly, 26 February 2012 
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and continuing for the period during the protest, my CDA distinguishes three prominent 
themes which are elaborated in the following sections.  
 
7.1.1. ‘Do not remain silent against the Armenian lies’ 
Although the time frame for the CDA of the news stories includes the week after the 
protest, the calls for the protest published in Zaman and Hürriyet before the protest are 
equally important. Cumhuriyet also announces the time and place of the commemoration 
on 26th February 2011. The ad published in Zaman reads as follows: 
 
Do not remain silent against the Armenian lies!  
We are gathering together in Taksim on 26th February Sunday at 2 pm.  
What happened on 26th February 1992? 
The Armenian army swept away the city of Khojaly in one night. The genocide took 
place in Khojaly. The soil of Azerbaijan the Turkish land Karabakh is under the 
occupation of Armenia. 1 million people were exiled from their lands. Thousands of 
innocent were slaughtered.  
If you say Khojaly, Srebrenica, Hama and Homs should not happen again, let’s be in 
Taksim on 26th February Sunday at 2pm.  
We did not forget the Khojaly Massacre, and we will not let it be forgotten.  
63 innocent children were slain.  
 
This ad was put in the newspaper by the ‘We are all Khojalians’ platform and the photos 
of some deceased children were printed underneath the statement. It is evident that all 
the views and claims expressed in this ad are those of the parties who made payment to 
the newspaper in order to reach the mass audience and who do not necessarily 
represent the standpoint of the newspaper. However, the decision of both the 
administrative and editorial committees of Zaman to publish this ad, which has the 
capacity to incriminate Armenians living in Turkey and cause their social exclusion, 
needs to be taken into consideration. In a similar way, Hürriyet gives publicity to the 
same advertisement under the news story entitled, ‘To Taksim for Khojaly’. The daily 
also cites particular quotations from the announcement made by the organisers of the 
event shown as below.  
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In the statement indicating that the occasion will be held in order to share the tragic 
event which tears the hearts of all Turks out and strengthens the friendships through 
the understanding of ‘One nation with two states’, it was told that ‘we are waiting for 
everyone from Azerbaijan, the Balkan Peninsula, the entire Turkic world and every part 
of Turkey and the ones who say no to the massacres to the Taksim Square’. 
 
The phrase, ‘Do not remain silent to the Armenian lies’, as the motto of the call for 
participation in the protest, also appears in the news story. It might be suggested that 
Zaman and Hürriyet disseminate this call as if they approve of the content of the 
advertisement and follow the same ideological line as the coordinators of the event. On 
the other side, following the identical content of the announcement for the protest and 
the core knowledge concerning the Khojaly Massacre, Cumhuriyet gives coverage to the 
statement made by the Human Rights Association. Regarding the posters that read, ‘Do 
not remain silent to the Armenian lies’, the statement proclaims as follows: 
 
To condemn all the attempts against human life anywhere in the world, including 
the Khojaly, is a human right. But these posters target Armenians as the citizens of 
the Turkish Republic. They target a society and its members as if they are enemies. 
 
Given the magnitude and the dominant nationalist posture of the components of the 
protest, the presence of this counter account in a challenging form within the news 
discourse of Cumhuriyet is significant. After that, the criticism of Bahçeli, the leader of 
the Nationalist Action Party, is included in the text under the subheading ‘The Chorus of 
we are all Armenians’. Although the subheading speaks for itself, briefly, it is claimed 
that ‘the chorus of we are all Armenians’ and the ones attempting to overcome taboos 
through the Armenian opening are different faces of the same coin. Despite the extended 
press release of Bahçeli, Cumhuriyet draws attention only to this part of citation, which 
conflicts with the efforts to develop empathy towards Armenians and recognition of 
their disadvantaged positions. When viewed from this aspect, the discursive strategy 
employed in this news story points out the ambivalent positioning of Cumhuriyet in 
between the two competing standpoints.  
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7.1.2. Language of Homogenisation  
The protest against the Khojaly Massacre appeared in the front pages of all the 
newspapers under analysis on 27th February 2012. The headlines of Zaman, Hürriyet 
and Cumhuriyet are indicated below. 
 
Zaman Thousands gathered together in Taksim for 20th 
year of Khojaly Massacre 
Hürriyet Khojaly March 
Cumhuriyet Khojaly was Commemorated 
 
Zaman portrays the number of participants at the protest as ‘thousands’, whereas 
Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet delete the subject through nominalisation. A CDA of the 
headlines and news stories concerning the protest unsurprisingly reveals the dominant 
representation of Armenians as the perpetrators of the massacre and Azerbaijanis as the 
victims. Three papers thus perpetuate the pan-Turkic understanding of ‘one nation with 
two states’ in their news stories through the emphasis on the fraternity that exists 
between the Azeri and Turkish nations. In constructing the particular media images of 
the communities, a simple binary opposition of ‘us’, including Azerbaijanis and Turks, 
versus ‘them’, denoting Armenians, is utilised.  
 
The use of the pronoun ‘we’ as one of the central features of the newspaper discourse 
stands for the combination of the newspaper and its readership in an ‘implied 
consensus’ (Fowler, 1991:189). It is possible to claim that the tendency of the 
newspapers under analysis to standardise the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Turkish 
communities resembles the ‘discourse of homogenisation’ (Nickels et. al, 2012). As 
Nickels et.al address the CDA of British newspaper coverage of the Irish and Muslim 
communities between 1974 and 2007, they identify a discourses of homogenisation, 
innocence/threat and inclusion/exclusion. In their study, the discourse of 
homogenisation operates through essentialist terms like ‘the Irish’, ‘the Irish 
community’, ‘Muslims’, ‘the Muslim community’ (ibid: 348). In a similar vein, in my CDA 
of the news coverage of the Khojaly protest, the terms, ‘Turkish nation’, ‘Azerbaijani 
nation’, ‘Armenians’, and ‘Armenian forces’ are commonly used in the national 
newspapers. Following the argument of Nickels et.al (2012) that ‘using such terms 
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without elaboration elides significant differences that exist within these communities’, 
the newspapers under analysis seem to fail to notice the distinction between the 
Armenians in Turkey (Western Armenians) and the Armenians in Armenia (Eastern 
Armenians).  
 
This notable generalisation also displays itself in the news stories using the broad term 
‘Armenians’. For instance, Zaman reported an exclusive story about a Turkish citizen of 
Azeri ‘descent’ whose grandmother had been killed in the Khojaly Massacre, and the 
headline selected for this story was: ‘Armenians killed my grandmother when she was 
praying’. The sentences below are extracted from the news published in Zaman on 26th 
February 2012.  
 
Atmaca stated that it is impossible to forget that atrocity and the ones who 
committed this atrocity could not be humans.  
The pains of the bloody pogrom committed by Armenians in the city of Khojaly in 
Azerbaijan retain their clarity.   
Atmaca indicated that many people were killed brutally without treating children, 
the elderly, and women and men unequally and claimed Armenians need to be 
penalised due to this massacre.  
She finished her speech by saying that Europeans who speak with authority 
regarding the human rights did not impose any sanction against Armenians.  
 
In addition to the denunciatory language and the explicit allegations about Armenians as 
the offenders of the massacre, this news story justifies any defamatory attitude towards 
this group of people. In other words, insulting slogans, placards, and statements about 
Armenians before, during or after the protest are able to find their reference points in 
the news discourse of a national newspaper.   
 
7.1.3. Our vs. Their Nationalism 
During the protest, people shouted slogans such as: ‘we are all Khojalians, we are all 
Karabakhians!’, ‘You are all Armenians, you are all bastards’, which are disparaging 
manipulations of the phrase ‘We are all Hrant, We are all Armenians’ used in the protest 
after the assassination of Hrant Dink to express solidarity with the Armenian community 
in Turkey. The nationalist tone in the protest also manifested itself through the banners, 
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with slogans such as:‘ We are all Turks’, ‘Call for an end to Armenian lies’, ‘Today, 
Taksim, Tomorrow, Yerevan: We will descend upon you suddenly in the night’ and ‘We 
are all Ogün Samast’ (the convicted murderer of Hrant Dink). Interestingly, the reporter 
in Cumhuriyet mentions none of these slogans or posters but speaks of the warnings of 
the organising committee against the slogan ‘revenge!’ shouted by Alperens. Hürriyet 
also employs a selective reporting technique for the slogans and publishes only: ‘We are 
all Turks, we are Khojalians’, ‘Karabakh is ours and will stay as ours’ and ‘one nation 
with two states, justice for Karabakh’. In the news story of Zaman, the placards such as 
‘Do not forget Khojaly’, ‘one nation with two states’ and ‘Stop to the Armenian lie’ are 
emphasised. 
 
In addition to the selective reporting practices of the dailies, Cumhuriyet and Zaman, in 
particular, make an effort discursively in order to label or imply ‘some’ groups of 
participants as (ultra) nationalist. The group described as ‘Alperens’ in the news story of 
Cumhuriyet might be identified as the youth branch of an ultranationalist party. The 
slogan of this ‘ultranationalist’ group is recounted as if the other slogans and placards 
during the protest had no nationalist or racist connotations. Under the subheading of, 
‘The Placards consisting of insults drew reaction’, a part of the news story in Zaman also 
reports on ‘some marginal nationalist groups’ who ‘attempted to sabotage the 
demonstration’. It is narrated additionally that ‘the members of the group drew 
reactions from the other participants as they were shouting racist and libellous slogans’. 
Although the prevailing vague news language blocks comprehension of the precise 
characteristics and acts of these ‘marginal nationalist groups’, it is obvious that Zaman 
draws a line between these extreme groups and other participants. 
 
Crawford (2012) explores what selected newspapers such as The Guardian, The Daily 
Telegraph, The Times, The Herald and The Scotsman in UK mean when they label a 
political party or an individual as nationalist. He looks at the strategies of the 
newspapers that disseminate the idea of the naturalness of existing nation states in 
contrast to the movements and individuals identified as nationalist. According to 
Crawford’s study, the newspapers employ the term ‘nationalist’ to describe various 
stances: someone who supports/opposes a secessionist movement; a religious 
segregationist; a defender of national or group culture; a racist. The journalists under 
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analysis also depict the notion of ‘nationalist’ as not respectable and ‘alien to the world 
of nation states and in particular as a means of identifying others’ (ibid: 635). The 
labelling of particular groups as ‘nationalist’ in the news discourse brings about a 
discrepancy between nationalisms, of which some forms are recognised as ‘normal’ and 
tolerable. The portrayals of the protest against the Khojaly Massacre in the dailies also 
construct this rhetorical distinction. They present ‘our’ nationalism not as a nationalism 
which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien’, but as a ‘patriotism which is 
beneficial and necessary’ (Billig, 1995: 55).  ‘Our’ nationalism, along with the ‘Azeri’ 
nationalism manifested through anti-Armenian sentiments in the protest, is packaged in 
an acceptable format in the news discourse that is recognised as patriotism. However, 
other forms of nationalism, just as in the case of news reporting in Cumhuriyet and 
Zaman, cannot be justified in the name of patriotism; they are just positioned as being 
opposite to ‘our’ patriotism.  
 
Furthermore, the discussion concerning different representations of nationalism and 
patriotism in the discursive domain with regard to the protest against the Khojaly 
Massacre brings about the issue of new racism. By dissociating itself from thoughts of 
biological or cultural inferiority, the new racism has established a link between race, 
nationhood, patriotism and nationalism (Gilroyi 1992 cited in Faimau, 2013: 22). 
Anthias (1995 cited in Faimau, 2013:22) also alleges that ‘others are endowed with 
fixed, unchanging and negative characteristics and subjected to relations of 
inferiorisation and exclusion’. However Faimau (ibid) considers that the notion of 
fixedness is exaggerated in Anthias’s claim, due to the flexible processes of ideas and 
discourses; but he agrees with the idea that when a certain group is excluded from the 
discourses of national belonging and identity, that group tends to be inferiorised and 
negativised.  
 
As this conception underlines the incompatibility of the different social or ethnic groups, 
the day after the event, the degrading and dehumanising aspects of the protest, with 
respect to Armenians representing the other of Turkish and Azeri identities, were 
featured in news discourse of the dailies. However, when the Human Rights Association, 
Istanbul branch, called for the initiation of an investigation into the organizing 
committee, the slogans, the placards and the speeches, as well as an investigation of the 
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Interior Minister for the content of his speech under Article 216 of the Turkish Penal 
Code, news discourse evolved into a more critical outlook. For example, on 28th 
February 2012 the selected title for the news story in Cumhuriyet was: ‘No to Racism’, 
which in fact was a quotation from the press release of the Revolutionary Socialist 
Workers Party concerning the protest. On 4th March 2012, Hürriyet also cited the 
statements of the general vicar of the Armenian Patriarchate, in which he says that some 
of the placards and slogans are insults against Armenians.   
 
7.1.4. The Creation of a Collective Narrative  
As the ingrained denial of the Armenian genocide at both political and public levels is 
taken into account, newspapers’ usage of the term ‘massacre/genocide’ without 
hesitation in their coverage of the protest needs to be underlined. In addition to the 
announced goals, the protest aims to put forward this tragic event as evidence of the 
‘inhumane’ nature of Armenians, their ‘capability’ of causing physical and psychological 
damage, and the ‘invalidity’ of their claims about the Armenian Genocide. In other 
words, the recognition of one human tragedy that occurred in the 20th century is shown 
as a reason for the denial of another human catastrophe.  
 
At this juncture, news media plays an important role in terms of acknowledging and 
presenting the magnitude and legitimacy of a mass execution and its relevance for the 
current political system in the eyes of the public. As the newspapers become sites for 
collective memory, news coverage of the protest against the Khojaly Massacre reminds 
us of the repressed ‘national’ memory of the Armenian Genocide. The memory 
construction and reproduction concerning the identification of Armenians as a mutual 
national enemy for both Turks and Azeris, becomes materialised in news discourse. As 
Leavy (2007:2) underscores for the American press, the media takes a part in selecting 
‘which events are to become staples in collective memory’ and affects the 
interpretations of these events. In addition to the construction of very particular and 
limited narratives about these selected events, the interpretations are often based on 
mythical concepts such as patriotism, martyrdom, heroism and evil (ibid). Media 
representations of the protest in the national newspapers correspondingly perpetuate 
the idea of the Khojaly Massacre as an indispensable component of collective memory in 
Turkey. To remember this massacre, along with the collective violence committed 
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against the Azeris by the Armenians, becomes a discursive tool for patterns of denial 
concerning the Armenian genocide, which also serves for Turkish national identity 
building.  
 
At the governmental level, the support of the AKP government for the protest came to 
light as the Interior Minister -İdris Naim Şahin- was one of the speakers at the 
demonstration. The extract below is only a part of his speech: 
 
Twenty years ago on this day, bloodthirsty murderers, merciless, heartless and 
covert aggressors claimed the blood of 603 people in Khojaly. That day, blood was 
spilled, but the case is not over. As long as the Turkish nation stays alive that blood 
will be answered for.  
 
This short piece even exemplifies how collective memory is operationalised through 
nationhood, national ‘others’ and national remembrance. Hürriyet and Zaman carried 
the notorious speech of the Interior Minister in their headline. For example, Zaman 
quoted the phrase, ‘The blood that spilled over in Khojaly will be called to account 
within the legal system’. The newspapers underline the efforts of the Turkish Republic 
towards gaining international recognition of the Khojaly Massacre as genocide, and the 
moral support of the ‘Turkish nation’ to the ‘Azerbaijani nation’ through this protest. 
More importantly, it might be asserted that they attempted to make the audience 
understand and/or feel that censuring the Khojaly Massacre is a part of the national 
mission that needs to be fulfilled by every responsible Turkish citizen. As was later 
realised, the police intervened in the protesters’ urge to walk towards the building of the 
Agos newspaper, on 1st March 2012. Agos commented on the racist and abusive slogans, 
placards and speeches targeting Armenians in the protest and also called for defending 
lives and not blood. Interestingly, Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman published Agos’ 
criticism without adding subjective evaluations; only Cumhuriyet used the phrase ‘hate 
speech’ to mention Agos’ point of departure for the declaration.  
 
7.2. The Comparison between the Massacres 
In this section I analyse the ideas of forty-five Armenian interviewees regarding the 
protest in Istanbul against the Khojaly Massacre in 2012. In addition to the cases of 
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Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı I specifically focus on this protest as a third incident in the 
designated national newspapers and in the interviews with Armenians. To seek the 
views of the respondents, I addressed the question: ‘What did you think when you saw 
or heard the protest against the Khojaly Massacre in Taksim Square and the 
slogans/posters targeting at Armenians?’. First of all, the phrases, ‘unsurprising’ and 
‘expected’, are recurrently employed by the interviewees to point out their familiarity 
with anti-Armenian discourse and actions in Turkey. In particular, senior Armenians 
explained how they have become accustomed to derogatory speech and marches against 
them. Some of these respondents relate the political and social atmosphere in Turkey 
that gave consent to this protest to the interrelated attitude of preceding governments 
and overriding prejudices in Turkish society against Armenians. According to the claim 
of a 53-year-old male interviewee, two different Prime Ministers in the Turkish 
governments employed the terms ‘Armenian bastard’ and ‘Armenian sperm’ to 
denigrate Armenian identity. More notably, he draws attention to the change in the 
descriptions of Armenians, from ‘the loyal community’ in the Ottoman Empire towards 
‘the community of traitors’ in the Turkish Republic. The offensive slogans and placards 
in the protest against Armenians are claimed to reflect the historical shift in the 
perception of the state towards its own citizens.  
 
The idea of the continual influence of the official attitude on promoting anti-Armenian 
sentiments in Turkey is also supported by another interviewee (49-year-old male), who 
exemplifies the lawsuit brought by the 11th president of Turkey to refute the claim of his 
Armenian roots. As an Armenian who has lived in Istanbul for years and in the social 
context in which the word ‘Armenian’ is perceived as a swearword, he describes the 
protest as ‘normal’. Obviously, what is defined here as ‘normal’ is not insulting language 
and a discriminatory mind-set, but the political and social circumstances in Turkey 
which normalise racism against Armenians and present this form of racism as the 
inevitable consequence of the claims for genocide recognition. In order to show the 
connection between the contemporary political milieu and the structure of the protest, a 
62-year-old female respondent recalls a part of Erdoğan’s speech on TV before the 
general elections in 2011. While he was explaining that ‘there are lots of conspiracy 
books written about himself and President Abdullah Gül’, he stated that ‘[i]n those books 
we were nothing more than Jews, Armenians and, excuse me, also Greeks. Can you think 
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about it?’29 By calling attention to this statement, the interviewee said: ‘Our prime 
minister talks in this way, why don’t the protesters do the same thing?’ As she implies 
the impact of the political discourse on the stigmatization of Armenians, she depicts the 
biased attitudes of political figures as incentives for other discriminatory attempts.  
 
Based on the explanations of some younger interviewees, it becomes apparent that they 
associate the predictability of this protest with the murders of Hrant Dink and Sevag 
Balıkçı, which are their primary traumatic experiences. As witnesses of the chain of 
killings of Armenians in the recent years, the younger generation also seems to be 
prepared for further acts of violence. Yet the striking point here is that these three cases 
-the killings of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balikci and the protest- are not perceived per se, 
but they are viewed as interdependent consequences of the negligent attitude of the 
Turkish government. The overt involvement of the Turkish government in the protest 
through the participation of the ministers and the notorious speech given by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs is cited by a group of young respondents. The quotations 
below demonstrate the reactions of the interviewees concerning the intervention of the 
government.  
 
Interviewee 39 (26-year-old female): The support of the statesman -Idris Naim 
Sahin- for this protest is very terrifying. This is as significant as the killing of Hrant 
Dink. The killing of Sevag is also normalized through this protest. It was a very 
pessimistic day for me.  
Interviewee 14 (24-year-old male): The protest done with the government 
support lays things out straight. Although the government claims to solve the 
murder of Hrant Dink and even if it succeeds in solving it, there is no point in solving 
that murder unless it comes to terms with the underlying fascist mentality. This is 
because people will be killed again. I left home after the end of the protest. But I saw 
the placards in the hands of the participants. I got angry but was not able to say 
anything. This is the reality and you just get used to it.  
Interview 2 (33-year-old female): Unfortunately Idris Naim Şahin made a speech 
in front of those banners. The thing that I get used to comes up time after time and 
disappoints me. The biggest disappointment for me was the murder of Hrant Dink. 
He was killed blatantly on one of the busiest streets in Istanbul and then an 
                                                          
29
 http://www.bianet.org/english/politics/157632-erdogan-excuse-me-but-they-called-me-armenian 
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Armenian soldier was killed on 24th April. How can I send my child to the military 
service? I do not want give birth to a boy because I do not want him to leave here. He 
might be treated badly in the army. After all that the Khojaly commemoration did 
not shock me.   
Interviewee 20 (29-year-old male): I think the speech of the Minister of Internal 
Affairs was a telling sign. His talk of revenge ignited the existing Armenian hostility. I 
did not find the speech strange because he has always talked in this way and his 
words are so familiar. I mean this attitude does not sound unfamiliar to us.  
 
The attempts of some senior and younger respondents to explain the protest on the 
basis of their preceding experiences, the everlasting anti-Armenian attitude of the state, 
along with the ties to other cases, also becomes manifest in other skeptical opinions 
about the actual aim of the protest. Despite the stated goal of the protest, which is to 
commemorate the Khojaly victims, it is argued that the protest seemed to reinforce 
hatred towards Armenians and reproduce prevailing racist reviews in Turkish society. 
The protest is specifically portrayed as a provocation, by a 33-year-old female 
interviewee, to instigate enmity and violent attacks on Armenians. Under the guise of 
remembering the victims and condemning the acts of Armenian perpetrators, she 
touches upon the possibility of a large-scale opposition movement against Armenians in 
Turkey.  
 
From an international perspective, the issue of the political and financial support of the 
Azerbaijan state for the protest is also introduced. For instance, a 36-year-old male 
respondent argues that the protest goes beyond targeting Armenians as it also aims to 
protect the national interests of the Azerbaijan state by creating public opinion in 
Turkey on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As can be easily understood, this inference 
belongs to a relatively well-educated journalist, particularly interested in these topics. 
However, few interviewees also elucidate the contribution of the Azerbaijan state to the 
protest on the grounds of the political cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In 
order to carry out the protest, a 53-year-old male interviewee claims that the Turkish 
state derives its financial power from the Azerbaijan state and creates an image in which 
Armenians in Turkey are despised and are exposed to swearing. That is to say, the 
protest against the Khojaly Massacre in Istanbul turns out to be both an ideological and 
psychological struggle against the Armenian community in Turkey.  
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The posters saying, ‘Don’t remain silent against the Armenian lies’ that were placed 
throughout Istanbul before the protest, and the slogans such as ‘you are all Armenians, 
you are all bastards’ and ‘One nation with two states’ that appeared during the protest 
might be read as the verbal manifestations of the struggle. In particular, the posters on 
the billboards appear demoralising for some interviewees as they claim these intervene 
in their everyday lives. Although they had the right to choose not to attend or watch the 
protest, the posters hung in different spots in the city became a part of their daily 
routine. The first reaction of some interviewees to the question concerning the protest is 
to unveil their thoughts and feelings about these posters. Two respondents express their 
states of mind as follows: 
 
Interviewee 12 (28-year-old female): In fact long before the protest the posters 
‘Don’t remain silent against the Armenian lies’ that hung everywhere frightened me 
very much. It caused a feeling like, ‘Do I not belong to here or to this society? Does 
nobody want to do something when they see these posters? Am I in this much of an 
excluded situation?  
Interviewee 20 (29-year-old male): We do not legitimise the massacre in Khojaly 
and of course it needs to be condemned, but it is worrying to see that it is used on 
this side. The reflection of this incident on the billboards was the final point. The 
genuine fear was these billboards. As I got on the underground I could see them. The 
fear entered into our homes.  
 
From my point of view, in the first extract the fragility of the Armenian identity comes to 
light through the thin line between the sense of belonging and exclusion. More 
importantly, her inquiry about the unresponsiveness of other members of the society to 
the posters gives the impression of a call to defend the rights of different ethnic and 
religious groups. In the second extract, the interviewee seems to feel obliged to indicate 
the recognition of the Khojaly Massacre on behalf of the Armenian community. 
Moreover, he draws attention to the situation in which the massacre is used against 
Armenians in Turkey. It should be also underlined that the motto ‘Don’t remain silent 
against the Armenian lies’ has a double-edged meaning. It stands for an attempt to 
compel the Armenian perpetrators to accept responsibility for the Khojaly Massacre on 
the one hand, while, on the other hand, it intends to recall the Armenian genocide, which 
is marked as a fictitious incident by the use of the word ‘lies’.  
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Using the commemoration of the Khojaly Massacre as an opportunity to deny the 
Armenian Genocide and oppress Armenians living in Turkey is also realised as the 
occurrence of Turkish nationalism by some interviewees. While the organisational form 
of the protest, the calls for the march, the posters on the billboards and the newspaper 
ads, are described as ‘fascistic’ and ‘extreme nationalist’, it is interesting to discern the 
difference between ‘reasonable’ and extreme forms of nationalism that appear in some 
responses. For example, a 53-year-old male interviewee maintains that he started to 
consider nationalism as a predominant force in Turkey, along with the effects of 
religious fundamentalism, particularly following the protest. However, notably, from his 
point of view, nationalism as an essential mechanism develops into a ‘harmful’ form 
when it is excessive. For another interviewee (38-year-old male), the predominant 
nationalist tone in the protest is closely related to a political strategy of the AKP 
government to pull votes from nationalist circles in Turkey. As the rightist and 
nationalist discourse is so ingrained in Turkish politics, he implies, the protest is just an 
additional tool to protect the sovereignty of the government.  
 
Regarding the way to commemorate the Khojaly victims and glorify their memories, the 
problem of generalisation is also brought up on the agenda. According to a few 
interviewees, the speeches and the placards/slogans incriminate Armenian identity and 
leave Armenians in a difficult situation. The protest once again strengthens the 
argument that, as stated by an interviewee (29-year-old male), Armenians in Turkey are 
held responsible for any action of an Armenian in any other part of the world. This view 
implies that the Armenian perpetrators in the Khojaly Massacre should not be equated 
with all other Armenians, particularly the Armenians of Turkey. By using strong 
language, a 34-year-old female respondent also recommends that the protesters should 
‘vent their spleen on Caucasian Armenians’, since Armenians in Turkey are unaware of 
the happenings in Khojaly. This viewpoint captivatingly resembles one of the official 
claims of Turkey, which highlights the distinction between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Turkish Republic, as well as the Turkish perpetrators under the rule of the Empire and 
the current Turkish administrators. The Turkish state therefore objects to genocide 
accusations, due to regime change, along with the shifting nature of the Turkish identity. 
Furthermore, another interviewee (37-year-old male) attempts to see the issue in a new 
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light and asks: ‘Why do I need to defend the massacre because of my ethnic identity?’ 
More notably, he implies that there is no remarkable difference between the state 
mechanisms for committing crimes. Thus, the issue of state violence instead of the effect 
of ethnic identities comes into prominence.  
 
Finally, the state-sponsored organisation of a far-reaching protest for the first time to 
commemorate the Khojaly Massacre in Istanbul is claimed to be a part of larger plan of 
the Turkish state. Since the year 2015 is the 100th anniversary of the Armenian 
Genocide, the state aims to use the Khojaly Massacre as an antithesis to deny the 
allegations and unsettle the image of Armenians as the injured party. Therefore, the link 
between the official preparations for the action plans in 2015, and the protest against 
the Khojaly Massacre in 2012, is underlined by a few respondents. According to a 46-
year-old male interviewee, the protest seems to be ‘normal’ if the Turkish state decides 
to carry on its official denial discourse in 2015. In very simple terms, he explains that the 
protest confirms the idea that ‘we did not do anything to you; in fact you, Armenians, 
committed crime against humanity’. In a similar vein, another respondent (44-year-old 
male) interprets the protest as a countermove of the government to cast aside the 
international pressure for genocide recognition. The sincerity of the protest on the 20th 
anniversary of the Khojaly Massacre is also questioned, as there was no protest until 
2012. The comparison between the massacres put forward by the government might be 
considered as a pre-emptive manoeuvre to invalidate the legal claims of Armenians for 
the genocide, as well as their demand for equal citizenship status.  
 
7.3. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed how explicit encouragement and involvement of the AKP 
government in the protest against the Khojaly Massacre were naturalised in news 
coverage of designated newspapers. The lack of critical attitude in media 
representations also epitomises the ordinariness of an-Armenian demonstration in the 
Turkish context.  Accordingly I claim that self-censorship mechanisms and limited 
autonomy of national newspapers under review resulted in the selective reporting 
which raises the controversial issue of objectivity in printed press. In particular the 
effects of the AKP government in the regulation of news spectrum played a pivotal role 
in the application of similar discursive strategies to recount the protest. My CDA also 
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highlighted the construction of opposition between ‘normal/tolerable’ and 
‘extreme/intolerable’ forms of nationalism in the same way as the cases of Hrant Dink 
and Sevag Balıkçı. This dichotomist interpretation similarly reveals itself in portrayals of 
Turkish and Azeri nationalisms as ‘our’ nationalisms and Armenian nationalism as ‘their’ 
nationalism. I consequently allege that news coverage of the protest against the Khojaly 
Massacre was utilised in order to refute genocide ‘claims’ of Armenians due to their past 
atrocities against Azeris. The lack of compassion towards the fragile status of Armenians 
in news discourse was also a revealing finding as it is completely different from the 
attention devoted to the construction and reproduction of Turkish national identity.  
 
The following section of the chapter also provided important insights into the discussion 
of the protest. It came out from the interviews that the protest was considered as an 
ideological and psychological struggle that promoted hatred against the Armenian 
community. Senior interviewees once again underlined the routineness of ethnically 
antagonistic discourse in Turkey, which was similar to their views on two other 
incidents. This protest additionally led some interviewees to spotlight the transition 
from the understanding of ‘loyal community’ to the ‘community of traitors’ in the course 
of history. It was yet more salient to observe that some accounts drew attention to the 
‘fascistic’ and ‘extreme nationalist’ characteristics of the organisational form of the 
protest, the calls for the march, the posters on the billboards and the newspaper. This 
signified an equivalent line of reasoning with the newspapers, that the distinction 
between ‘reasonable’ and ‘extreme’ forms of nationalism was put into words. My 
analysis of interviews thus pointed out the extent of the internalisation of inferior status 
amongst Armenians in relation to the constant process of othering of Turkish 
nationalisms. In other words the Turkish nationalist discourse partly incorporates 
Armenian concerns and partly resists and stigmatises them.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ANALYSIS of the INTERVIEWS 
 
8.1. The Sediments of the Past 
In this part I present the particular findings that focus on the interviewees’ narratives 
concerning the Armenian Genocide. As the respondents are not survivors of the 
genocide, the transfer of knowledge and experiences across the generations shapes the 
patterns of memory at both individual and communal levels. In other words, the 
interviewees’ tendency to remember and forget the genocidal process or to associate 
their current status with past encounters also depends on the life experiences related by 
elder family members and/or acquaintances. The basic questions regarding personal 
information, namely date and place of birth, educational background and the number of 
generations of their family that have lived in Istanbul also assisted my inquiry into the 
forms of memory transmission among the Armenian generations in Turkey. In addition, 
knowledge sharing between the generations of the Armenian community, especially in 
terms of cultural trauma and suffering, sheds light on the forms of suppression and the 
coping strategies developed in the aftermath of the genocide. Against the backdrop of 
the ongoing official denial of the genocide and the repressive mind-set propagated by 
the Turkish state, the existing interpretations of the Armenian interviewees with regard 
to the preceding atrocities provide important insights about the linkage between past 
and present.  
 
The role of memory in assisting individuals to establish a sense of their past, present and 
future (Fentress and Wickham 1988; Tugal 2002) also explains the efforts of nation-
states to create a sense of imagined community for the nation through institutions of 
memory such as museums (Bennet 1995; Duncan 1995 cited in Özyürek, 2007:11), 
monuments (Savage 1994 cited in ibid), commemorations (Bodnar 1992 cited in ibid) 
and founding myths (Ben Yehuda 1995 cited in ibid). In the name of constructing a 
homogenous identity, religious minorities were massacred, deported or encouraged to 
migrate during the process that led to the foundation of the Turkish nation- state and 
national identity. More importantly, the memory of the traumatic events, namely the 
massacre of Armenians in 1915 (Akcam 2004; Dadrian, 1999), the deportation of 
Orthodox Christians in exchange for a Muslim population from Greece in 1923 (Hirschon 
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1998) and the Wealth Tax in 1943 (Akar 1999; Bali 1999; Aktar 2000) prevail ‘in the 
silenced memories of individuals who experienced them’ (Yalçın 1998 cited in Özyürek, 
2006:11-2). It also needs to be underlined that the attempts of the Turkish nation-state 
to disentangle itself from its ‘undesirable’ past are still prominent. In response to the 
refusal of the state to confront its history, studies on the memories of Armenians, as well 
as their transmission to succeeding generations, provide important insights. For 
instance, the Hrant Dink Foundation has recently published three books which are the 
end products of an oral history project. The first book, ‘The Sounds of Silence: Turkey’s 
Armenians Speak’ includes the stories of 15 Armenians living in both Istanbul and other 
Anatolian cities. In the second book, ‘The Sounds of Silence II- Diyarbakir’s Armenians 
Speak’ with the intent of ‘reimagining or reconstructing the cultural presence of 
Armenians in Diyarbakir’ 81 Armenians are interviewed; accordingly, the last book , 
‘The Sounds of Silence III-Ankara’s Armenian Speak’ draws attention to the unique 
experiences of Armenians living in Ankara, which is an overshadowed issue.  
 
Drawing on this perspective, which emphasises the acts of remembrance and forgetting 
by a minority group, the memories of Armenians in this research are also significant in 
indicating the conflict and negotiation sites between the nation-state and its citizens. In 
her analysis of how the memory of the historic presence of Jews disappeared in Poland, 
Irwin-Zarecka (2007) opts for the notion of the ‘memory void’ to highlight the near 
absence of Jewish heritage. This mainly denotes the disappearance of parts of the past in 
collective memory and their replacement with other versions of the past. According to 
Irwin-Zarecka (2007 cited in Keene 2011: 1097) ‘when we set out to listen to historical 
silence, we are forced to listen to a great deal of noise’. Regarding the case of Armenians 
in Turkey, I thus aspire to uncover these ‘noises’ along with the congruent ‘silences’ 
which seem to admit the replaced versions of the past.   
 
In contrast to my expectations, only 17 out of 45 respondents stated that they were told 
about the genocide and the experiences of their family elders. However, the memory 
accounts of the interviewees have very limited scope and fail to present meticulous 
narratives of the past. Given the manifest impossibility of obtaining eye witness reports, 
due to the period of time elapsed, these accounts point out partial remembrance as well 
as expression. In light of the affirmative answers of the interviewees concerning the 
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transfer of genocide stories across the generations in their households, two types of 
attitudes might be identified. According to one point of view, the experiences lived 
through by their predecessors were not recounted by positioning Armenians as 
genocide victims. The excerpts below illustrate the frame of this perspective. 
 
Interviewee 15 (33 year old male): My family’s telling me about the genocide is 
not all that important. This happened for certain, there would not be this much 
polemic if it did not occur in the first place.  
All in all the genocide took place on both sides because if someone hits you then you 
will also hit him. For example, now there is a Kurdish issue but there is no Armenian 
who can show his teeth like in the case of the Kurdish issue. The Armenian 
community does not have a vengeful mentality which claims ‘they took my lands 
now it is my turn to appropriate theirs.’ But Kurds have such a state of mind.  
Interviewee 12 (28 year old female): Of course, I was told during my childhood 
but these were not narrated within the framework of the genocide. I know the 
individual stories such as the things that happened to the families of my 
grandmother and grandfather and their inability to find anyone when they returned 
from Istanbul to Van. Due to fear I guess I have never been told that ‘Turks are 
denying but there is genocide as such’. 
Interviewee 8 (39 year old male): I was told about the genocide. In fact I am a 
little lucky because my family did not hide it from me. It is wrong to generalise but 
80% of the current generation does not explain these things to their children in 
order to prevent them facing problems outside. But my family did tell me and when I 
was listening to them I asked what Armenians did in return. Did they bow to the 
inevitable? I found out the reason behind the claim of Turkey that ‘Armenians 
actually slaughtered Turks’. Then I said ‘yes, Armenians also killed people’. For 
example, an incident occurred in Sivas and Armenians in the eastern part of Sivas 
bore arms and killed Turks as a defensive reflex but I am not saying this to legitimise 
it. In short these were told to me about the genocide.  
 
It might be argued that in these narratives it is possible to observe slight traces of the 
formal approach of the Turkish state and the Turkish national collective memory. The 
interviewees’ ideas supporting or legitimising the Turkish side of the genocide story also 
signify hints of the Turkish national collective memory rather than a thorough account 
of their ancestors’ experiences. In addition, the emphases on the avoidance of describing 
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the 1915 events as genocide and the efforts of the contemporary generation to protect 
their successors by disrupting the flow of information about the genocide are worthy of 
mention. This standpoint bears the stamps of the remembrance boundaries set by the 
dominant national ideology for the citizens of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, the first 
passage indicates how the interviewee makes a connection between the present status 
and claims of Kurds and the past situation of Armenians. It is implied that due to the lack 
of a ‘vengeful mentality’ the Armenian community dissociates itself from past 
occurrences so the willingness to forget and selective remembrance becomes evident. 
This attitude might also be explained by the typology of victim responses to massacre 
delineated by Miller and Miller (1982) who did thirty-five in-depth interviews with 
Armenian survivors in California. It resembles the ‘rationalization’ victim response to a 
massacre, in which plausible explanations are invented as reasons for the massacre and 
in general to justify the outcomes of events (Miller and Miller 1982: 62). Although in 
Miller and Miller’s study there is only one instance in which the 1915 events are justified 
by the survivor, the common rationalization technique refers to the ‘latent benefits of 
the massacre’, such as the rise in Armenian nationalism and Armenians becoming more 
personally religious. More importantly, from the perspective of the survivors, the 
experiences of suffering and pain caused by the genocide are not legitimatised by these 
‘positive’ outcomes (ibid: 63). As the quotations suggest, the focal point of rationalisation 
for Armenian interviewees who are not genocide survivors residing in Istanbul is 
reciprocal suffering and defensive purposes.  
 
The other viewpoint held by the interviewees with recollections about the genocidal 
process puts forward the counter arguments against the official history. Even if the 
respondents admitted that they were informed about the genocide by their family 
members, most of the respondents abstained from giving details about the events. The 
short extracts below exemplify the veiled and cursory narratives of the interviewees 
with regard to their confrontation with the past.  
 
Interviewee 1 (41 year old female): I had no chance to meet my grandparents as 
my family had been struck by the genocide. There were not so many people left in 
the hometown of my mother’s family and the survivors were rescued by Muslim 
families.  
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Interviewee 18 (52 year old male): A cook used to work in my grandmother’s 
house and one day he was taken away by the state officials as he was from Van and 
he was never able to come back.  
Interviewee 25 (45 year old male): My family told me about the genocide and I 
also searched by myself. My father’s mother is the only one who could survive 
among eight siblings and she was looked after by a Muslim family.  
Interviewee 28 (41 year old male): We always heard things about the genocide. 
The events took place in 1915 but I was born in 1972 and the events conveyed by 
the others may change over time. We only listened to the stories about the ‘big 
disaster’ in 1915 from the viewpoint of our side.  
Interviewee 40 (26 year old female): If I am not mistaken one of the relatives of 
my father’s grandmother had no family connections because they were murdered or 
lost during the deportation. There are such cases but I do not know in detail.  
Interviewee 42 (48 year old female): My grandmother is a survivor of the 
genocide. I do not know in detail and am not particularly interested in this issue.  
 
It might be claimed that these accounts challenge the official rewriting history of the 
Turkish state as they serve as testimonies of an intentional deportation and massacre. 
Yet it is apparent that the interviewees seem to conceal some central parts of the 
anecdotes. Collective trauma as such also may possibly result in the choice of what to 
remember and what to forget. In addition, as genocide is still an unrecognised tragedy in 
Turkey, different forms of recollection and evocation emerge in the status of being an 
Armenian. Following Freud’s argument that melancholy is the inability to narrate the 
mourning process, it is possible to mention ‘a process of unexpressed mourning for the 
experiences caused by the catastrophe in 1915’ among the members of Armenian 
society (Tataryan, 2011: 29-30). In addition to the influence of  ‘unexpressed mourning’ 
on the interview process, my position as a ‘Turkish’ researcher identified with the image 
of a stranger might also have an effect on the narratives of the interviewees.  
 
In addition, only 5 out of 17 interviewees who stated that the elder family members 
transferred their genocide memories to the younger generations elaborated on the 
stories that had been told in their households. At this point I need to admit that to 
maintain my role as a researcher when I heard about these distressing recollections was 
one of the most challenging aspects of these interviews. On the one hand, they showed 
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me how traumatic experiences carried through the generations are beyond mere 
remnants of the past; but this heritage also plays a role in the construction of Armenian 
identity, as well as in the confrontation with an imposed national collective memory. On 
the other hand, these reminiscences made me realise once again the power of the 
repressive national education, along with the other national spheres of socialization, in 
terms of overlooking the alternative historiography. Although I was aware of the fact 
that I had never had a chance to cross over to the ‘other’ side of the ‘story’, I had not 
expected to encounter such clear-cut accounts. Both the narratives and non-verbal 
gestures of the interviewees led me to question yet again the so-called glorious national 
history and the effects of ingrained state denial on the current problems of Armenians. 
The passages below illustrate both the physical and psychological wounds that 
penetrated into the memories of Armenian interviewees.  
 
Interviewee 5 (22 year old male): I heard many things about the genocide 
particularly from my grandma and dad. For instance as far as I recall there had been 
a 90 year old woman, the cousin of my dad’s grandpa. My dad used to live in their 
home in Istanbul when he was a child and this woman was deaf mute but this was 
not an inherent defect. In 1915 when she was four or five years old she saw her 
sister beheaded; since then she never spoke to anybody or heard anything.  
Interviewee 7 (53 year old male): In our family we have relatives who lived 
through the genocide, for instance my mom’s dad. He was born in Erzurum and this 
incident took place when he was too little. He had many memories about the 
genocide and told us that he was tortured. He had a very big adze scar in his head. 
While we were watching a TV programme in which there was the discussion over 
the genocide denial he showed us the scar in his head and said ‘Genocide is here’. As 
in all Armenian families we have also the marks of the genocide in our family.  
Interviewee 26 (55 year old female): I have relatives who were killed during the 
genocide. My dad’s uncle was killed when he was only 21. My grandma told me that 
she had hard times. After she got married to my grandpa, he was exiled to Adana. As 
she was an expectant mother she could only travel after giving a birth. In her 
journey to Adana with two children they converted to Islam and became Muslims in 
order to survive. They also had to change their names for some time but then 
returned to their own identities. If you did not convert to Islam then you would be 
slaughtered. Most of the survivors were the ones who were Islamized during that 
time.  
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Interviewee 38 (34 year old female): My mom’s grandma experienced the 
genocide first-hand. She was looking for someone to share her past and the entire 
extended family was tired of listening to her past sufferings. I agreed to do listen to 
her memories and am glad that I listened to her and imprinted her memories on my 
memory.  
During the deportation her mom was buried under avalanche and she also lost her 
dad as they were forced to walk 17 km between two villages during the winter time. 
As the soldiers realised that there were too many orphan children they decided to 
dig a pit to slaughter the children and my mom’s grandma somehow was able to run 
away. Certainly the ones who stayed there were killed. Three years ago my mom and 
I went to this place and walked all the streets to find this pit.  
Interviewee 39 (26 year old): My mom’s family went through the genocide. My 
grandma’s siblings were adopted by other families and then an Armenian family 
took them. That is why some members of the family are in Argentina now. Since my 
grandma was traumatised she was very timid. When I became interested in this 
issue I was able to understand my grandma’s silence.  
Even though my dad’s mom did not experience the genocide she was more eager to 
talk about it. She witnessed the Wealth Tax and the 6-7 September riots. As she was 
traumatised by these incidents she kept telling me about them.  
 
These narratives concerning ‘the marks of the genocide’ disclose the ways in which 
tortures, deportation and slaughter became genocidal tools and the conversion to Islam 
was enforced. The ties with the past also seem to act as a reminder for successive 
generations in order to raise their consciousness of their own identity and history.  
 
In addition, these memories provide an opinion about the silence of other interviewees 
and the avoidance of their families to share their ancestral knowledge. 28 out of 45 
interviewees expressed the fact that they were not informed about the genocide in their 
households. First of all, different parenting styles are mentioned to explain the attitude 
of the families. For example, according to some of the interviewees, their families did not 
want to raise their children in an environment of hatred and this is the reason behind 
their reluctance to rake up the past. One of the youngest interviewees (23 year old 
female) explained that her family deliberately abstain from using the word ‘genocide’ 
and attempt not to dictate this attitude. In a similar vein, another young interviewee (24 
year old male) said that knowledge of the genocide or history is not a part of the 
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education that he received in his family. He also further claimed that this is the general 
approach of Armenians in Turkey.  
 
In a similar vein, the research of Miller and Miller (1991) that explores the ways in 
which the trauma of the Armenian genocide has affected the memory and identity of 
survivors, their children and grandchildren, draws a parallel conclusion. In spite of the 
variety in terms of the personal responses of the survivors to their childhood tragedy, 
quite a few respondents said that they had never spoken with their children about the 
genocide (ibid: 28). Although Miller and Miller conducted their research between the 
years 1974-1986 in America, the reluctance of the preceding generations to pass on 
their memories is a predominant tendency also in my research. In fact a particular 
quote, ‘My story is too sad; I didn’t want to burden my children with it’, of a genocide 
survivor in the analysis of Miller and Miller (1991: 28) bears a resemblance to the 
concerns expressed, particularly by middle-aged Armenian interviewees. For instance, a 
53 year old male interviewee explicitly stated that even at the present time the elders 
are unwilling to speak of the genocide because of intimidation and fear and for the 
purpose of protecting themselves from potential hazards. He alleged that the 
understanding based on the premises ‘What is in the past is in the past’ and ‘there is no 
point in digging in the past’ still dominates the frame of mind of some Armenians. It 
might also be inferred that the main motive for Armenian families’ endeavour to protect 
their children from the burdens of the past is their persistent feeling of insecurity within 
the Turkish nation-state borders. By  employing ‘chosen amnesia’ as a coping 
mechanism (Buckley-Zistel 2006) some Armenian families intentionally prefer to 
exclude particular aspects of the past or a traumatic event from their discourse in order 
to live peacefully and prevent antagonisms in their quotidian lives. More notably, as 
Buckley-Zistel (2006: 134) underscores, ‘to choose amnesia serves a particular function 
deriving from particular needs of the present’, which is ‘the immediate benefit of not 
remembering’. When considered from this point of view, the citizenship ties with the 
Turkish nation-state, along with cohabitation with the ‘heirs’ of the perpetrators of the 
genocide, the tendency among Armenian interviewees to internalise a ‘chosen amnesia’ 
takes on a new meaning.  
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The direct consequences of this deliberate preference can be observed in the younger 
generation of Armenians. Interestingly, it became evident that the generation born 
around 1970-80 is more likely to be unfamiliar with the word genocide until they go to 
the university or hear it on TV programmes. However, it might be argued that even 
though the pains brought about by previous experiences are not put into words in the 
households, as one of the interviewees (37 year old male) precisely describes, there is 
sediment of the past which can be sensed. Connerton (2008: 68) portrays such acts of 
silence as a form of survival, as well as a type of repression, and in that process of 
survival the desire to forget becomes a crucial component. By challenging the 
assumption that promotes remembering and commemorating as virtues Connerton 
(2008) posits seven types of forgetting which have different meanings. The interruption 
of memory transfer among Armenian households might be considered as an example of 
‘forgetting as humiliated silence’ (Connerton, 2008: 67), which reveals itself as the 
unwillingness to remember or narrate the occasions of humiliation. As it is a covert form 
of forgetting that puts traumatic and difficult collective memories beyond words, it is 
inaccessible (Waterton, 2010: 133). However, the interviews enabled me to recognise 
how this type of forgetting, regardless of its hidden character, leaves its marks on the 
perceptions and experiences of Armenians. The tone with which they express their 
thoughts, non-verbal gestures (i.e. paying attention to other people when using the term 
genocide, long pauses or tears) and the usage of striking words unveil the remnants of 
both personal and collective history. 
 
8.2. The Armenian Issue vs. the Armenian Genocide  
The denial of the Armenian genocide and the categorisation of its components, such as 
torture, deportation, expropriation, and assaults as ‘Armenian allegations’, are integral 
parts of the official historical narrative of the Turkish nation-state, as well as forms of 
Turkish nationalism. One of the most visible consequences of this dominant mentality 
might be suggested by the expressions ‘the Armenian issue’ and ‘the Armenian question’. 
These phrases mainly imply that by no means was any systematic slaughtering and 
maltreatment against Armenians planned by state officials and that Turks were also 
killed by Armenians during the war; thus, 1915 incidents should not be called genocide. 
From the perspective of the Turkish side, Armenians are also accused of collaborating 
with Russians against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. More 
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importantly, what makes genocide an issue or a question for the Turkish state is the 
international pressure for the official recognition of genocide. By refraining from using 
the word genocide and evading responsibility for its role in the atrocities, the Turkish 
nation-state intends to reframe the experiences of Armenians and undervalue the 
impact of such a human tragedy. Furthermore, this ‘issue’ is associated with the political 
strategy of foreign powers such as US and France, along with the Armenian Diaspora, to 
undermine the national development of Turkey.  
 
In this context, I seek to explore what Armenians as citizens of the Turkish Republic 
understand by the idea of ‘the Armenian issue’ and how they define, challenge and 
restructure this foremost mind-set. The primary objection to this phrase is based on the 
linguistic formation which gathers the Armenian identity and the words ‘issue’ and 
‘problem’ side by side. The interviewees thus criticise the negative meaning ascribed to 
the state of being an Armenian and the quotations below are the manifestations of this 
critical standpoint.  
 
Interviewee 5 (22 year old male): When it is called the Armenian issue it develops 
a perception as if Armenians are evil, Armenians made something bad and they 
cause trouble for you. I do not agree with this Armenian issue discourse. In fact it 
needs to be referred as the problem of the perpetrators of 1915 events.  
Interviewee 11 (33 year old male): Do we cause trouble, are we a problem, what 
are we? Now it is called as the Armenian issue but nobody from my side names it as 
the Turkish issue.  
Interviewee 12 (28 year old female): In the first place it is very disturbing that it 
is accepted as the Armenian issue. This means that your identity is identified with a 
problem.  
Interviewee 14 (24 year old male): The phrases of the Armenian issue and the 
Armenian problem irritate me. I mean the people who use them are also from the 
other side.  I think this is the opposite side’s literature. I think this word is employed 
by more rightist conservative people or official historians or the people 
acknowledging the official view of the state.  
Interviewee 23 (46 year old male): Up until last year I used to call it the Armenian 
problem but I made a decision that I will not use the word ‘Armenian’ along with the 
word ‘problem’ any longer. If I need to name it I call it genocide.  
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Interviewee 33 (27 year old female): This is not the Armenian issue; this is the 
perception of the ones who name it. Sometimes I consider it as the Turkish issue.  
Interviewee 37 (38 year old female): We are not a problem. I am so disturbed that 
we are represented as a problem. It is meaningless to regard a community that 
cannot be counted on the fingers of one hand as a problem. There is no such thing as 
the Armenian issue; you [the state] make an issue of Armenians. The one thing that 
Turkey needs to do is not to turn it into a problem. It needs to accept the events of 
the past. 
  
In addition to the explicit content of these statements, the style of self-expression might 
be taken as evidence of their fervour. The reactions might arise from the nature of their 
unique experiences, the continuous exposure of political debates on ‘the Armenian 
issue’, as well as tendentious news discourse in print and visual media. Although I had 
expected such direct responses, it was novel to witness how the unrest concerning the 
usage of the term ‘Armenian issue’ transformed into the Turkish issue by following a 
similar discursive path. The expression ‘the Turkish issue’ also adheres to the same line 
of reasoning that homogenises Turkish identity and depicts it as a problem. As the 
official authorities and the denial mentality are focal points of some of the criticisms 
above, the personal pronoun ‘we’ is used to refer to all Armenians as if they were a 
single entity. The sayings ‘my side’ and ‘the other side’ also epitomise the tendency to 
dichotomise ‘the issue’. The debate over recognition and denial surfaces through the 
binary opposition between the expressions ‘genocide’ and ‘issue/problem’ in the first 
place. The interviewees’ reactions consequentially reflect this enduring tension in both 
social and political spheres.  
 
Moreover, the views of other groups of interviewees depend on the importance they 
attach to their past and/or contemporary experiences and the historical developments 
following the 1915 events. The perception of time thus becomes a determining factor in 
the way they outline their views of the Armenian issue. According to a 32 year old male 
interviewee, Hrant Dink and Agos30, are the key points today for the Armenian issue. 
Thanks to the personal attempts of Hrant Dink and the presence of Agos, he thinks it has 
                                                          
30 It is an Armenian bilingual weekly newspaper published in Istanbul. It has a symbolic meaning for the 
visibility of the Armenian community in Turkey as well as the preservation of the communal ties among 
Armenians.  
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become obvious that Armenians and their experiences deserve an apology that might 
solve the current problems. In a similar vein, a male respondent draws attention to the 
significance of the official apology; but more notably, he underlines the recognition of 
the events of 1915 in Turkey both by the society and the state without necessarily 
calling it genocide. The interviewee redefines the Armenian issue as an issue coming 
from the past and carried into future.  
 
In contrast to the official narrative that restricts the Armenian issue to 1915 and eclipses 
its wider temporality, few respondents challenged this understanding and exemplified 
recent events and their personal experiences as evidence for the continuous impact of 
this issue. From the point of view of a 53-year-old male, the identification of the issue 
with genocide, deportation or massacre, and the number of the victims, is significant to a 
certain extent, as he is concerned with the recurrence of these incidents. He asks 
rhetorical questions such as, ‘Was not Hrant shot? Was not Sevag murdered when he 
was serving in the military?’, and draws a conclusion that these planned events aimed to 
force the emigration of Armenians in the same way as during and after the genocide. 
That is to say, the genocidal process and mentality come to light again through these 
latest incidents, which are now constituents of the Armenian issue. Furthermore, based 
on his personal concerns, a 50-year-old male respondent connects the Armenian issue to 
the current prejudices against Armenians. For instance, he complains about the 
reactions of the Turkish people concerning his Armenian name and their insistence on 
finding out its meaning. He also tells the story in which some people say, “I have never 
seen an Armenian during my whole life” when they meet him, and he replies “You have 
no idea about our characteristics. We have tails!” This ironic narrative at the same time 
indicates how the myth of the tail used to insult Armenians is employed to counteract a 
biased attitude.  The views of two female interviewees born in the 1970s also epitomise 
the identification of the Armenian issue with the approach of non-Armenian individuals. 
The excerpts below clarify the implications of this issue for these respondents.  
 
Interviewee 24 (39 year old): The traumas which had been actually lived through 
still affect our lives and thus we don’t want to say that we are Armenians. Because I 
refrain from being perceived differently and when they ask ‘why your name is such’ 
I tell them different things. When I say ‘I am from Malatya’ they ask from ‘where did 
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Armenians or Christians come to Malatya?’ and I reply ‘We had been already there 
before you came’. 
Interviewee 38 (34 year old): The nation that is called as Armenian causes trouble 
for this [Turkish] nation. Even the breath we take is a problem. We are a nation that 
was unable to be exterminated neither in 1915 nor in 6-7 September. We come out 
by our buildings, our cultural structure, our [Muslim] converts but at the same we 
cannot become visible because we are low in number. For whom it is a problem? Are 
seventy thousand Armenians now a problem?   
 
The clearly distinguished defensive tone in the narratives appears as a sign of the 
articulation of a collective identity and history with the refusal of the official ideology 
and Turkish nationalist claims. From another angle, two interviewees address the 
Armenian issue as a question relating to the Armenians who ‘stayed behind’ in Turkey. 
According to a 29-year-old male interviewee, the question “How will the state be 
reconciled with the ones who remained in this land?” needs to be taken into 
consideration to sort out this issue. The murders of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı and the 
forms of everyday racism against Armenians for another respondent (37-year-old male) 
substantiate the argument that the hidden experiences of the past still haunt the lives of 
Armenians in Turkey today.   
 
In order to point out that what is called the Armenian issue today has multiple layers, 
one interviewee gives the example of the books, ‘My Grandmother: A Memoir’ (2004) by 
Fethiye Çetin, also the attorney in the Hrant Dink case, and ‘The Grandchildren: The 
Hidden Legacy of 'Lost' Armenians in Turkey’ (2009) by Fethiye Çetin and Ayşe Gül 
Altınay. He recounts that thanks to the interviews done for the latter book, one of his 
friends had discovered his/her Armenian identity and his/her story as a grandchild of 
an Armenian was also given space in the book. As these volumes provide both a 
historical overview of adopted and Islamised Armenians after the genocide and their 
hidden identities, the meaning of this legacy for the Armenian community, as well as for 
Muslim families, is also embedded in the Armenian issue today. Despite these attempts 
to overcome the taboos around Armenians and their identity in Turkey, other cases 
recalled by the interviewee signify prevailing prejudices in both official and public 
domains. The first example is a lawsuit brought by the 11th president of Turkey, 
Abdullah Gül, when the Izmir deputy of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Canan 
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Arıtman, claimed that the mother of Gul is of Armenian origin. The lawsuit, along with 
the official statement of the president to testify his Turkish and Muslim identity, is an 
explicit symptom of an attitude that regards being an Armenian as an insult. As a second 
example, he mentions the street interviews in a TV programme in which as a response to 
the question, ‘How many Armenians do you think live in Turkey?’, the man on the street 
said a population between three hundred thousand and twenty million. As stated by the 
interviewee, the reason behind the exaggeration of the numbers lies in the fact that the 
Armenian identity comes into existence as an image of the enemy for Turkish people.   
 
In contrast, some interviewees characterise the Armenian issue as a part of the intra and 
interstate political problems, rather than part of the problems among the nations. 
According to a 33-year-old female respondent, the national education system based on 
rote-learning catalyses the stereotypes concerning the Armenian community. She 
further claims that “[i]f the image of an Armenian is introduced as a bogeyman to a child, 
he/she will recognise all Armenians as a foe without even knowing a single Armenian.” 
She proposes dialogue between the communities in order to cope with these imposing 
instructions. In a similar way, a twenty years older male interviewee agrees with the 
idea that the Armenian issue is unrelated to the two communities, particularly among 
the new generation. By criticising any effort to reawaken the ‘old’ events, however, he 
implied that my intention to explore the Armenian issue would only prevent the wound 
healing and would lead it to bleed.  
 
Some interviewees also find the involvement of the government policies of other states, 
particularly US, unsettling, as the Armenian issue is seen as being ‘politicised’. A 41-year-
old female interviewee refers to the insignificance of the genocide recognition by the US 
and the preference of Obama to use the term ‘Meds Yeghern’31 instead of genocide. This 
is interpreted by another interviewee (23 year-old-female) as an instance of how politics 
in other states is fed by the Armenian issue. Correspondingly, a 28-year-old female 
respondent expresses how she is uncomfortable with the debates about whether Obama 
will use the term genocide or not on every 24th April as the remembrance day of 
Armenian genocide. In addition, the Armenian diaspora, as recounted by the 
interviewee, is represented as dehumanised and homogenous and exploiting Armenians 
                                                          
31 It is an Armenian phrase meaning ‘great calamity’. 
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in Turkey, along with the US and EU states, to weaken the state power of Turkey, 
especially in the Turkish media. More importantly, she evaluates this situation as a 
disrespectful act towards the sorrow of Armenians. Another interviewee (54-year-old 
female) also considers the Armenian issue as an end result of the demands of the 
Armenian diaspora and Armenia for genocide recognition. As other states enact laws 
concerning the recognition of genocide, she argues the issue goes beyond a conflict 
between Turks and Armenians, and the Turkish government is troubled by the 
intervention of other states on such a delicate topic.  
 
8.3. The Discourses of Nationalism and National Identity 
This part presents a discussion of the various meanings ascribed to the notions of 
nationalism(s) and national identity in Turkey by the Armenian interviewees. The semi-
structured interviews based on the perceptions and experiences of Armenians provide 
significant insights concerning the debates on these issues. The analysis of the responses 
to the questions: ‘As a citizen of Republic of Turkey, do you think there is a prevalent 
discourse of nationalism and national identity in Turkey? If yes, how do you 
describe/experience it? Do you think it excludes Armenians?’ brings out four main 
interpretations. These consist of the role of Islam within Turkish nationalism(s); the 
comparative analysis of Kurdish community and its relationship to the forms of 
nationalism; the issue of state-sponsored nationalism and the ideologies of the political 
parties; and the positioning of Armenian identity with regard to Turkish national 
identity. Before moving on to the analysis of the responses, it is important to highlight 
that the notions of ‘state’ and ‘government’ are employed interchangeably by many of 
the interviewees. The emphasis on the AKP government is particularly worthy of 
mention as the effects of current government policies and the political strategies and 
electoral concerns of AKP are associated with the rise and decline of nationalism.  
 
First of all, almost one-fourth of interviewees point out the increasing influence of Islam 
on the construction and reproduction of Turkish nationalism(s) under the rule of the 
AKP government. Although Islam has been always a constitutive element of Turkish 
nationalism(s) throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, it might be argued that 
the visible negotiation between Islam and the strong secular state tradition in the public 
space is perceived as a threat to their existence by Armenian interviewees. A 36-year-
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old male respondent explains his encounter with Islam by giving the example of the 
censorships of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) that compels TV 
channels to blur images which are assumed to be opposed to Islamic belief. At the 
moment when he feels that Islam restricts his freedom and has an impact upon his 
private life, he holds particular religious practices responsible for the constraint of his 
living space. In other words, he underlines the ability of Islam to make its presence 
perceptible and adapt itself to different situations through the means of the state. The 
criticism over the interference of Islam in the private and public spheres is also 
emphasised by a 64-year-old male interviewee who explicitly said, ‘I am not afraid of 
nationalism or national identity. But I am terrified of Islamic discourse.’ He expresses his 
fear of the power of Islam by giving the example of the ban on the sale of alcohol and its 
consumption in university campuses. The correlation, between Islam and conservatism, 
he implies, and its scope of application in the political and social fields, might be 
regarded as one of the significant components of the ideology adopted by the AKP 
government. More importantly, based on the views of this senior interviewee, the 
survival of Turkish nationalism is questionable as Islam has the potential to dissolve 
nationalist elements and impose its own principles.  
 
Following a similar line of reasoning, a younger interviewee (23-year-old female) draws 
an analogy between Turkey and Iran and cites the film ‘Persepolis’ to call attention to 
the potential ‘threat of Islam’ in Turkey. The power of Islam, instead of national identity 
and even nationality, she argues, has become more authoritative in Turkey. More 
importantly, she criticises the discourse of ‘so-called’ tolerance in practicing Islam under 
the name of a positive approach to other religions. The scepticism about the recognition 
of any other religion except Islam, specifically in the public sphere, reveals the idea of 
the shifting roles of Islam and Turkish nationalism for the exclusion of non-Muslim and 
non-Turkish citizens. The suppression of nationalism in Turkey is claimed as being 
related to the religious conservative ideology of AKP, which brings the Islamic 
brotherhood into prominence. In terms of the understanding of Islam as a political tool, 
a 53-year-old male interviewee makes a thought-provoking comment as follows: 
 
The threat of Islam depends on how they employ Islam in the political arena. If this 
government instils Islamic discourse and Islamic way of life in the general public 
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more than ever then you might be also obliged to wear a headscarf. But if Turkey 
turns its face to the West rather than the Middle East then Islam will no longer be a 
threat.  
 
This remark underlines the politicization of Islam from above by the AKP government. 
This effort, though, is different from the entrenched state tradition which aims to 
secularise the entire Turkish society, homogenize the different religious communities 
and thus proliferate a republican, laicist and ethno-nationalist state Islam (Karakas, 
2007:i). In particular, a state-led Islamization ‘from above’ is aimed at by the military 
leadership (ibid: 17); and it complements the ‘nationalism from above’ perception of the 
reforms and policies enacted during the early Republican period of Turkey and the 
successor governments. According to Keyder (1997: 42-3), Turkish nationalism is the 
extreme example of a condition in which the masses remained as silent partners and the 
passive recipients of the nationalist messages and the modernizing elite did not attempt 
to accommodate the popular resentment; thus, the constitutive element of the founding 
ideology of the new Republic was ‘nationalism from above’. In other words, Islamisation 
and nationalism from above imposed by the state, government policies and the military 
mainly target the standardisation of national subjects. It might be argued that the 
current policies of the AKP government have overturned the ingrained political order in 
terms of promoting Islam and blurring the distinction between secular and religious 
elements in the public realm. This might be also the underlying reason for the 
interviewee to warn me about the prospective government policy with regard to the 
legal obligation of wearing headscarf. The stance of the interviewee thus epitomises a 
typical controversy between the Kemalist secular perspective and religious conservative 
standpoint of AKP over the headscarf issue. The attempt of the AKP government to 
represent excluded Islamic values and ‘create a perception of resemblance between the 
lifestyle of the nation and that of those occupying political power’ (Saraçoglu 2011 cited 
in Kaya, 2014:8) is read as a challenge to the republican state ideology.  
 
In line with the claims associating the prominence of Islam with the changing forms of 
Turkish nationalism, some Armenian interviewees draw attention to the nature of the 
relationship between other minority groups and nationalism/national identity. Since the 
official understanding of an ideal citizen corresponds to a Turkish and Muslim national, 
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the Turkish state also perpetuates religious commonality depending on political 
interests. A group of interviewees thus underscores how the Islamic fraternity between 
Turks and Kurds is activated as a unifying force for the solution of the ‘Kurdish problem’. 
This repetitive theme in the interviews is voiced by a 32-year-old male respondent as 
follows:  
 
The Armenian issue is the intersection point between Islam and nationalism. The 
most important factor that prevented Kurds from getting into trouble is their being 
Muslim. 
 
In this regard, the concern about the collaboration between religious and nationalist 
elements entails a threat for the permanent exclusion of Armenians, which is repeated 
by several interviewees. Nonetheless, alleging that the religious identity of Kurds has 
resulted in a harmonious relationship with the state and the rest of the society 
constrains the discussion to Islam only. By adhering to the idea of Islam being a means of 
conflict resolution, a 29-year-old male interviewee claims that: 
 
The state has a policy that says ‘Turkish identity is no longer able to fulfil all the 
demands. Kurds are also Muslim. Then let’s meet under the roof of Islamic 
fraternity”. However, when it comes to the Armenian issue all the political and social 
actors unite against Armenians.  
 
This allegation postulates the religious affiliation of Armenians as the main obstacle for 
the recognition of the Armenian identity in the eyes of the state as well as other agents 
in society. Moreover, the approach taken by the government toward the Kurdish 
community recently is read as verification for the decline in the importance of Turkish 
national identity. The most notable point to be underlined here is the tendency of some 
Armenian interviewees to interpret their own social and political status with regard to 
Turkish nationalism in terms of their religious identity and a comparison with the 
conditions of the Kurdish community. However, the overemphasis on the Islamic 
brotherhood seems to miss the point of prolonged armed and political conflict between 
the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), as well as the problematic 
status of the Kurdish community. It should also be noted that the relationship between 
Turkish nationalism(s) and the Kurdish question has been far from stable. According to 
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Yeğen (2007:121), the relational and historical nature of these two subject matters has 
equipped Turkish nationalism with various lenses for looking at the Kurdish question. 
His historical analysis indicates that Kurds are considered as future-Turks by the 
Turkish nationalism of the republican era; but at present the possibility of achieving the 
status of Turkishness for Kurds seems to have been abandoned by Turkish nationalism. 
The principal cause for the questioning of the Turkishness of Kurds is the recognition of 
the non-Muslimhood characteristics of some Kurds, such as being Jewish or Christian. 
This shifting image of Kurds in the eyes of Turkish nationalism suggests that the 
members of this community now bear resemblance to the other non-Muslims of the 
country ‘who have been traditionally perceived by Turkish nationalism as those who fall 
outside the scope of Turkishness’ (ibid: 137-140).  
 
Thirdly, some interviewees address the issue of state-sponsored nationalism. A 27-year-
old female interviewee maintains that ‘the foundation of the Republic is built on 
nationalism and the emphasis on the supremacy of the Turkish nation had never 
changed’. Two other senior respondents (53-year-old male and 65-year-old female) also 
believe that the dominance of Turkish nationalism and national identity has been always 
present. In a more clear-cut way, a 65-year-old female interviewee relates the 
implementation of nationalism by the state to the country’s prevailing lack of self-
confidence. Due to the unsuccessful attempts of Turkey to belong to Europe or Arab 
countries, she contends, it is now in a ‘mixed-up’ condition in the international arena. In 
other words, Turkey’s poor international image is put forward as a reason for the 
reinforcement of nationalism at the hands of the state in order to preserve solidarity and 
unity within the national borders. From another perspective, a-24-year-old interviewee 
expresses that 
 
It is impossible to come to power in Turkey without escalating nationalism because 
there is a well-designed national identity in terms of Turkish and Sunni Muslim 
identity. This formula is acceptable by almost all actors such as conservative, 
Kemalist or fascist standpoints. Some of them associate this with Islam, some of 
them merged this with rightist Kemalist elites and some of them combine this with 
moderate political Islam model like the current government. Namely, it suits every 
identity in Turkey.  
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It suggests that identities are ‘situational’ rather than ‘fundamental’, which denotes the 
articulation of identities in specific contexts in Turkey. In a similar vein, a 38-year-old 
male interviewee criticises the usage of the concept of ‘Turkish-Armenian’ even among 
Armenians. From his point of view, this situation signifies the success of republican 
ideology in terms of suppressing different identities and consolidating Turkish identity 
concurrently. In contrast to other interviewees who are critical of the Kurdish 
community and their advantageous position within the Turkish nation-state thanks to 
their religious identity, he underlines that the Kurdish movement paved the way for the 
recognition and visibility of other ethnic identities. As a result of the revival of ethnic 
consciousness he asserts that some members of the Armenian community have started 
to say:  
 
‘We are not Turks, we are Armenians. We have an identity, we have customs and we 
want to live these customs and maintain the cultural heritage.’ But when these 
demands are uttered, this led to a conflict with the state. This is mainly because the 
state persistently dictates that ‘[y]ou have no idea about being an Armenian’. Thus 
we are thrown in a schizophrenic condition.  
 
The clash between the Turkish state and the Armenian community, as noted above, 
might be interpreted as a consequence of the assimilative and discriminatory state 
policies founded on an ideal citizen typology. It is also appealing to see how the 
ambivalent attitude that the state holds towards its citizens brings about a lack of 
confidence and devotion. Moreover, the stress on the Armenian identity, culture and 
cultural heritage in the responses, brings to mind the question of to what extent these 
claims share a similar mind-set and discourses to Turkish nationalism(s). At this point it 
is vital not to fall into the trap of romanticizing minority nationalism and introduce it as 
an alternative to other forms of nationalism.  
 
It is equally interesting to observe that some interviewees directly associate the 
discourse of nationalism and national identity with the ideologies of the political parties. 
The excerpts below exemplify how the political climate in Turkey is assumed as the focal 
point for the proliferation of nationalist thought.  
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Interviewee 9 (36 year old male): I think nationalism is on the rise in general even 
though the stress on the Turkishness has been reduced. All the big political parties 
are nationalists. I will not think the opposite unless they declare that they are not 
nationalists.  
Interviewee 19 (50 year old male): I voted for Republican People’s Party but I will 
not support them in the next elections. I witness serious nationalism in this party. I 
cannot say anything about other parties after even Republican People’s Party 
appears as nationalist.  
Interviewee 32 (53 year old male): Nationalism is now repressed in Turkey. The 
democratic initiatives launched by Erdogan inhibit nationalism. He knows that if 
nationalism starts to rise other parties such as Republican People’s Party and 
Nationalist Movement Party will also make use of it as well as himself.  
Interviewee 36 (44 year old male): Nationalism is always present in Turkey but 
changes its form all the time. In 1999 elections Nationalist Movement Party became 
the second party as nationalism appropriated this party; in 2000s nationalism also 
did not disappear but supported Welfare Party. Nationalism is liquid in Turkey. It 
changes its mentality, its discourse but its general standpoint never disappears. 
Sometimes it brings Muslimhood to the fore, sometimes Turkishness.  
 
In addition to the link constructed between the political parties and nationalism, the 
opinions above also signify how the conceptualisation of nationalism is confined to a 
particular form of understanding. Since one of the goals of this research is to interrogate 
how Armenians in Turkey perceive and interpret the constant encounters with the 
symbols of the nation and nationalism, these accounts seem to ascribe a political role to 
nationalism and underline the effects of socio-political conjuncture on the practice of 
nationalism. It might be argued that they support the ‘tidal wave approach to 
nationalism, which treats it as a force hitting on particular occasions or as a temporary 
aberration’ (Özkırımlı and Uyan-Semerci, 2011: 60). This perspective identifies 
nationalism as an ephemeral force which ‘desensitizes us to the continual nature of 
nationalism’ (ibid: 61). That is to say, the accounts look as if they turn a blind eye to the 
idea of the everydayness of nationalism as an ideology embedded in everyday life 
through the constant flagging of nationhood (Billig 1995). Rather than the daily 
reproduction of the nation based on all unnoticed, routine practices, ideological habits, 
beliefs and representations (ibid: 8), these interviewees portray nationalism as an 
ideological tool that can be adapted to the fluctuating political conditions and electoral 
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strategies of the parties. Thus, the selections of phrases such as the rise of nationalism or 
its repressed form, are noteworthy as they stand for the understanding of nationalism 
that ‘waxes and wanes in particular historical moments’ (Özkırımlı and Uyan-Semerci, 
2011: 61). The interviewees’ choices to label the political parties as ‘nationalist’ 
straightforwardly, and restrict ‘nationalist’ thought to only the ideological stances of the 
parties, also give the impression that nationalism is depicted as a spatial and temporal 
force that is utilised for political manoeuvres.  
 
Furthermore, the interviewees’ observations suggest multiple forms of Turkish 
nationalism. According to Bora (2003: 436), Turkish nationalism is not a homogeneous 
discourse but as a series of discourses and a vast lexis; and he distinguishes five 
nationalist discourses in the Turkey of the 1990s. These are: official nationalism, 
Kemalist nationalism, liberal neo-nationalism, Turkist radical nationalism and 
nationalism in Islamism. In brief, official nationalism firstly aims to construct and to 
preserve the nation-state and it is ‘the root-language of Turkish nationalism’ (ibid) ; 
secondly, Kemalist nationalism as a left-wing nationalist discourse understands 
‘nationalism as the advocate of the process of secularization and 
modernization’(ibid:440); thirdly, liberal neo-nationalism ‘defines national identity in 
terms of its fervour and ability to attain the level of the developed or wealthy countries 
of the world’(ibid); fourthly, Turkist radical nationalism as a ‘perverted branch of official 
nationalism’ expands the conception of ‘homeland’ which includes all the territories 
inhabited by people of Turkish descent (ibid: 445); and finally, the ideology of 
nationalism in Islamism ‘envisages Turkey as the potential leader of the Islamic world 
and union’ (ibid: 449).  Based on this taxonomy, it might be alleged that interviewees’ 
ideas concerning nationalism in Turkey overlap with the discourses of official 
nationalism, Turkish radical nationalism and nationalism in Islamism. For instance, the 
emphasis on Turkishness in the political domain as expressed by the first interviewee 
might be interpreted as a reflection of ‘the state-centred conception of nationalism’ 
(Bora, 2003: 438). By referring to the Nationalist Movement Party and its electoral 
success in 1999, two interviewees also draw attention to the ideology of pan-Turkism 
which struggled against the Kurdish national movement along with the reactionary 
nationalistic wave  and ‘rehabilitated its relationship with official nationalism and drew 
closer to the political centre’ (ibid: 446). Lastly, by referring to the prominent role of 
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Muslimhood, a 44-year-old male interviewee refers to nationalism in Islamism, in which 
a certain religious identity becomes the determining feature of an ideal citizen. 
 
Finally a cluster of the interviewees interpret the discourse of nationalism and national 
identity by taking into account their own rights and experiences and the status of 
Armenian identity with regard to Turkish national identity and other citizens. In very 
explicit terms, a 59-year-old male comments as follows: 
 
We get used to live with it and will continue to live with it. If the minorities are 
approached with empathy, of course some people will disapprove and raise their 
voice. These are normal. But people will have to learn live together no matter what 
views they hold.  They will also learn how to live by accepting like us. They will learn 
to put up with us even if they do not love us at all.  
 
As the interviewee speaks on behalf of the Armenian community, the usage of the 
personal pronouns and thus the binary opposition between ‘us’(Armenians) and ‘them’ 
(Turks) is very apparent in this remark. More importantly, he depicts the experiences of 
nationalism as a social force that leaves the entire community no choice but to become 
accustomed to its rules. While the discriminatory reactions of some majority group 
members to the equal treatment of Armenians are presented as ‘normal’ by the 
interviewee, the stress on the ability of living together can be read as an implicit 
criticism of the failure of nationalism in terms of managing diversity in Turkey. The 
assumption that insinuates the distinction between ‘tolerant’ and ‘submissive’ 
Armenians and ‘prejudiced’ Turks is worth mentioning. The prospective efforts of Turks 
to develop a new point of view concerning their resistance to different identities are 
believed to be the solution for the challenges posed by nationalism.  
 
According to a 41-year-old female respondent, the presence of Armenian churches, 
hospitals and schools substantiates the inactive role of nationalism in Turkey. From this 
point of view, the protection of citizenship rights specifically for the Armenian 
community by the Treaty of Lausanne, is put forward to refute the claim vis-à-vis 
dominant nationalist state tradition and policies. In contrast, a 22-year-old male 
interviewee identifies public spheres, especially schools, as the central sites to nourish 
the ‘disguised’ rise of nationalism. He recounts a lived experience in which a history 
201 
 
teacher in an Armenian school told the students, “Here is Turkey, do not speak 
Armenian, speak Turkish!” Linguistic oppression in this case interestingly resembles the 
‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign in the 1930s in Turkey. As speaking Turkish was a 
‘key determinant that distinguished the ‘real’ Turks from Turkish citizens’ in the 1930s, 
and by means of linguistic homogenisation the boundaries of Turkishness were hoped to 
be drawn (Bayar, 2011:120), non-Turkish speaking groups were targeted by the Turkish 
state to achieve a commonality of language. However, the sufferings of these particular 
groups during the nation-building process in Turkey through language policies now take 
a new turn. Although the only exception to the constitution that restricts the teaching of 
any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to citizens are the educational 
institutions of the Greeks, Armenians and Jews who are legally authorised to run their 
own schools (Oran 2004 cited in Bayar, 2011: 125), the implementation of these 
education rights is still challenging. Nonetheless, in the international arena they are 
presented as a testimony of the tolerant, respectful and hospitable attitude of the 
Turkish state towards its citizens from minority groups. The choice of the interviewee to 
recount this biased form of education thus uncovers how linguistic oppression still 
operates as a part of the politics of nationalism in Turkey.  According to the report of 
Minority Rights Group International, for instance, both Armenians and Greeks face 
procedural difficulties for the approval of their school textbooks (Kaya and Baldwin, 
2004:10), as well as bureaucratic obstacles concerning students’ enrolment restrictions 
and budget shortages in Greek minority schools (The Constantinopolitan Society, 2014: 
4). As stated by May (2001: 57), the best and worst case scenarios for minority groups 
respectively correspond to the preservation of their ethnic habitus in the private sphere, 
despite the strong attempts of the state to assimilate their language and culture, and the 
active suppression of minority language and culture which is a common feature of 
modern nation-state policy. In addition, he refers to the suppression of Kurdish in 
Turkey up until the early 1990s as an example of the state-sanctioned linguistic 
suppression of minority languages. Unlike the explicit discriminatory treatment of 
Kurdish and Kurdish culture, under the guise of giving authorisation to the teaching-
learning process of the Armenian language and culture, the Turkish state still maintains 
a surveillance role. The determining factor at this point is not the rights granted by an 
international treaty for the minority groups in the nation-state. The issue at stake is: 
‘How and under what conditions are these rights ‘given’ by the state?’ More notably, 
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analysing Arendt’s felicitous saying ‘the right to have rights’, Benhabib (2004:57) points 
out the dependency of the rights-bearing status on the recognition of membership and 
pertinently asks ‘Who is to give or withhold such recognition?’  
 
8.4. The Official Ideology of the Turkish State 
In this section I aim to reveal research findings on the perceptions of interviewees with 
respect to the continued denial of the Armenian Genocide by the Turkish state. Although 
the Armenian Genocide is acknowledged as the first genocide of the twentieth century 
by many states and international bodies, ‘the denial of this part of the nation’s founding 
history has become a fundamental (if silent) part of Turkey’s national identity’ (Dixon, 
2010: 106). Turkey’s resistance to admit its responsibility for the massacres also reveals 
itself in the usage of terms such as the ‘Armenian issue/question/allegations’, ‘1915 
events’, ‘relocation’, ‘deportation’, ‘forced emigration’ and ‘ethnic conflict’ in the official 
narratives. Briefly stated, from the standpoint of the Turkish state, the ‘civil war’ 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Armenians caused many deaths on both sides and 
the ‘loyalty’ and the claims of the Armenian subjects at that period of time are open to 
discussion; thus, the 1915 events are not recognised as genocide in the eyes of the state 
as well as its institutions. This belief is also held by much of the Turkish public, which 
has been convinced by ‘decades of silence, limited access to historical material and more 
recently active propaganda campaigns’ (Cooper and Akçam, 2005: 84). As Turkish 
national identity played a pivotal role in the formation of the Turkish Republic rising 
from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, it is also the determining cause for the 
understanding of the Armenian Genocide as a taboo issue within Turkish society. More 
importantly, ‘the reason for the Turks’ deafening silence (at best) or categorical denial 
(at worst) of the Armenian Genocide is that Turkish national identity has made the 
subject utterly unapproachable’ (Akçam, 2004:59). Consequently, the questioning of this 
officially forbidden or silenced part of the national identity and history from the 
perspective of Armenians as citizens of the Turkish Republic may provide new insights 
into the debate on the ongoing implications of the official ideology.  
 
It is thus crucial to disclose how the descendants of the victims of the mass killings of 
Armenians comment on Turkey’s policy of denial with regard to collective violence and 
the way it reacts to officially enforce forgetting and/or silencing the past. By asking the 
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question, ‘As you might know the official narratives in Turkey still deny the Armenian 
genocide and regard it as an ‘ethnic conflict’ ‘deportation’ or ‘forced emigration’, what do 
you think about this claim as a citizen of Turkish Republic?’, I also intend to find out the 
current impression of the interviewees towards the Turkish state. Unlike other parts of 
the analysis of interviews, it is possible to talk about the integrity of the responses in 
terms of competing with the state ideology by using strong language. The central 
argument of the interviewees involves objection to state-led amnesia and its effects on 
their experiences. Moreover, the dominant feeling of mistrust among the interviewees 
towards the state along, with its policies in all other issues, shows the interdependency 
of their past and present encounters with the state.  
 
To begin with, the shifts in the self- perception of the Turkish state lead some 
interviewees to raise an issue of (dis) continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Turkish Republic. The ambivalent discourse employed by the state is criticised by a 41-
year-old female interviewee in this way:  
 
When it suits the state’s purpose it is said ‘the Ottoman Empire is our past’; but 
when it does not it is said ‘the events took place during the Ottoman time we have 
nothing to do with the events’ 
 
On the one hand, the will to embrace the Ottoman legacy recalls the narratives of the 
nationalists comprising the themes of the golden age, the superiority of the national 
culture, the periods of recess from which the nation is destined to ‘awaken’, and the 
national hero, pointing out the representation of the nation as a mystical, a temporal and 
even transcendental entity (Özkırımlı, 2010:50-52). With regard to the themes of 
antiquity and the golden age, the Turkish Republic puts forward the 600-year-old 
national and cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire and the sovereignty of the empire 
in three continents as evidence for its entrenched national power. By excluding the 
status of the Ottoman Empire during the recession period (17th and 18th centuries), and 
its situation as the ‘sick man of Europe’ in the early twentieth century, from its national 
narratives, the official ideology attempts to robustly acclaim the Ottoman heritage and 
nostalgia. On the other hand, the historical incidents that might cast doubt on the 
nation’s image and the state’s credibility result in the detachment of the Turkish state 
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from its predecessor. In particular, the evasion of responsibility for the Armenian 
Genocide epitomises the selective historical reading of the state. Avedian’s (2012: 797) 
scrutiny of the continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic 
reveals that the issue of state responsibility is the ‘fundamental obstacle for genocide 
recognition’. By applying some of the legal principles and theories of international law, 
he demonstrates ‘how the Turkish Republic not only failed to cease the wrongful acts 
committed by its predecessor but also continued and fulfilled the very same 
internationally wrongful acts, committed against the Armenians and other Christian 
subjects of the country’ (ibid: 805). 
 
The repercussions of the official ideology’s constant genocide rejection unveil both 
different and overlapping coping strategies and interpretations amongst the Armenian 
interviewees. The extract below belongs to a-28-year-old female interviewee and can be 
considered as an example of the accusatory approach: 
 
These discourses make me feel like a second-class citizen. The Turkish state still 
denies the genocide because to carry out massacre is something that might damage 
the Turkish pride. In Europe in the history textbooks Turks are called barbarian but 
Turks definitely deny it. But Turks are barbarian. You tried to destroy the problem 
instead of trying to solve it. I do not want to make you-we distinction in the language 
but it exists. If one person is killed due to his/her nationality or is denigrated 
because of his/her race and there is a hate crime, no one can talk about the war 
conditions or the mutual killings. To recognise the genocide or to reinstate the 
people’s rights will damage the perception of Turkish pride and the belief that Turks 
are excellent; thus no any Turk wants to admit it.  
 
This inference implies that the reason behind the denial policy is the deep-seated image 
of the Turkish nation and thus not only the state but also Turks disapprove of the 
presence of genocide. She also does not believe the official declarations that put forward 
the state of war as a reason to refute claims of genocide.  The contrasting aspect of her 
argument seems to be the simultaneous ascription of ‘barbarian’ feature to Turks and 
the stress on the stigmatisation of people due to their nationality or race. The aggressive 
tone correspondingly becomes explicit through the use of the personal pronoun ‘you’ in 
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the sentence to draw attention to the responsibility of Turks for the genocide and their 
negligence in seeking a legal remedy.  
 
In response to the continuing denial of the state, a group of interviewees asks similar 
questions which are shown in the passages as follows:   
 
Interviewee 13 (53 year old male): Non-Muslims constituted 21.5-22 % of the 
population according to census results in 1913. Now the sum of all the Greeks, 
Armenians and Assyrians in Turkey is not even 1% of the total population. Do I need 
to say anything else? What happened to these people?  Did they vanish into thin air?  
Interviewee 29 (25 year old male): The question of ‘Where are so many people 
now?’ has no answer. For instance my grandpa’s dad did his military service for 24 
months. When he returned to home he couldn’t find his wife; because she committed 
suicide not to be raped. Could you imagine this? A person who did military service 
for this country could not find his wife due to this reason. After all we continued to 
live in this country. The state needs to admit it and fight against genocide in other 
parts of the world.  
Interviewee 30 (62 year old female): Why are the relatives of our family elders 
not alive? Why do our family elders try to memorialise them and cry for them? What 
is the story that has been told us? It was not a science-fiction story. Why the 
experiences are still denied persistently?  
Interviewee 38 (34 year old female): If the genocide didn’t occur why are we only 
seventy thousand people now? Where are all the people that used to live in Anatolia 
now?  
 
The importance of these reactions lies in the fact that there is an incompatibility 
between the experiences and memories of the members of a particular community and 
the attitude of the state with regard to one and the same historical phenomenon. 
Although the historical interpretations may diverge, the ways in which the Turkish state 
decides to face the past come under criticism for its efforts to distort the historical facts. 
The interviewees’ responses highlight the fact that the official denialist stance not only 
seeks to conceal the tragedies of the genocide, but also restrains the persecuted people 
from receiving convincing answers to their basic questions. The rhetorical inquiry 
concerning the deceased Armenians inevitably evokes the idea that the decrease in 
number of the Armenian population was a consequence of the deliberate policies of the 
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state. Therefore, the minority status of the Armenian community in the present day is 
accentuated by the interviewees because this is regarded as the most visible evidence 
for the state-led destruction of a particular ethnic-religious social group.  
 
In order to ‘survive’ within the national borders and have a problem-free relationship 
with the Turkish state, it might be argued that the interviewees develop their own 
coping mechanisms. It is thus possible to make a distinction between reconciliatory and 
critical standpoints. One group of interviewees emphasise the sufferings of both Turkish 
and Armenian sides and the need to move beyond the past failures of the state. The 
motto of this understanding can be basically summarised as ‘what is in the past is in the 
past’. Since ‘there is nothing left to be fixed now’, a 33-year-old male interviewee claims, 
the important question is ‘Are we going to continue with the mentality based on the 
distinction between Turk and Armenian from now on?’ When I asked whether the 
recognition of the state is important to the interviewee, he said hopelessly that ‘I 
accepted the genocide refusal of the state. It is not unimportant but the state didn’t 
acknowledge genocide and it will never do’. This form of ‘despairing acceptance’ of state 
violence and denial also becomes evident in the remark of a 23-year-old female 
interviewee. She even agrees with the use of the term ‘so-called genocide’ in the official 
narratives, as long as the state is able to reassure the Armenian community about 
preventing prospective collective violence against them and thus ensuring the past 
events never occur again. Her account also seems to uncover a profound feeling of 
insecurity about the treatment by the Turkish state of its citizens, especially non-Turkish 
and non-Muslim ones.  
 
From another perspective, the interviewees who might be considered as more critical 
recurrently draw attention to the deceptive structure of the official ideology in Turkey. It 
is equally interesting that the word ‘lie’ in both noun and verb forms is employed twenty 
times by the interviewees to express their opposition to the state’s foremost line of 
reasoning about the massacre of Armenians. 
 
Interviewee 8 (39-year-old male): In the present day there are few states which 
are able to come to terms with their history. The official ideology always tells lies 
and there is such a truth here.  
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Interviewee 9 (36-year-old male): The official ideology in Turkey is completely 
based upon lies. It is an invalid contention in the outer world. It is just a discourse 
and standpoint which aims to align the public opinion in Turkey with a certain 
understanding of 1915 events. But it becomes less and less persuasive as the people 
know that ‘the state tells lies’ from other examples.  
Interviewee 25 (45-year-old male): First of all there is no such thing as official 
ideology but the state is miserable. I don’t believe in its ideology, its regime, its 
orders or anything that belongs to it. I am a citizen of the Turkish Republic but I am 
the man of this land not of the rulers.   
Interviewee 33 (27-year-old female): The official history is something that was 
fictionalised and fabricated depending on the demands of the state and presented to 
the citizens. The official ideology is a system and mentality that was built upon these 
elements.  
Interviewee 36 (44-year-old male): I am a person who believes that the state tells 
lies in every issue. The official ideology is altogether a fantasy. It is the act of telling 
lies to society in order to create a society. This is the same everywhere but in Turkey 
it is the attempt to create a Turk from Alevis or Kurds.  
 
Although it is unsurprising to see the judgmental comments above regarding the nation-
state’s official ideology, what makes the case of these Armenian interviewees peculiar is 
that they abstain from restricting the problematic mind-set of the official ideology to 
historical events or the issue of minority rights. Instead they point out the deep-rooted 
crisis of the understanding of citizenship in Turkey. In particular, during the creation of 
a Turkish nation-state ‘the conceptualization of citizenship’ synchronised with the 
formation of ‘a unique, unchangeable and historic Turkish identity’ that was enabled by 
a new monolithic culture disregarding ethnic and sub-cultural identities. Thus, the 
paradox of the official definition of Turkish identity and citizenship derives from the 
Turkish state’s continuing respect towards the common historical heritage shared with 
non-Turkish groups despite their rejection of Ottoman and Islamic heritage. Although 
the non-Muslim groups were considered as Turkish citizens as a continuation of their 
community status in the Ottoman Empire, there were debates about their citizenship 
status, particularly related to their equal treatment and assimilation (İçduygu et.al, 
1999: 195-96). The exclusionary outlook of the political elites towards non-Muslim 
communities, under the cover of protective citizenship rights, has also remained 
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throughout the succeeding governments. Since citizenship rights in Turkey are based on 
a ‘ruling class strategy’ whereby rights are given from above (Mann 1987 cited in Arat, 
2000:275), the interviewees’ highlighting the fabricated and deceptive nature of the 
official ideology also comes into prominence. The criticisms of the interviewees with 
respect to the genocide denial of the official ideology thus indicate two significant points. 
On the one hand, the Turkish state aims to dictate to its Muslim and Turkish citizens 
how they should perceive, remember and also legitimate the Armenian genocide. 
Through its official ideology and institutions, on the other hand, the state draws the line 
for the Armenian community as ‘tolerated citizens’ (non-Muslim and non-Turkish) in 
terms of what to tell and claim about the genocide and also ‘advises’ them to suppress 
their memories and experiences in order not to obfuscate the national narratives.  
 
8.5. Under the Rule of the AKP Government 
As this research concentrates on more recent shifts in the understanding of the 
‘Armenian issue’ and the status of Armenians with reference to the debates on 
nationalism, national identity and media representations, the developments under the 
rule of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government since 2002 have become 
relevant for a comprehensive analysis. The incidents selected for this research, namely 
the assassination of Hrant Dink, the murder of Sevag Balıkçı and the protest against the 
Khojaly Massacre, have taken place during the AKP government’s period in office. The 
government’s project of ‘democratic openings’ has also given a new impulse to the 
treatment of ethnic religious minority groups. Although these attempts mainly target the 
solution of the ‘Kurdish issue’, the government has taken steps to negotiate with Alevi 
and Armenian communities and other marginalised groups in order to rehabilitate their 
rights. However, the AKP government’s equal fulfilment of the recognition of religious 
freedoms and rights through the discourse of a conservative democracy in every social 
setting, especially in the case of religious minorities, is debateable. It is argued that the 
policies of AKP ‘to stimulate social sensitivities toward toleration and recognition of 
religious minorities and the protection of religious right were confined to the Sunni 
conservative and Islamist segments’ (Kaya, 2013:86). In order to understand the 
reverberations of the ambiguous approach of the AKP government to the position of the 
Armenians, in the course of interviews I asked the question, ‘How do you evaluate the 
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eleven years period under the government of Justice and Development Party regarding 
the position of Armenians in Turkey?’.   
 
First of all, it needs to be stressed that every single interviewee declares the political 
sympathy towards the AKP government among the Armenian community. Despite the 
different voting preferences uttered by some interviewees, they touch upon the 
increasing support for the AKP government by the majority of the Armenian population. 
31 out of 45 interviewees refer to the return of the seized properties of Armenian 
foundations and the official permissions for the restoration of Armenian churches as 
positive developments under the rule of AKP. Since the Armenian Genocide under the 
hegemony of the Ottoman Empire was a multifaceted process of destruction which 
embraced the mass executions of Armenian elites, expropriation of Armenian property 
and capital transfer to the state, deportations, forced assimilation through the 
conversion to Islam, the kidnapping of women and children, the construction of an 
artificially created famine region and the destruction of material culture such as 
churches and buildings (Üngör 2013), its lingering effects still haunt the lives of 
Armenians in Turkey. As the genocidal process for Armenians, including legal, economic 
and social difficulties, preceded another phase with the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic, the sanctions of the state aim for the Turkification in all spheres of life. From 
the beginning of the Republic, the policy of the Turkification of economic life confirmed 
that it is impossible for a non-Muslim to be accepted as a Turk. The main goal of the 
state was to reduce the influence of the non-Muslim minority population over the 
economy by following a nationalist economic policy and substituting them with Muslim 
Turks so as to create a national bourgeoisie. In addition, the desired consequence of 
economic Turkification was the decline in the numbers of non-Muslims as they were 
compelled to emigrate to other countries due to economic distress (Bayır, 2013:120-22). 
These historical developments, specifically the appropriation of Armenian properties 
and the legal regulations with the purpose of eliminating non-Muslim actors from the 
‘Turkish’ economy, thus revive the issue of the reinstatement of rights. Accordingly, the 
recent attempt of the AKP government to return the seized properties of Armenians 
might be considered as a significant legal and political rearrangement of minority rights.   
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The excerpts below illustrate how some interviewees mention the government’s steps to 
resolve the problem of confiscated possessions in the first place.  
 
Interviewee 1 (41 year old female): The most noticeable changes during the AKP 
period are the return of the seized properties of Armenian foundations and the 
official permissions to rent out these properties and make a profit from them. In fact 
these should have been done so far but this government made these developments 
willingly or reluctantly. On this subject I don’t feel distant from the government.  
Interviewee 11 (33 year old male): Under the rule of the AKP government there 
have been uplifting developments concerning our foundations’ properties. Because 
the state appropriated from us under the name of Wealth Tax and didn’t give back 
anything. After the long years of waiting this change has given the message that ‘you 
are not the other any longer; you also belong to here’. 
Interviewee 21 (59 year old male): The AKP government’s support, interest and 
participation in our schools, associations and cultural activities are actually 
extraordinary compared to the other governments. Many of our foundations have 
started to retake their properties and the government has begun to cover the cost of 
the Armenian textbooks in our schools.  
Interviewee 26 (55 year old female): We used to have many foundations and the 
state appropriated all their properties. But these foundations have recently 
repossessed almost all their properties thanks to the AKP government.  
Interviewee 37 (38 year old female): In the past we had to fulfil many procedures 
to make repair and maintenance of the churches. Now we can make them easily. 
There had been properties belonged to the foundations and they were not allowed 
to make use of these and such types of obstacles have been removed.  
 
Although the interviewees are aware of the historical delay in the political decision 
about the compensation of their assets, they appreciate the latest initiatives of the AKP 
government in comparison to the preceding governments. The probability of the 
government’s unwillingness to implement this policy is interestingly put into words by a 
41-year-old female interviewee in particular. She might read the electoral concerns and 
the impact of European Union criteria as the main motives of the AKP government to 
bring this issue to the agenda at this point in time. Yet another remarkable comment, 
voiced by a 33-year-old male interviewee, maintains that this economic amendment also 
paves the way for the disengagement of Armenians from minority status. The link 
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constructed between the sense of belonging and the prevention of the infringement of 
economic rights, also signifies how the enjoyment of fundamental rights and liberties 
might become a state of exception for the Armenian community in Turkey, as well as 
other minority groups. As noted by another interviewee (53 year old male), despite the 
relatively better rights and liberties ‘given’ by the AKP government for now, he has 
doubts whether these ‘privileges’ will be provided in the long term due to the aggressive 
policy of the government both in internal and external affairs. From a critical approach, 
few interviewees object to the assessment of the return of seized properties as a ‘favour’ 
or ‘privilege’ by other members of the Armenian community. It is chiefly alleged that 
Armenians had already been the owners of these properties and the current political 
strategy to remedy the illegal practices of the previous power elites should not be 
appreciated as this is considered as a natural extension of the ascribed status of 
Armenians. Moreover, a 53-year-old male respondent interprets this policy as one of the 
‘alleged’ developments under the AKP rule and poses the question ‘why does the 
government ask for the documents from the owners to prove their properties as if the 
appropriated chattels are outside the government’s knowledge?’ In fact the lack of legal 
papers and the complicated application process, he contends, might result in the 
rejection of the claims. In a similar vein, a younger interviewee (24-year-old male) 
criticises the challenging procedures for the validation of deeds and more specifically 
the enforcement of the statutory decree instead of a permanent law.  
 
In addition, the comprehension of some interviewees regarding the recovery of rights at 
the governmental level relies on the attitude of the AKP government towards other 
incidents between the years 2002-2013. In contrast to my presumptions, only 11 
interviewees evaluate the period under the AKP rule by taking into account the murders 
of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı and the participation of the statesmen in the protest 
against Khojaly Massacre. Although the commencement of major legal and political 
changes and democratic openings by the ruling party is admitted, a 33-year-old female 
interviewee spells out that ‘I do not forget that Hrant Dink was killed when AKP was in 
power’. Similarly, the comments below reveal how the interviewees reflect on the socio-
political context during the AKP years that laid the groundwork for these tragic events.  
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Interviewee 14 (24 year old male): While the government seems to make 
progress about our rights, on TV the Prime Minister says that, ‘They have said we 
are Jewish, Armenian and, excuse me saying this, but Rum (Greek)’. At the same time 
the government organised the Khojaly protest and released the murderer of Hrant 
publicly.  
Interviewee 15 (33 year old male): Due to the failure of the AKP government to 
solve the murder of Hrant Dink I don’t think anything positive about this 
government. If the government really seeks to do something for Armenians, then it 
would have solved the murder long time ago.  
Interviewee 17(29 year old male): The return of two or three ruined houses does 
not mean anything. What has changed in the social life of Armenians? Armenians are 
still being killed. The government doesn’t consider the killing of Armenians as 
harmful and punish the murderers. The murderer of Hrant Dink was put on trial in 
the juvenile’s court. The penalty for the murderer of Sevag will be probably between 
two to six years prison. Thus there is no punishment for killing an Armenian in 
Turkey. Nothing has changed in the period of AKP rule.  
Interviewee 30 (62 year old female): The government speaks softly but carries a 
big stick. Both Hrant and Sevag were killed during the AKP rule. Nothing has 
changed. It is same as a hundred years ago.  
Interviewee 34 (33 years old male): There might have been institutional 
developments concerning Armenians but both Hrant and Sevag were killed in the 
past ten years. We are talking about a government that kills its Armenian citizens.  
 
The common point mentioned above is the inconsistent approach between different 
administrative bodies of the government. In particular, the reservations concerning the 
operation of the justice system, as well as judicial independence, seem to lead the 
interviewees to find the acts of the AKP government insincere. As a result of the 
exclusionary tone in the speeches of Erdoğan, the lack of fair trials inside the Turkish 
criminal justice system and the involvement of the government and the governmental or 
regulatory bodies in violent attacks against Armenians, the policy concerning the seized 
properties loses its significance in the eyes of some interviewees. The opinion 
concerning the uniformity among successive governments in the history of the Turkish 
state in terms of neglecting the issue of discrimination and abetting crimes against 
Armenians, is also significant. It bears a resemblance to the discussion of the 
(dis)continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic and state 
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responsibility for the genocidal process. This is also implied by a 62-year-old female 
interviewee who argues that the status of Armenians in Turkey under the AKP 
government is not very distinctive from their status during the twentieth century vis-à-
vis being susceptible to state violence.  
 
8.6. Conclusion 
This chapter presented an exploration of the perceptions of forty-five Armenian 
interviewees with regard to their genocide stories, the notion of ‘Armenian issue’, the 
discourses of nationalism and national identity, the official ideology of the Turkish state 
and the developments during the AKP government. In line with previous chapters that 
dealt with the interviewees’ accounts concerning three particular incidents, in this 
chapter I intended to point out interconnected aspects of the consumption side of the 
Armenian question. The first part on the transmission of knowledge and experiences 
across the Armenian generations regarding genocidal process revealed distinct patterns 
of remembrance and forgetting. More notably the interviews uncovered the differences 
among Armenians in terms of their ability and inability to narrate their loss and trauma. 
The next part correspondingly disclosed strong reactions of a great majority of the 
interviewees towards the artificial distinction between the Armenian issue and the 
Armenian Genocide. This particular analysis also supported my argument that the 
genocide is not confined to past acts of state violence yet it is an ongoing process for 
some interviewees.  
 
As I consider the discourses of Turkish nationalism and national identity as integral 
facets of the genocidal process, in the third part I discovered that various forms of 
Turkish nationalism were also underlined by the respondents. This might be read as an 
important finding as it indicates that the shifting roles and discourses of Turkish 
nationalism are also recognised by some members of the Armenian community.  The 
following part additionally put forward the incompatibility between the official ideology 
of the state based on the denial of genocide and the interviewees’ experiences of state-
led violence. In the last part of the chapter, however, I found out that the developments 
during the AKP government such as the returns of the seized properties of Armenian 
foundations and the official permissions for the restoration of Armenian churches led 
several interviewees to support the ruling party. It was also interesting to observe how 
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some interviewees assessed the AKP government period without referring to the 
incidents namely the murders of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı and the protest against 
the Khojaly Massacre. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has explored how the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkey opens up a discursive 
space in which various forms of Turkish nationalism are constructed, reproduced 
and/or challenged and suggests multifaceted interpretations by particular members of 
the Armenian community. The problematic notion of the ‘Armenian question’ has itself 
been a political and linguistic tool for official genocide denial ever since the foundation 
of the Turkish Republic and has come to stand for the controversy between the denial 
and recognition of the Armenian Genocide at both national and international levels. 
However, by employing this term I have aimed to challenge the attempt to 
decontextualize the collective violence against Armenians and restrict it to the Ottoman 
Empire period, and have indicated how this issue goes far beyond the politics of 
genocide in today’s Turkey. The study was thus set up to point out the discursive 
encounters between Turkish nationalisms and the recent incidents discussed in the 
previous chapters as the continuation of the genocidal process and mentality in the 
designated national newspapers. In addition to the investigation of news discourse, I 
also delved into the wider reverberations of the ‘Armenian issue’ and the latest events 
for Armenians in Turkey. As the successors of the victims of the Armenian Genocide as a 
form of ‘foundational violence in the constitution of the Turkish republic’ (Göçek, 2015: 
19) and also as citizens of the Turkish state, the readings of Armenian interviewees 
additionally unfolded novel layers of debate on nationalism, collective memory, and 
experiences of suppression and discrimination.  
 
Accordingly, the research has sought to answer two main research questions. First, I 
demonstrated how news discourse in particular national newspapers, namely Hurriyet, 
Cumhuriyet and Zaman, constructs, reproduces and challenges Turkish nationalisms in 
their reporting of the murders of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balikci and the protest against 
the Khojaly Massacre. Second, I analysed the perceptions, experiences and reactions of 
forty-five members of the Armenian community with regard to the selected cases, 
historical occurrences and present socio-political milieu in Turkey. Thus, by combining 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews my goal was to provide 
a comprehensive examination of the specified ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ phases of 
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the ‘Armenian issue’ in Turkey. By doing that I also intended to move beyond the 
conventional discussion on the identification of 1915 events as genocide or as an ‘issue’ 
and the tendency of public opinion and legal arrangements to regard the official 
acknowledgment of past offences as an act that constituted ‘insulting Turkishness’.  
 
Instead, this research was concerned with the interplay between the discursive 
formation of Turkish nationalisms and the ‘Armenian question’. It also engaged with the 
continuing and shifting patterns of confrontation and denial of past and present 
experiences, both in the media representations and the interpretations of Armenians. In 
order to offer a detailed assessment of this research, in this chapter I firstly highlight the 
distinctive empirical findings and then concentrate on the theoretical implications of the 
study. Subsequently, I point out the main theoretical arguments in the light of the data 
analysis and trace the limitations of the study. Finally, the chapter ends with the final 
remarks and recommendations for further research on this topic.  
 
9.1. Empirical Findings  
In this section I briefly review the main findings illustrated in the data analysis chapters 
(Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight) and their contribution to the critical understanding 
of the Armenian issue in Turkey. As the first three data analysis chapters (Chapters Five, 
Six and Seven) respectively focused on the cases of the assassination of Hrant Dink, the 
murder of Sevag Balıkçı and the protest against the Khojaly Massacre, I integrated the 
analysis of the interviewees’ responses concerning these incidents into each chapter. 
Thus, the last data analysis chapter (Chapter Eight) was dedicated to a thorough 
scrutiny of other themes covered in the semi-structured interviews with Armenians.  
 
As has been previously stated, the key motive behind the selection of the cases was their 
capacity to exemplify the divergent forms of Turkish nationalism, the current status and 
experiences of Armenians as an ethnic-religious minority group, and both different and 
mutual insights concerning the ‘Armenian question’ in general terms. More precisely, 
the position of Dink as a public figure made his assassination a fundamental issue for 
this research, in particular for his reconciliatory efforts between the denialist ideology of 
the Turkish state and the Armenian Diaspora, as well as the Armenian community in 
Turkey, and with regard to the crucial roles played by various government agencies in 
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the crime, and the unanticipated large-scale protest after the murder, embracing the 
slogan ‘We are all Armenians’, as well as for the ongoing legal struggle for justice. 
Although Sevag Balıkçı was an everyday citizen doing his compulsory military service in 
the Turkish Armed Forces, his shooting on the 96th anniversary of the Armenian 
Genocide by a Turkish soldier raised questions about the mistreatment of non-Muslim 
and non-Turkish male citizens under the protection of the army, which is one of the 
constituent elements of Turkish state and nationalisms. Furthermore, the lack of legal 
standards for the penalisation of offensive conduct similar to the Dink case and the 
discussions about the civil martyrdom law after the murder led me to enquire into the 
news coverage of this murder. As a third case, the protest against the Khojaly Massacre 
in 2012 was an important indicator to observe how this crime against humanity was 
ideologically used to refute the occurrence of the Armenian Genocide by both state 
officials and some members of society, since the perpetrators of the massacre which 
took place in 1992 were Armenians. What makes this protest worth examining are the 
political and public attempts to compare the two human tragedies in order to put 
forward ‘unconvincing’ claims with respect to the Armenian Genocide, the 
reinforcement of anti-Armenian sentiments in Turkey, and the solidarity between 
Turkish and Azeri nationalisms against a mutual enemy.  
 
By taking into account these specific incidents I applied CDA to three chosen national 
newspapers which were assumed to have dissimilar ideological affiliations, publishing 
policies, journalistic ethics and relationships with the government. It should be first 
noted that it was hard to speak of significant differences among the newspapers under 
analysis as the discursive strategies were generally quite similar. In the case of Hrant 
Dink (Chapter Five), my research findings showed that Turkish national identity was 
characterised by a considerable degree of insecurity in the news reporting. The news 
portrayal of this assassination as a threatening move for national security also 
overlapped with the image construction of the Turkish state as an actual aggrieved party 
in the articles. It was equally interesting to observe that the killing was defined in 
nationalist terms, particularly through the word ‘traitor’ to label the offender. The death 
of a member of the ‘enemy-within’ community caused by a Turkish-Muslim citizen 
affected the narratives concerning fabricated enemies of the nation. In other words, this 
incident revived the national fear of being charged with the murder of another 
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Armenian and led the national newspapers to preoccupy themselves with both the self-
image and the international image of the Turkish nation and state. I thus argued that the 
construction and reproduction of Turkish nationalisms in the papers centre on the 
discursive strategies that forestall any argument and/or feeling that the assassination 
was the result of dominant nationalist sentiments in Turkey and the fault of state organs. 
The emphasis on the cooperation between the internal and external enemies plotting 
against Turkey through this murder to damage the international image of the state, and 
the representation of the arrest of the perpetrator by the police forces as a matter of 
national pride and exculpation in the news stories, evidenced this argument.   
 
Furthermore, my analysis of the newspapers’ depiction of Dink’s funeral and the mass 
protest against nationalist violence uncovered that the slogan, ‘We are all Armenians’ 
adopted also by Turkish protesters was decoded as a sign of national togetherness. 
Particularly, the use of the expression ‘entire Turkey’ in the headlines called attention to 
strident resistance to the recognition of any differences amongst Turks. Since the 
newspapers seemed to grasp the connotations of a slogan that questions the very 
foundation of Turkish nationalisms, the participation of individuals from different ethnic 
and religious backgrounds in the protest was delineated as a sign of national unity 
against external pressure for the acknowledgment of genocide. This also meant that the 
newspapers under review instrumentalised the assassination in terms of how it 
facilitates the Armenian cause, especially in the international arena. The accounts in the 
interviews correspondingly enabled me to claim that Dink’s killing allows the Armenian 
Genocide to be remembered, and is associated with the continuing genocidal mentality 
shown by the respondents.  The analysis highlighted the differences among the 
generations of the Armenian community in terms of their understanding of the 
assassination. The younger generation defined the loss of such an influential character 
as a ‘trauma’, whereas the older generation identified his death as ‘expected’ and ‘usual’. 
This implied the contention that generational identity was being formed around the 
murder of Dink. The opinions and feelings of the interviewees also pointed out how the 
personalisation and dramatization of this incident was able to pinpoint a key moment 
for the lives of Armenians. On the one hand, this assassination was epitomised as 
‘sacrifice’ for the visibility of an Armenian identity. On the other hand, the murders of 
other intellectuals and previous forms of state-led violence committed against different 
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ethnic-religious groups in Turkey was underscored to give an idea about the larger 
picture of the state and power relations. That is to say the peculiarity and ordinariness 
of this case referred both to an interruption and continuity in the treatment of the 
Turkish state against its citizens along with the position of the Armenian community in 
society.  
 
Secondly, my inquiry with regard to the killing of Sevag Balıkçı (Chapter Six) reached the 
interesting conclusion that news discourse in the newspapers particularised the 
incident but simultaneously downplayed its seriousness. I discovered interrelated 
discursive strategies that reflected the (re)production and preservation of Turkish 
nationalisms and nationhood in the print media in relation to the status of Armenians 
and the Armenian issue. The recurring emphasis on the ‘Armenian descent’ of the victim 
in the news stories attached importance to the ethnic, religious and linguistic differences 
rather than immediate causes, the timing of the murder and the intent of the 
perpetrator. Although an Armenian soldier was shot by a Turkish soldier on the 
Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day while serving in the Turkish army, interestingly 
the newspapers turned a blind eye to the contextual conditions and nationalist messages 
of this event. This might be inferred as a structured defence mechanism in the national 
media to detach the ‘Armenian question’ and its historical background from the current 
repercussions of Turkish nationalisms. In contrast to these discursively repressed 
themes, I found out that the narratives overstated the ‘problematical’ martyrdom status 
of the injured party and the martyr’s funeral at the Armenian Church. As the notion of 
martyrdom stands at the intersection point between Islam, nationalism and martial 
configurations in Turkey, the incompatibility of the ethnic-religious identity of Sevag 
Balıkçı with the understanding and rituals of martyrdom was implied and at the same 
time cast in ‘tolerable’ and consumable ways.  
 
Although the newspapers attempted to represent this incident as an ordinary criminal 
case and a human casualty among many in the Turkish army, they persistently employed 
national symbols and myths. From my point of view this was mainly due to the 
journalistic concern to convince the readers that an Armenian soldier deserved the 
status of martyrdom and that this murder had no organic link with anti-Armenian 
nationalist violence or with an enduring genocidal animosity. Thus, in the news 
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reporting, the Turkish flag as a ‘banal reminder of the nationhood’ (Billig, 1995: 41) and 
the conception of sacrifice for the nation as an honorary act were naturalised under the 
name of patriotism. However, some interviewees, especially young male interviewees, 
objected to the idea of sacrifice for the nation vis-à-vis the case of Sevag Balıkçı. A more 
remarkable finding was the description of the compulsory military service as another 
site to confront Turkish nationalisms for male Armenians. However, according to one 
group of interviewees, Sevag Balıkçı was one of the latest sufferers of deep-rooted 
violence in the army against soldiers, regardless of their ethnicity and religion. Yet a 
large number of respondents asserted that Armenian identity was an ‘adequate’ reason 
for this intentional assault. It was also shocking to realise how the historical continuity 
of the attacks in the military, along with the discriminatory frame of mind of the state, 
were voiced by some respondents to draw attention to the negligent attitude of the 
authorities towards this incident.  
 
Thirdly, the investigation of the protest against the Khojaly Massacre (Chapter Seven) in 
the designated newspapers indicated that overt support of and participation of the AKP 
government in an anti-Armenian demonstration was not problematized and/or 
criticised at all. This outcome might be considered as revealing for issues of self-
censorship and the autonomy of the national newspapers and the implementation of 
similar linguistic devices to get along with the government. Although this gathering went 
beyond its purpose, which was to commemorate the victims of the Khojaly Massacre, but 
which turned out to be an occasion to insult Armenians and reject the Armenian 
Genocide, the active sponsorship of the government was glossed over by the 
newspapers under review. Moreover, my findings have spotlighted how particular 
groups were categorised as ‘nationalist’ and particular forms of nationalisms were 
recognised as ‘normal’ in the news discourse.  This selective news reporting became 
evident when the term ‘ultranationalist’ was employed to underline its discrepancy from 
‘nationalist’ citizens and the understanding of nationalism. As Turkish and Azeri 
nationalisms as ‘our’ nationalisms in this case were depicted as essential components of 
patriotism, certain political groups were held responsible for ‘extreme’ and ‘intolerable’ 
manifestations of nationalism.  
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I also detected that the newspapers showed no awareness of the thoughts and/or 
reactions of the Armenian community in Turkey with respect to the protest. 
Additionally, they failed to notice the basic distinction between the Armenian 
community in Turkey as citizens of the Turkish Republic and Armenians in Armenia, and 
preferred to consider these groups equal in order to create a stereotyped representation 
of Armenians. I consequently argued that news portrayals of the protest mobilised 
prejudices against Armenians once again, but more importantly that this protest was 
deployed as a discursive tactic to make the readers discredit the genocidal claims of 
Armenians due to their own history of pogroms against Azeris. In a similar vein the 
interviews also revealed that the protest was perceived by Armenian interviewees as an 
ideological and psychological struggle to reinforce hatred towards their community 
despite the announced goal of the commemoration. Although some senior interviewees 
expressed their familiarity with anti-Armenian discourse and actions in Turkey’s 
republican history, the protest was set as an example for the effects of current political 
discourse and figures, particularly Erdoğan, on the stigmatisation of Armenians. It was 
yet more striking to hear the claims of some interviewees who defined the 
organisational form of the protest, the calls for the march, the posters on the billboards 
and the newspaper ads as ‘fascistic’ and ‘extreme nationalist’. They followed a 
comparable line of reasoning with the newspapers, that the distinction between 
‘reasonable’ and ‘extreme’ forms of nationalism was recognised. This has also 
demonstrated the extent of the internalisation of inferior status amongst Armenians in 
relation to the constant process of othering of Turkish nationalisms.  
 
In addition to conducting a CDA of particular cases along with the qualitative data 
provided by the interviews regarding these incidents, Chapter Eight critically dealt with 
questions of collective memory, the ‘Armenian issue’, nationalism and national identity, 
official ideology and the AKP government. By focusing on the transmission of knowledge 
and experiences across the generations concerning the traumatic genocidal process, I 
presented the patterns of remembrance and forgetting of the interviewees. This clearly 
showed the difference between those who were able to or chose to narrate personal 
stories of loss and trauma and those who kept quiet. On the one hand, the narratives 
marked by the remnants of genocide disclosed the means by which torture, deportation 
and slaughter became genocidal tools and the conversion to Islam was imposed. The 
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forms of remembrance and the confrontation with the past also called attention to the 
lives of Armenians permeated with sorrow and suffering in conjunction with a zone of 
contestation between the state and its citizens. On the other hand, the power of 
suppression and silencing was a noteworthy theme that the accounts of some 
interviewees termed ‘chosen amnesia’ (Buckley-Zistel 2006) and ‘forgetting as 
humiliated silence’ (Connerton 2008) and which served as coping strategies. Therefore, 
diverse memories and silences allowed me to indicate the linkage between the past and 
present as well as its meaning for Armenian interviewees.   
 
In connection with this historical linkage, this research sought to address how Armenian 
respondents define, challenge and reframe the ‘Armenian question’. My objective was to 
identify the alternative explanations of interviewees since this term is the basic tool of 
official ideology to overlook the existence of the Armenian Genocide and the unceasing 
problems of the Armenian community. An interesting finding was the redefinition of the 
Armenian issue as the Turkish issue by some interviewees, accompanied by a 
fundamental tendency to refuse to distinguish past from present. Moreover, some 
interviewees associated the issue with intra and interstate problems rather than the 
problems among the Turkish and Armenian nations. The interference of other states in 
the genocide recognition was also interpreted as the ‘politicisation’ of the Armenian 
question, as if it had not been politicised in both national and international domains. 
However, what this argument suggested was that the humane aspects of the 
catastrophic incident were to be removed and replaced by the political question of 
whether or not it was genocide.  
 
Since the debates on Turkish nationalisms and national identity reconfigured the 
understanding of the Armenian issue as well as the experiences of Armenian 
interviewees, this study also touched upon this subject matter. Drawing on the 
responses with regard to the prevalent discourse of nationalism and national identity, I 
ascertained four main lines of argument. These were: the role of Islam within Turkish 
nationalisms; the comparative analysis of Kurdish community and its relationship to the 
forms of nationalism; the issue of state-sponsored nationalism and the ideologies of the 
political parties; and the positioning of Armenian identity with regard to Turkish 
national identity. It might be further claimed that the variety of opinions also 
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substantiated the fluid constitution of Turkish nationalisms instead of fixed 
arrangements according to Armenian interviewees. Besides the stress on Islam and the 
Kurdish community, the positioning of Armenians was crucial to see competing themes 
within debates on nationalism.   
 
The views about the official ideology of the state predictably encompassed criticisms 
and the focal point of the criticisms was the state-led amnesia and its outcomes for the 
experiences of Armenians and the rest of the society. From my perspective the most 
striking finding was the tendency of some interviewees to elaborate the problematic 
sides of the official ideology and emphasise the innate crisis of understanding amongst 
the citizenship in Turkey. Yet the political support towards the AKP government among 
the Armenian community contradicted my presuppositions. As the murders of Hrant 
Dink and Sevag Balikci and the contribution of the government to the protest against the 
Khojaly Massacre took place under the rule of AKP government, I had expected more 
critical answers. However, the returns of the seized properties of Armenian foundations 
and the official permissions for the restoration of Armenian churches were put forward 
as positive and promising developments by a large number of interviewees. The 
disapproving comments mentioned the operation of the justice system as well as judicial 
independence, and the lawsuits of the cases of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı were cited 
to draw attention the insincerity of the AKP government.  
 
9.2. Theoretical Implications 
In line with the research questions, the theoretical framework (Chapter Three) of this 
research was predicated on three fields of scholarly debates. Firstly, I critically reflected 
upon the literature on nationalism with a specific focus on the conventional discussions 
on nationalism and national identity, the discursive and contested aspects of nationalism 
and the forms of Turkish nationalisms and their ‘others’. Since the classic debate 
between the modernists (Gellner 1964), the primordialists and the ethno-symbolists 
(Smith 1986) shapes the theories of nationalism and national identity (cited in 
Sutherland, 2005:185-6), some of their arguments were essential to understanding 
succeeding research on nationalism and Turkish nationalisms in particular. My findings 
also demonstrated how existing theories of ‘nationalism from above’ (Breuilly 1993; 
Keyder 1997; Synder 2000) and ‘nationalism from below’ (Guibernau 1996; Smith 1998; 
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Hroch 2000; Horowitz 2004) explained different aspects of Turkish nationalism in 
relation to the Armenian issue. For instance, the state’s assimilationist policies directed 
against ethnic and religious minorities, which were explicated in Chapter Two, and the 
ways of challenging the dominant composition of nationalism imposed by the state, 
which were addressed in Chapter Eight, exemplified the blurred distinction between 
these two standpoints. Furthermore, I positioned my research within the studies on 
discursive and contested aspects and the quotidian construction and reproduction of 
nationalisms (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1992, 2000; Calhoun 1993, 1997; Puri 2004; 
Özkırımlı 2010) and attempted to indicate how Turkish nationalism as ‘a series of 
discourses with a vast lexis’ (Bora, 2011:62) positions itself with regard to Armenians in 
Turkey. More importantly, the research modestly contributed to the understanding of 
discursive, representational and exclusionary phases of Turkish nationalism by taking 
into account the ‘Armenian question’. 
 
Correspondingly, I delved into the topic of news discourse as one of the major 
institutions of the construction and reproduction of Turkish nationalisms. By taking 
Billig’s (1995) seminal work as a starting point for the discussion on the interplay 
between nationalism and media representations, I endeavoured to suggest how the 
flagging of Turkish nationalisms became evident in the media representations of 
Armenians. Although Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) and Köse and Yılmaz (2012) 
replicated Billig’s study for the Turkish context and pointed out how the press generates 
nationalism in an ordinary way, I intentionally picked out extraordinary periods to 
specifically observe the ways in which the ‘flagging of the Turkish nation and 
nationalisms’ came to light in the images of the Armenian issue and Armenians.  When 
considered from this point of view the portrayals of minority groups in the national 
newspapers became significant for the construction and reproduction of a national 
discursive sphere to promote a certain sense of national belonging or exclusion. 
Following Mahtani’s (2001) critique of binary conceptual frameworks based on the 
under-representation or mis-representation of the minorities in the media, this research 
also attempted to understand why particular images of the Armenian issue and 
Armenians were ‘tolerated’ and produced at all. More notably, it sought to explore the 
involvement of the discursive formation of Turkish nationalisms in the dissemination of 
anti-Armenian sentiments. Finally, this research took a critical approach towards media-
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centred assumptions that fail to mention ‘subtleties of media meanings, the polysemy of 
media texts’ (Jewkes, 2004:11) and tend to see the audience as ‘empty vessels’ that 
impulsively absorb media messages (Madianou 2005). Thus, the application of CDA to 
investigate the news discourse of particular incidents in the designated national 
newspapers and the semi-structured interviews with Armenians allowed me to 
transcend the limitations of media-centred explanations.  
 
Moreover, the importance of the temporal and discursive dimensions of the Armenian 
Genocide for the construction and reproduction of Turkish nationalisms and Turkish 
national identity led this research to centre on the subject of memory. From my point of 
view it was crucial to scrutinise the efforts of the official ideology and historiography to 
fabricate past, present and future and to silence, disregard and/or distort memories of 
the victims and witnesses. In this respect, the examination of news discourse revealed 
how selective forgetting and remembrance of the past operated in agreement with 
imposed representations of Armenians despite the contemporary nature of the events. 
The choice of the Armenian interviewees to narrate or repress genocidal memory and 
their readings of current and prospective encounters with diverse forms of Turkish 
nationalism also substantiated the relevance of this theoretical inquiry.  
 
9.3. Discussion  
In this section I intend to briefly discuss how emerging themes from the data from the 
Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight resonate with some of the theoretical arguments 
mentioned in this research. According to the findings of CDA of the first substantive 
chapter (Chapter Five) on the case of the assassination of Hrant Dink the issue of 
national insecurity in the news media substantiates the idea of the Turkish nation-state 
as a ‘nationalizing state’ (Brubaker 1996). When the role of the national newspapers in 
‘the communicative space of the nation-state’ (Schlesinger 1991b) is taken into account 
news stories about the assassination seem to fulfil the need of ‘nationalizing’ the Turkish 
state by depicting it as being under persistent internal and external threats. This is 
mainly related to the unfinished and imperfect condition of Turkish national identity 
which requires continuous self-referential discourses on a daily basis in order to justify 
and normalise its existence and also oppressive treatment of non-Turkish and non-
Muslim groups. It might be further argued that the examination of media portrayals of 
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this incident reveals the symbolic power of ‘the dominant representations of 
nationhood’ which illustrates ‘the nation as the natural political and cultural unit’ and 
‘requires the denial of difference within the nation’ (Brookes, 1999: 248; emphasis in 
original). However the reflections of the interviewees on the assassination of Hrant Dink 
challenge the main message conveyed in news discourse which read as follows: ‘…the 
nation as a mystical, a-temporal, and even transcendental entity whose survival is more 
important than the survival of its individual members at any given time’ (Özkırımlı, 
2010:52). Despite the differences among older and younger generations in terms of their 
insights concerning this loss, it is still significant to observe a common deep-seated 
sentiment of insecurity to the state and ingrained apprehension of state-sponsored 
discrimination and violence.  
 
The data analysis elaborated in the subsequent chapter on the murder of Sevag Balıkçı 
also unveils the mismatch between ‘encoding’ and ‘decoding’ moments (Hall 1973) of 
the news media and Armenian addressees. On the one hand newspapers under review 
attempted to describe this case as an ordinary criminal case and employed particular 
discursive strategies in order to construct and reproduce the hegemonic language and 
the dominant representation of events (Erjavec 2001). On the other hand some 
Armenian respondents mainly concentrated on the contextual factors such as the timing 
of the murder, the Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, and the larger socio-political 
setting that rationalises anti-Armenian attacks throughout the history of the Turkish 
Republic. In addition to the discussions centred on the interplay between nationalism 
and media representations and the implicit and explicit ways of flagging the nation in 
newspaper texts (Billig 1995), the gap between the production and consumption sides 
of this case is also related to the problem of freedom of press in Turkey. The stress on 
the issues of ethnic and religious identity of the victim, the martyrdom status of the 
deceased and sacrifice for the nation rather than the timing of the murder, the motives 
of the perpetrator, and the political and social implications of this attack for the 
Armenian community might be read as a manifestation of the self-censorship of media 
regarding the taboo topics. One of the main reasons behind this self-control mechanism 
is to be compatible with the official stance of the Turkish state on controversial subjects 
such as the ‘Armenian question’. From this point of view Armenian interviewees as a 
part of news audience do not simply question the reliability and objectivity of news 
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reporting practices; but their awareness of their prejudiced or discursively repressed 
media representations plays a part in the construction of the Armenian identity.  
 
In the third substantive chapter on the protest against the Khojaly Massacre my CDA 
correspondingly discovered that the status of freedom of expression is still debatable in 
the news media since meeting the ideological demands of the government remains as 
the main concern. Newspapers under review employed two discursive mechanisms with 
regard to the portrayals of the protest and the Armenian community. First they relied on 
the idea that those who exercise authority in political, social and economic or social 
institutions may speak authoritatively about issues and events (Ungerleider, 1991: 159).  
In the present case the declarations of the political elite concerning the Khojaly 
Massacre were allocated space in the news stories and they were presented as the 
ultimate comments on this human tragedy. Second the categories of heroes, villains, and 
victims are generated in the narrative structure of the news and the issues are framed as 
conflicts between these figures (ibid: 160). From this aspect a very rough dichotomy 
between Azeris as victims and Armenians as perpetrators was constructed and 
reproduced in the news stories in order to impose the idea of the Armenian community 
as the actual guilty part in the discussion over the Armenian genocide.  Although this 
protest was read by the majority of the interviewees as an episode of ongoing anti-
Armenian accounts in the public space, interestingly this form of hostility was taken for 
granted by some senior respondents similar to two other cases.  
 
The last empirical chapter accordingly offers insights into particular contentions which 
were elucidated in the theory chapter. To begin with transmission forms of genocidal 
information and experiences across the generations of the Armenian community and 
their (in) ability of self-expression underline how memory acts ‘as a counter-hegemonic 
site of resistance, a space of political opposition’ (Bell, 2013: 66). This is mainly because 
those who were able to speak up about different modes of violence confronted with 
official ideology of the state as a pivotal ‘memory maker’ (Kansteiner 2002) and 
discursive sphere created in national newspapers as institutions of myth-makers. At this 
point however the capability of the Armenian community to influence the national 
memory is dependent on their means to voice their ideas and the compatibility of their 
vision with social and political objectives (Kansteiner, 2002: 187). As I intended to 
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demonstrate in the next section on the antagonism between the ‘Armenian issue’ and 
the ‘Armenian Genocide’ the access to political power also determines the prioritisation 
of myths over memories as well as the legitimacy of specific memories.  While the 
thoughts of a group of interviewees were in conflict with the definition of the ‘Armenian 
issue’ by ‘a nationalist governing mythology’ which enforces a ‘definite meaning on the 
past, on the nation and its history’ (Bell, 2003:74); another group of interviewees 
generated their own ‘subaltern myths’ (ibid) which contested the governing myth. 
Therefore the Armenian question might be described as a discursive space in where 
different forms of nationalist governing mythologies are created and perpetuated and at 
the same time in where patterns of remembrance and forgetting as coping strategies 
cohabit and challenge these mythologies.  
 
Similar to diverse types of nationalist mythologies and policies identified by the 
interviewees, their comments on the debates on Turkish nationalisms and national 
identity and official ideology of the state, as aforementioned in Chapter Eight, were 
multi-layered. Yet there are two crucial arguments that come out of forty-five 
interviews. Firstly continuous process of Turkish nation-state formation relied on ‘state-
led nationalism’ (Tilly 1994:133) or ‘state-building nationalism’ (Hechter et.al, 2006: 89) 
still affects the treatment and representations of the Armenian community. In particular 
official historiography with respect to the past and present state-led violence against 
Armenians is predicated on and justified by the issues of national unity and security, the 
importance of ethnic and religious homogenisation, and the ideas of fabricated internal 
and external enemies. Secondly, despite the understanding of citizenship in Turkey as 
‘an uneasy marriage between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity and 
belonging’ (İnce, 2012:24), actual state practices indicate ‘an ethnic nationalist view’ 
(Aslan, 2007: 249). Although some legal amendments made during the AKP government 
were put into words by a group of interviewees, ‘the paradoxical nature of Turkish 
nationalism’ (Kadıoğlu, 2011:45) uninterruptedly impinge on the lives and experiences 
of the Armenian community.  
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9.4. The Research Limitations 
As has been previously elucidated, the study draws on data from critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews. Chapter Four principally concentrated 
on the methodological foundation of the research and the following four chapters, 
Chapters Five through Chapter Eight, offered a critical examination of data obtained 
from specific qualitative research methods. Certainly, the research encountered a 
number of limitations during the stages of data collection and analysis. In this section I 
sketch out an overview of the shortcomings of this research.  
 
First of all, the issue of translation posed one of the core challenges for a CDA of the 
news stories written in Turkish and the analysis of the interviews conducted in Turkish. 
Since the interrelationship between language, meaning and discourse accompanied by 
power relations lies at the core of CDA, my translation efforts from Turkish to English 
played a pivotal role in content integrity and semantic loss and shifts. I preferred to 
avoid the use of third parties for translation as my ‘own’ words and reading as a 
researcher was vital in the production and representation of meanings. According to 
Temple and Young (2004: 168)  
The researcher/translator role offers the researcher significant opportunities for 
close attention to cross cultural meanings and interpretations and potentially brings 
the researcher up close to the problems of meaning equivalence within the research 
process. … This researcher/translator role is inextricably bound also to the socio-
cultural positioning of the researcher, a positioning, whether intended or ascribed, 
that will also give a meaning to the dual translator/researcher role. 
 
Rather than depending on a translator I decided to be actively involved in the 
translation of news reporting, as well as in the interviews with Armenians. The texts 
were translated into English after I had agreed on the parts of the stories and 
interviewees’ accounts which needed to be included in the study.  This helped me to 
save time and reach a systematic picture of what was relevant for the research 
questions. Regarding the validity of my qualitative research I also adhered to Van Nes 
et.al (2010: 314)’s proposition that ‘the findings should be communicated in such a way 
that the reader of the publication understands the meaning as it was expressed in the 
findings, originating from data in the source language’. Although there was no language 
difference during the data gathering process, I paid particular attention in the course of 
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data analysis to the preservation of the originality of narratives to prevent the loss of 
meaning.  
 
In addition to my socio-cultural positioning that was influential on the dual 
translator/researcher role as stated by Temple and Young (2004), my research 
priorities and political standpoint with respect to the ‘Armenian question’ were decisive 
in the reflexive interpretations of the news stories and the responses of the 
interviewees. The decision of what to include and leave out was thus contingent upon 
my subjective filters as a researcher. This might be thought of as an indispensable aspect 
of a qualitative research, but I intended to achieve a degree of objectivity and minimise 
the factor of bias as far as possible in order to ensure reliability in this study.  My non-
Armenian identity also inevitably shaped the ways in which I as an ‘outsider’ to the 
Armenian community gave meaning to the perceptions and experiences of Armenian 
interviewees. In a similar vein, my assessment of the particular incidents that directly 
impinged on the lives of Armenians might lack a level of sensitivity and empathy and I 
am aware of the fact that this situation could have been different if this research was 
carried out by an Armenian scholar.  
 
9.5. Concluding Remarks 
The main contention of the research in very general terms was to highlight that the 
‘Armenian question’ includes, but is not limited to, the official recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide, the compensation claims of Armenians and the international 
appeals of the Armenian Diaspora for the acknowledgment of the Turkish state’s 
responsibility.  I argued that the ‘Armenian question’ at the same time introduces the 
issue of diverse forms of Turkish nationalism, a discriminatory and oppressive state 
tradition against the Armenian community, the deep-seated problems of minority rights, 
as well as the freedom and diversity of the press in Turkey. However, it should be 
underlined that the instances of unequal treatment and representations which were 
expounded throughout the thesis also embrace other ethnic and religious minority 
groups in Turkey along with other ‘non-ideal citizens’ identified by the state and the 
current AKP government. By recalling Tolstoy’s (1878) well-known first sentence in his 
novel Anna Karenina, ‘Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in 
its own way’, I consider that the experiences of minority and disadvantaged groups 
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resemble one another in Turkey and also in other parts of the world, but their sufferings 
have their own ‘stories’. My personal eagerness to learn more about the unique ‘story’ of 
Armenians was the starting point for this academic research.  
 
At this point the study not only contributes to the growing body of knowledge about the 
perceptions and experiences of Armenians in Turkey who are described as ‘the remains 
of the sword’, but also provides insights into various forms of nationalism, collective 
memory, and news discourse as other fields of study.  The research is also one of the 
first sociological explorations that employed critical discourse analysis and semi-
structured interviews as data collection methods to unmask different underlying forces 
of the ‘Armenian issue’ in Turkey. Furthermore, the findings of the research might be 
regarded as the parts of a humble quest for a confrontation and reconciliation with the 
past; and they also intend to take the studies discussed in the previous chapters further 
and to extend the understanding of the ‘Armenian issue’ and its relation to Turkish 
nationalisms. 
 
The discoveries of the research also signal the need for further research on three 
particular topics. Although the power of silencing and resignation was a salient feature 
of a number of interviews, the tendency among some Armenian interviewees to 
challenge Turkish nationalisms seemed to result in the promotion of Armenian 
nationalism. Therefore, the implications of Armenian nationalism as minority 
nationalism with the purpose of challenging Turkish nationalisms and its similar and/or 
different mind-set might be one of the areas of study. Secondly, the opinions of the 
interviewees with regard to the ‘Kurdish issue’ and their relationship with the Turkish 
state and nationalisms and the comparisons made between the Armenian and Kurdish 
issues might provide a fertile ground for additional research. Finally, given the 
increasing role of social media to mould public opinion in Turkey, the question of how 
the ‘Armenian issue’ and Armenians are pictured in different social media channels 
might be a point of departure for another study.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A  
Coding Scheme for the News Media 
 
Text Structure Discursive Strategies  
Name of the Case Tone/Style/Attitude 
Name of the Newspaper Lexical Choices 
Date of the Newspaper Direct Quotations 
Page Number Nominalisation  
Prominence of Article Position Active and Passive Forms 
Headline  Emerging Themes 
Accompanied by photograph(s) Absent Themes 
 
A Sample of a News Story Analysis 
Text Structure 
The Case: Hrant Dink  
Name of the Newspaper:  Hürriyet  
Date of the Newspaper:  20th January 2007 
Page Number: 1 
Prominence of Article Position: Front Page, Capital Letters in Bold  
Headline: HRANT DINK WAS KILLED- THE ASSASSIN IS TRAITOR  
Accompanied by photograph(s): Yes- The photos of Hrant Dink, his dead body and his 
friends on the street, camera image of the perpetrator   
 
Discursive Strategies 
Tone/Style/Attitude: Labelling/ Accusatory 
Lexical Choices: Was Killed/Traitor 
Direct Quotations: Excerpts from the interview with Hrant Dink before his 
assassination, the Governor’s press release and Prime Minister’s condolences to the 
Armenian Patriarch 
Nominalisation: Subtitles- ‘In the Heart of Istanbul’ ‘Timid like a Pigeon’ 
233 
 
Active and Passive Forms: Both active and passive grammatical features   
Emerging Themes: National Security and Unity/ Democracy under Threat/ the 
Turkish state as an Aggrieved Party/ An Anonymous Enemy Figure  
Absent Themes: Contextual Factors/ the Reasons behind the Assassination/ the 
Current Status of Armenians in Turkey 
 
Appendix B 
An Overview of Interview Data Analysis  
The Issue Emerging Themes Decisive Factor (if 
any) 
 
 
 
 
 
The Assassination of 
Hrant Dink 
• Pioneer 
• Instil confidence in Armenians 
• Self-criticisms: the responsibility 
of the Armenian community 
• Routine hostility vs. Extraordinary 
incident 
• The political structuring & state-
sponsored violence 
• Sufferings of other ethnic groups 
• The visibility of Armenian identity 
 
Differences between 
older and younger 
generations: 
Asymmetric 
experiences of violence 
& the patterns of 
remembrance and 
forgetting 
 
 
 
 
The Murder of Sevag 
Balıkçı  
• Reactions to the compulsory 
military service 
• The timing of the murder 
• Historical continuity of the attacks 
vs. an isolated incident 
• Unreliability on the lawsuits 
against the perpetrators 
• The effects of national education 
• The exposure of discrimination/ 
humiliation/intimidation during 
the military service 
 
 
 
The effect of gender: 
differences between 
female and male 
interviewees 
 
Particular reactions of 
young male 
respondents 
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The Protest against 
the Khojaly Massacre 
• Familiarity with anti-Armenian 
discourse and actions 
• The transition from ‘the loyal 
community’ to ‘the community of 
traitors’ 
• Normalisation of racism against 
Armenians  
• Biased attitudes of political figures 
and the government 
• An ideological and psychological 
struggle 
• Reasonable vs. extreme forms of 
nationalism 
 
 
 
 
Age-based differences 
 
 
 
 
Genocidal Memories 
• The lack of a thorough account of 
ancestors’ experiences 
• The counter arguments against the 
official history 
• The transmission of genocidal 
memories 
• The silence of a group 
interviewees 
• Coping strategies: Chosen amnesia 
& forgetting as humiliated silence 
 
 
 
The effect of the flow of 
information among 
predecessors and 
contemporaries  
 
 
 
 
 
The Armenian Issue 
• The negative meaning ascribed to 
the state of being an Armenian  
• The focus on ‘the Turkish issue’ 
• The perception of time as a 
determining factor 
• The wider temporality of 1915 
events 
• Islamised Armenians and 
Armenians who ‘stayed behind’ 
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• The involvement of the 
government policies of other 
states 
 
 
 
 
 
Nationalism and 
National Identity 
• The role of Islam within the forms 
of Turkish nationalism 
• The comparative analysis of the 
Kurdish and Armenian 
communities 
• The issue of state-sponsored 
nationalism and the ideologies of 
the political parties 
• The positioning of the Armenian 
identity 
 
 
 
 
Official Ideology of the 
Turkish State 
 
 
• State-led amnesia and its effects 
• The emphasis on the sufferings of 
both Turkish and Armenian sides 
• The selective historical reading of 
the state 
• Deep-rooted crisis of the 
understanding of citizenship 
 
 
 
Distinction between 
reconciliatory and 
critical standpoints 
 
 
 
 
The AKP Government 
Period 
 
 
 
 
 
• The increasing support for the AKP 
government 
• The return of the seized properties 
• The official permissions for the 
restoration of Armenian churches 
• The murders of Hrant Dink and 
Sevag Balıkçı  
• The concerns about judicial 
independence  
 
 
 
 
Differences based on 
political affiliations 
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